INSIDE THE BILDERBERG GROUP

AN EXCLUSIVE REPORT PREPARED BY LIBERTY LOBBY AND THE SPOTLIGHT

A REVEALING GLIMPSE INTO THE SHADOWY WORLD OF THE GLOBAL ELITE

Soestdijk Palace, December 1956

Dear Mrs. Steenbergen,

I have the honour to invite you to the next Bilderberg Conference which will take place on the 15th, 16th and 17th February 1957 at St. Simon's Island, Georgia, in the United States of America.

The object of this conference will be to study common and divergent elements in the policies of the Western World.

[Signature]

Prince of the Netherlands

R.S.V.P.: Dr. J. H. Retinger

27, The Vale, LONDON S. W. 3

Shown above is the actual invitation from Bilderberg founder, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, asking the recipient to participate in the 1957 Bilderberg Group conference at St. Simon's Island off the coast of Georgia. (Inside this special report is the actual Bilderberg members-only report of that conference along with other revealing documents from other Bilderberg meetings during the last four decades.)

THIS REPORT INCORPORATES EXACT PHOTOGRAPHIC REPRODUCTIONS OF ‘CONFIDENTIAL’ BILDERBERG DOCUMENTS TAKEN FROM THE PRIVATE FILES OF A LONG-TIME BILDERBERG MEMBER.
WHAT'S A BILDERBERGER—AND WHY DOES IT MATTER WHAT THEY DO?
A Brief Introduction to this Special Assembly of Actual Bilderberg Documents ...

The wide-ranging and heavy hand of Rockefeller family financial clout is evident behind the appointees named to high office by President Bill Clinton. However, Clinton is not the only president of recent memory whose appointees have moved in the Rockefeller family sphere of influence. Virtually every president in this century has had his share of Rockefeller-influenced appointees within powerful policy making positions. Many of these appointees have been affiliated with three distinct Rockefeller-created and Rockefeller-financed international policy power blocs which are often confused by their critics: the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, and the Bilderberg Group. (Clinton is a member of all three.) A reason for the confusion about the groups is that, aside from the fact that each is controlled—fully or in part—by the Rockefeller empire, the three groups are very similar in content and have a largely overlapping membership, usually working in direct concert toward the same goals. The membership in each of these groups is always composed of members of the Rockefeller family, their paid employees and consultants, allied international financiers and industrials, academics from the major universities and tax free foundations, high-ranking union leaders, key media personalities and controllers, and selected political figures. However, each of the three—the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission and the Bilderberg Group—is very different. Here is a brief summary of each of the groups in question:

THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. Based in New York and comprised solely of U.S. citizens. Publishes the quarterly journal Foreign Affairs and conducts regular meetings and seminars. Key meetings are strictly confidential and off the record. Created in 1921 with Rockefeller funding and emerged as the American branch of the British Royal Institute on International Affairs (RIIA), succeeding an earlier, less organized entity already established in that role. The RIIA was the brainchild of English financier Cecil Rhodes (founder of the Rhodes scholarship) and devoted to the concept of reuniting the United States with the British Empire. David Rockefeller himself served as a longtime chairman of the CFR and remains its virtual master.

THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION. Organized exclusively by David Rockefeller in 1973. Holds an official regular annual conclave closed to the independent press, but conducts seminars and other gatherings that are less exclusive. Membership is limited to elites from the United States and Canada, Western Europe and Japan, several hundred in number. Issues periodic reports known as the “Triangle Papers” and press releases and published a journal called Triialogue (now defunct). David Rockefeller has continuously served, since its inception, as "North American chairman" but is acknowledged as its primary mover.

THE BILDERBERG GROUP. Takes its name from the hotel in Holland where the group met in 1954, during the earliest period of its inception. Meets regularly (presumably on a once-a-year basis) at various locations around the world, always in extreme secrecy, often at resorts controlled by either the Rockefeller or Rothschild families. The Rothschild family is the leading European force within the Bilderberg Group, sharing its power with the American-based Rockefeller empire. Has a revolving membership of several hundred participants composed of elites from the United States and Western Europe, primarily—almost exclusively—from the NATO countries. (Representatives from the former Soviet Union and East Bloc countries have attended recent gatherings, however.) Maintains an extremely low profile seldom, if ever, publishes reports or studies (for the public, at least) under its own official aegis. Bilderberg participants denied the group’s very existence for decades until forced into the open by the glare of media publicity, generated largely by LIBERTY LOBBY’s weekly newspaper, The SPOTLIGHT, and its newsletter-format predecessors, "Liberty Letter" and "Liberty Lowdown" (the latter now defunct). Only mentioned in passing—if at all—in the major media.

The Bilderberg Group, among the three, is by far the most powerful and influential. It might be said that when a politician or media personality or some other influential figure is invited to a Bilderberger conclave that he or she has truly “made it.” The documents that appear within the pages of this special report are actual, exact photoreproductions of a variety of private and highly confidential “members only” Bilderberg files (including the personal files of a long-time high-level Bilderberg member). The documents appear exactly as they came into the possession of LIBERTY LOBBY and The SPOTLIGHT. Any handwriting or other alterations that appear on the pages are from the original document(s). Absolutely nothing has been altered.

These are only a handful of perhaps several thousand photoreproductions of original Bilderberg materials that are now in the possession of LIBERTY LOBBY—much to the dismay of the Bilderbergers. The documents reproduced here provide a unique insight into the backstage maneuvering and high-level intrigue of the Bilderberg Group members. Accompanying the documents are clearly noted annotations by LIBERTY LOBBY explaining the nature of the document and pointing out significant items relating to the document. The materials selected are designed to demonstrate to the reader several things: a) that the Bilderberg Group does indeed exist and meet annually and does so in an organized fashion; its gatherings are neither “informal” nor are they “casual” as the Bilderbergers would suggest to the public; b) that Bilderberg is attended by a veritable international elite whose impact on policy making in their home countries is indisputable and that the conferences do indeed have an impact on such policy making; c) that the group does attempt to maintain a low profile and keep its deliberations under wraps; d) that major issues of world importance are discussed at these conferences and policies affecting those issues are indeed adopted through the aegis of the Bilderberg conferences.

This report is, beyond a doubt, the most detailed assembly of in-house Bilderberg documents ever issued to the world public, illustrating clearly, that the course of world events is very much a part of the Bilderberg agenda, whether the participants admit it or not. LIBERTY LOBBY and The SPOTLIGHT remain committed to reporting continually on the activities of this shadowy elite power bloc as we have done in-depth for now some thirty years. But where is the rest of the media?

On a shoestring budget, long-time SPOTLIGHT correspondent Jim Tucker has followed the Bilderbergers around the world for over a decade himself. As Tucker puts it: “If a group of the world’s most popular TV personalities or football players met together for a secret meeting at an exclusive resort once a year, the worldwide media would be demanding to be admitted. But when the world’s richest bankers and industrialists and powerful politicians and heads of state get together for a secret meeting, the media looks the other way. Why? Which is more important to the world at large?”

The SPOTLIGHT has led the way. Now it is up to the rest of the world media to take up the challenge and bring the truth about the Bilderberg Group’s activities to the world public. If there’s nothing “wrong” with what the Bilderberg is doing and the group has nothing to hide, then the media must DEMAND that the group open its conclaves to the media’s inspection.
The following statement was released last night at Soestdyk Palace:

During the last three days a group of seventy-five European and Americans have been meeting at the Hotel Bilderberg at Oosterbeek. The individuals attending this meeting were invited by His Royal Highness in order, by means of a free and frank exchange of views, to improve mutual understanding between Europeans and Americans on problems of common concern. There were present members of different political parties, representatives of business and labor and academic life. While some of the members are in active political life, all members were present only in their individual capacities, and no member spoke for any government or organization. It was not the intention of the Conference to propose governmental action, but simply to determine the areas of agreement on these common problems, and to reach a better understanding as to the underlying reasons for differences in the attitudes prevailing amongst the European and American people. The members of the Conference all came from countries sharing the same basic democratic faith, end a firm devotion to liberty and to the rights and dignity of individual citizens.

During the course of the three-day Conference the members discussed the following subjects:

A. The attitude toward Communism and the Soviet Union.
B. The attitude toward dependent areas and peoples overseas.
C. The attitude toward economic policies and problems.
D. The attitude toward European integration and the European Defence Community.

As a result of the discussion, it developed that the extent of agreement among the members was far greater than had been foreseen, and even where there was a divergence of attitude the reasons for differing views were fully and frankly discussed, and are now better understood.

During the course of the discussion the following points were among those made on the subjects under consideration:

Shown above and on consecutive pages are exact photoreproductions of a press release issued by the Bilderberg Group after its first formal gathering at the Bilderberg Hotel in Holland. The group had not yet formally adopted the name by which it has since become known, but it very clearly had an international agenda in mind. Although the Bilderberg Group has periodically issued press releases (as a formality), it does not encourage press coverage. Critics ask the simple question: "Why?"
I. The attitude toward Communism and the Soviet Union

1. The peoples of the free nations of Western Europe and the United States gave an overwhelming support to the program of Communism and the Soviet military power that the question of the conflict between Communist ideology and Western democracy was the central issue. Faced with the threat of aggression, the Western democracies were left with no choice but to resist. The difference between these nations as well as the fact that there was no common bond among them are not differences of principle but of purpose.

2. Criticism, which is an essential ingredient of a healthy democratic society, must also be an ingredient of a healthy democratic alliance. The democratic nature of the alliance takes on a new dimension. When the free nations work together through consultation and co-operation, the effect is felt not only in the Western alliance front but also in the Western alliance front itself. This is not to say that there are not differences of opinion or differences of method.

3. The basic purposes of the free world were described by different spokesmen in the U.S. Congress as freedom, democracy, and unity. The free nations are united in their purpose. They are united in the purpose of creating a world of free nations, not merely of free peoples.

4. Good relations between the free nations must rest on a clear understanding of the purpose of the alliance, which is to create a world of free nations. This understanding is essential for the maintenance of the alliance.

5. The Communist threat poses itself in different ways in varying countries. It is not the same everywhere. In some countries, it appears as a threat to the democratic institutions and to the way of life. In others, it appears as a threat to the security of the country. The United States and Western Europe must work together to meet this threat. The alliance must be based on a clear understanding of the purpose of the alliance.

6. The alliance is not based on a common bond but on a common purpose. It is not based on a common culture but on a common purpose. It is not based on a common interest but on a common purpose. It is not based on a common bond but on a common purpose.

II. Attitude toward dependent areas and peoples overseas

1. The problem of dependency arises wherever there is a difference between the United States and the dependent peoples. The difference is not in the nature of the dependency but in the nature of the relationship between the United States and the dependent peoples.

2. It is sometimes difficult to determine the nature of the relationship between the United States and the dependent peoples. It is not possible to determine the nature of the relationship between the United States and the dependent peoples.

3. Underdeveloped areas are sometimes not well-supplied with information and understanding. The United States should make every effort to improve the situation.

4. The dependence of the underdeveloped areas on the United States is often the result of a lack of understanding of the problems of the underdeveloped areas.

5. The situation in the underdeveloped areas is not necessarily worse than in the developed areas. The underdeveloped areas are not the result of a lack of understanding of the problems of the underdeveloped areas.

6. The underdeveloped areas are not necessarily worse off than the developed areas. The underdeveloped areas are not the result of a lack of understanding of the problems of the underdeveloped areas.

7. It is not possible to determine the nature of the relationship between the United States and the dependent peoples.

III. Economic Policies and Problems

1. It was generally agreed that economic policies were no less important than political policies. The United States and Western Europe must work together to develop a policy that is acceptable to all.

2. The economic policies of the United States and Western Europe must be based on a clear understanding of the purpose of the policies. The economic policies must be based on a clear understanding of the purpose of the policies.

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7. The economic policies must be based on a clear understanding of the purpose of the policies. The economic policies must be based on a clear understanding of the purpose of the policies.
In 1953, American and European aid was essential in order to prevent the collapse of the Western bloc and to create a strong political and economic alliance against the Communist threat. The Marshall Plan, a $12.5 billion aid program, was the cornerstone of American strategy. It was designed to rebuild war-ravaged Europe, create a strong economic base, and prevent the spread of communism. The plan was widely accepted, with contributions from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other Western nations.

However, not everyone was on board. The Soviet Union opposed the plan and its objectives. The Kremlin viewed the Marshall Plan as an attempt by the West to dominate and control Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc satellites boycotted the plan and chose to develop their own economic recovery programs.

The success of the Marshall Plan was evident in the economic recovery of Europe. By 1958, the European economy had recovered to pre-war levels. The plan also helped to create a strong political alliance against the Communist threat. The Western nations that contributed to the plan, including the United States, worked together to maintain a strong political and economic alliance.

In conclusion, the Marshall Plan was a significant achievement in the Cold War. It helped to rebuild war-ravaged Europe, create a strong economic base, and prevent the spread of communism. The plan also helped to create a strong political alliance against the Communist threat. The success of the plan demonstrated the importance of international cooperation and the need for strong alliances in the face of global threats.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF STATEMENT

1. The state Department and the United Nations will announce a joint statement on the status of the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the control of nuclear weapons. The statement will be released at 10 p.m. on June 15, 1961.

2. The statement will be released in the presence of the media.

3. The release will be made by the Secretary of State and the United Nations Secretary-General.

4. The statement will outline the current status of the negotiations and the next steps.

5. The release will be made available to the media in advance of the announcement.

6. The release will be made available in both English and French.

7. The statement will be made available to the media in both electronic and print formats.

The release will be made available to the media in both electronic and print formats. The statement will be made available to the media in both English and French.

May 15, 1961
March 11, 1955.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GABRIEL HAUGE

I understand that next week Prince Bernhard is having a meeting at Barbizon, continuing his exploration looking toward improving European and American relations.

If personally you can fit such a trip into your schedule, I suggest you find the money and go to France.

D. D. E.

On official White House stationery, President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote a memorandum (shown above) to his then-administrative assistant, Gabriel Hauge, making reference to the upcoming Bilderberg Conference in Barbizon, France. (Note that he does not use the term "Bilderberg," however, inasmuch as the annual conference had not yet adopted the name.) The president suggests that Hauge "find the money and go to France." Then, in his own handwriting, the president amended the memo and next to the reference to money he added "(govt)"—that is, "government." In other words, he was suggesting that Hauge come up with taxpayers' money to finance his trip to the Bilderberg meeting. This alone suggests that despite Bilderberg claims to the contrary, American taxpayers' dollars—not to mention the tax dollars of other nations—are used to promote the Bilderberg agenda. On the two pages which follow the memorandum shown above are exact photoreproductions of Hauge's report to the president of the events of the Bilderberg conference in France. Note that Hauge concludes his memorandum with a number of intriguing direct quotations from statements made by Bilderberg attendees, although he is careful not to reveal the names of those who made the remarks quoted—this in keeping with what we shall see is official Bilderberg policy. And bear in mind, of course, that Hauge was undertaking this venture at the expense of the American taxpayers who were not privy to the events taking place inside this international conclave of elitists.
U.S. was reported as a powerful propaganda factor for the Communists. It is estimated that $200 million is now being spent annually by the Communist party in Italy. The U.S. was charged by an Italian delegate with certain responsibility for the fastening of Communism upon Italy because of our insistence immediately after the war that Communist ministers be included in the government. The U.S. High Commissioner at that time was reported by this delegate to have said he did not care whether Italy went Communist or not.

In HOLLAND there is a Communist trade union which is regarded as a good thing and helpful in keeping the situation under surveillance.

In PORTUGAL Communism is reported as no problem for the following reasons: a) the country has never had any diplomatic relations with Russia and therefore Russia has had no embassy from which to operate its propaganda; b) the trade unions are a controlled part of the state and hence Communists cannot easily operate in their leadership; c) the police are effective; d) the people are deeply religious. The way Communists are treated is illustrated by the fact that when Russian ships come for cork, their crews are not permitted to land.

In the UNITED KINGDOM Communism was reported as not a political issue, merely as a security issue.

During the course of the discussion these general points, and in some instances conclusions, emerged:

There was discussion as to whether free world propaganda was hindered by the failure to have what one delegate called a "Democratic" as a counterpart to the Comintern. Discussion on this point was inconclusive and turned finally to the possibility of invoking Article II of the NATO Pact which provides for cooperation in non-military fields.

In the opinion of a Dutch delegate, the growth of the United Europe movement was the factor which has produced from the Russians considerable initiative in sports and cultural exchange. By this program they hope to gain acclaim of Europeans. There was a consensus in the group that the sports and cultural exchanges should be fostered, provided that appearances in the Russians in Western countries are not under auspices they select but under auspices we select.

A Dutch delegate presented an analysis of the psychological factor among the underdeveloped peoples of the Far East as being one basis for their disposition to listen to the Communists. He described a state of psychological revolt and rebellion against the fact that what they regard as their spiritual superiority is unavailing as against the material superiority of the West. They indulge this psychological feeling by resentment against their former political overlords of the West and against rich America that wants to do business with them on a basis which they regard as factual inequality. The delegate referred to this psychological situation as a "psychic trauma."

There was a disposition in the group to approve a cultural conference between representatives of the East and the West in an effort to get to the intellectuals who were reported to be largely against us or neutralist in attitude.

Considerable discussion revolved around legal measures to deal with the Communist party and its apparatus. Part of the U.K. delegation and all of the Dutch delegation were strongly for such measures. The French and Italians were against them, saying that Communists should be dealt with not as traitors but as Communists. There was a sense of uneasiness that Europe's free societies lacked the vitality to deal with these people except with police state methods.

An English delegate made the observation that the Soviet has not yet tried much economic aggression, but he anticipates that we are on the threshold of an era of economic warfare to be launched against us by the Communists especially in the underdeveloped areas of Asia.

Great emphasis with respect to the Asian problem was placed on the diluting effect on economic progress originating in population increase. A Swedish economist stated that 40 years from now there will be one billion Chinese and 700 million Indians (U.S. Population then would be in the range of 275-300 million). While there was a good deal of pessimism about the diluting effect of population on economic improvements in the Far East and hence upon expectations from economic aid programs, the conclusion strongly emerged that these uncommitted people must not make their choice between Communism and the free world in an economic environment of economic stagnation or decline. That, in itself, would constitute an adequate basis for whatever assistance could usefully be given. This conclusion emerged despite a widespread feeling that the cold war decision would probably be made before appreciable economic improvement in these areas could be brought about.

A Dutch delegate asserted that there was need for the establishment of a sociological research center in connection with any economic assistance program for the Far East to seek better understanding of what these people really want and how they may be aided in getting it.

It was interesting to observe in these discussions how various Europeans, who have their assorted gripes against the U.S., time after time cited our country and our economy as evidence of what the free way of life could produce in contrast to the Communist.

An English delegate asserted that Asians should not be asked to commit themselves either to the Communists or to us but merely helped to develop themselves.

An American delegate stressed the need for development in non-economic lines. For example, he said that one of the greatest threats in the Philippines today is the fact that 108,000 college graduates are without jobs.
A Swedish delegate quoted Communist propaganda in that country as raising the question, "Are you against the H-Bomb? If so, you should be with us."

The Swede suggested that the reply to that attack is for leading citizens of the West constantly to refer to the proposals we have made for atomic control and to President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace plan.

A Swedish delegate quoted the Communists as raising the question, "Is it easier to get into the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R.?

In replying to Communist charges that the West is responsible for the cold war, a Swedish delegate said that their reply was to point to the reduction in arms by the Allies after the war and the failure of Russia to do the same. He has found this effective.

A French Socialist delegate stated that the principal propaganda claims in his country were that the Communist party removed class barriers, produced greater equality, abolished privileges and sought to replace the system of capitalism which causes war and unemployment.

The French replies have pointed out that Russia is not a Communist state but is operated on the basis of state capitalism; that one and a half million Russians exploit 190 million; that young people cannot go to the universities in Russia unless they are approved by the Communist leaders; that free science, free art and free literature is impossible -- witness the rejection by Stalin of Picasso's portrait of him; some of the worst race discrimination in Europe is in the satellite states; workers in unions should be free to fight the state, free to quit their jobs if they wish.

Striking quotations from the days' discussions included these:

"Communists play the role of innocents pursued by the evil state with foul means."
- Norwegian delegate

"Technical assistance experts representing international bodies such as the International Bank encounter less resistance from people in the underdeveloped countries than do the same individuals coming as nationals from their own countries."
- American delegate

"I believe industrialists should go as far socially as it is possible to go economically."
- Italian delegate

"The function of the state is to provide liberty and opportunity to the ambitious and security to the unambitious."
- German delegate

"The side that equips India with machines will win the cold war."
- Belgian delegate

"Nationalization is nationalism with an inferiority complex."
- English delegate

"International law is nineteenth century British foreign policy."
- American delegate

"Communists are neither to the right nor to the left, but to the East."
- French delegate

"Nobody is worth over 12,000 per annum."
- Nehru, as reported by an English delegate
March 30, 1955.

Dear Gabe:

Many thanks for your highly informative and interesting report on the highlights of the recent Barbizon Conference. I hope you won't mind if I both plagiarize and quote you.

With warm regard,

As ever,

The Honorable Gabriel Hauge,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Showed above is President Dwight Eisenhower's acknowledgment of his executive assistant's report on the Bilderberg conference in France. Note, in particular, Eisenhower's comment that "I hope you won't mind if I both plagiarize and quote you." In other words, Eisenhower intended to incorporate Bilderberg thinking and philosophy into his own private and public addresses. Yet, to the best of anyone's knowledge, although Eisenhower's foreign policy ventures often reflected the internationalist "one world" outlook of the Bilderberg Group and the Council on Foreign Relations (of which his assistant, Hauge, later emerged as an officer) the president never once attributed any of his policies to the influence of the Bilderberg Group nor, so far as is known, did he ever mention the group in public by name.
BILDERBERG CONFERENCE

ST. SIMONS ISLAND
(U. S. A.)

15-17 February 1956

NOTICE TO PARTICIPANTS

Shown above and on the next two pages are exact photoreproductions of the official “notice to participants” attending the Bilderberg Group conference held on St. Simon’s Island off the coast of Georgia on February 15-17, 1957. As befitting the highly-organized gathering that it is, Bilderberg officials provided detailed travel arrangements and other pertinent information to the invitees. By this time the group had officially adopted the name “Bilderberg” as its moniker.
Place of the Conference

The Conference will be held in the King and Prince Hotel, St. Simons Island, near Brunswick, Georgia (U.S.A.).

Telephone number: 3411 St. Simons Island, Georgia.

Accommodation

Room, meals and beverages at the King and Prince Hotel will be free of charge to participants.

All unions, such as telephone calls, laundry, housekeeping and valet service, will be at the delegates' own expense.

In the event of participants being accompanied by members of their family or staff, the latter may be accommodated at their own expense in the neighborhood of St. Simons Island. The Secretary of the Conference will be pleased to help with the necessary arrangements on request.

Whether these arrangements are made through the Secretary or directly, they must be made not later than the first week of January.

Programme

It is currently hoped that the participants will arrive the day before the Conference opens, i.e., Thursday, 14 February, so that the sessions can start punctually on Friday, 15 February, at 10 a.m. Meetings will be held every day both in the morning and in the afternoon, and their times will be announced as usual at the end of each session.

Participants will be able to leave either on Sunday evening, the 17th, or preferably on Monday morning, the 18th.

No entertainment necessitating evening dress is foreseen.

Languages

The official languages of the Conference will be English and French.

All documents will be translated into one or the other of these languages and simultaneous interpretation will be provided during the meeting.

All European participants should communicate all Conference matters with:

Dr. J. H. Retouge
27. The Vale — London — S.W.3
Telephone number: Pl.Axxam 0079.
Telegraphic address: Berenger London.

During the Conference, i.e., from 15 to 17 February, the Secretary will be established at:

The King and Prince Hotel,
St. Simons Island — Georgia (U.S.A.).
Telephone number: 3411 St. Simons Island, Georgia.

Transport

A schedule of trains and airlines flights between New York, Washington, and Brunswick is given below.

a) European participants are expected to make their own transatlantic travel arrangements. In view of the length of the journey they should be ready to leave New York or Washington for St. Simons Island not later than noon on Thursday, 14 February.

The organizers of the Conference will, on request, arrange and provide for charge accommodations in New York for the night of Wednesday, 13 February, and for a night following the return from the Conference.

They will also provide for the necessary additional accommodations for those whose transatlantic travel arrangements require them to arrive in the United States a day or an early or to leave a day or so late. Transportation from the place of arrival in the United States to St. Simons Island and return will be provided free of charge by the organizers, by train, commercial airline or private plane.

b) Canadian and American participants are expected to make their own travel arrangements, but to notify the Secretary in New York of their travel plans well in advance.

c) All participants making their own travel arrangements should do so early as travel is very heavy at this season.

Secretary of the Conference

Prior to the Conference, all American participants should address correspondence concerning the Conference to:

Mr. Joseph L. Johnson
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1411 N. Plam — 40th Street — New York 17, N.Y.
Telephone number: Oxford 7-5141.
Cable address: INTERPAX.

Air and Rail Connections

NEW-YORK CITY, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND BRUNSWICK, GEORGIA

New York City to Brunswick, Georgia — Air:

| Leave New York City (JFK) | Lincoln, New York | 10:12 a.m. |
| Leave New York City (La Guardia) | Newark, New Jersey | 10:12 a.m. |
| Leave Washington, D.C. | Washington, D.C. | 5:30 a.m. |
| Leave Washington, D.C. | Washington, D.C. | 5:30 a.m. |
| Leave Brunswick, Georgia | Brunswick, Georgia | 7:30 a.m. |

New York City to Brunswick, Georgia — Rail:

| Leave New York City (Pennsylvania Station) | New York City | 2:20 a.m. |
| Arrive New York City (Pennsylvania Station) | New York City | |
### Air and Rail Connections

**BRUNSWICK, GEORGIA, NEW-YORK CITY, AND WASHINGTON, D.C.**

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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
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<td><strong>Washington, D.C. to Brunswick, Georgia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Air</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rail</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Leave Washington, D.C. via National Air Lines</td>
<td>9:05 a.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrive Jacksonville, Florida</td>
<td>12:05 p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leave Jacksonville via Delta Air Lines</td>
<td>12:25 p.m.</td>
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<td>Arrive Brunswick</td>
<td>1:21 p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
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<td><strong>Washington, D.C. to Brunswick, Georgia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Air</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rail</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrive Atlanta, Georgia</td>
<td>3:12 p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leave Atlanta via Delta Air Lines</td>
<td>3:16 p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrive Brunswick</td>
<td>7:18 p.m.</td>
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**NOTE:** These are the schedules as of December 1956. Schedules are subject to change. Rates or losses from the King and Prince Hotel will meet planes and trains on which participants are scheduled to arrive.

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**NOTE:** These are the schedules as of December 1956. Schedules are subject to change.
Following the 1957 Bilderberg Group meeting on St. Simon’s Island, Bilderberg organizers issued this member-only summary report shown here and on the ten following pages (in exact photoreproductions of each of the individual pages). Note that the cover describes the report as being “strictly confidential” and “not for publication either in whole or in part.” This was the first time that a Bilderberg conference was held in the United States of America.
NOTE THE NAMES of some of the attendees whose names appear on these just these particular pages: David Rockefeller; Dean Rusk of the Rockefeller Foundation and later U.S. Secretary of State; U.S. Senators John Sparkman and Alexander Wiley and U.S. Representative John Vorys. On other pages appear the names of other leading figures among the world elite who compose the Bilderberg.
### LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

**CHAIRMAN:**
V.E.H. The Prince of the Netherlands

**HONORARY SECRETARY:**
J. H. Ruyter

**UNITED STATES HONORARY SECRETARY:**
Joseph E. Johnson

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* Participants who had accepted the invitation but were eventually unable to attend.
INTRODUCTION

The fifth Bilderberg Conference met in the USA on St Simons Island, Georgia. It was the first to be held in America. The first four were held in the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Denmark.

Seventy persons attended from twelve different countries, wherever their status or function in public life they all took part in a purely personal capacity. Like all other meetings of the Bilderberg Group, this Conference met to pursue the frank discussions of problems and future policies prevalent to the nations of the Western Alliance. As members were all informed persons of authority and influence in their respective countries. Since difficulties and differences are bound to arise among any group of democratically oriented people which believe in the right of dissent, the Bilderberg Group aims at contributing towards a reconciliation of divergent views and interests by providing the opportunity of free discussion among leaders of opinion who share a common desire to achieve a better understanding of one another's convictions and intentions.

For this reason, the subjects chosen for discussion at Bilderberg Conference namely concern questions on which the Western Alliance may have difficulty in agreeing. Fruitful discussion requires an atmosphere of mutual trust, so that participants can express themselves in complete frankness. This has been largely achieved at all the Bilderberg Conferences because the meetings are held in private, free and public are excluded and neither background papers nor speeches are published. In the final printed report, like the present one, opinions are summarized and speakers are not quoted by name.

The Conferences of the Bilderberg Group do not aim to formulate policy or even reach conclusions—no resolutions are submitted for discussion or voted upon. The purpose of the debate is to present a comprehensive review of the problems so that the Agenda from which each participant is free to draw his own conclusions. It is hoped, however, that in a result those who attend the meetings may be better equipped to use their influence so that the Atlantic Alliance may function better.

The main items on the Agenda of the fifth Bilderberg Conference were as follows:

1. Review of events since the fourth Bilderberg meeting in May 1956.
2. Nationalism and neutralism as disruptive factors inside the Western Alliance.

I. REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE FOURTH CONFERENCE IN MAY 1956

The first day was spent in reviewing world developments over the nine months which had elapsed since the fourth Bilderberg Conference in May 1956 at Fredensborg, Denmark. This period covered the Suez crisis and the revolutions in Poland and Hungary—events which put to the test the aims, methods, and assumptions of Western policy. Leaving discussion of possible future action in the Middle East and Eastern Europe for the following day, the Conference began, as usual, with an informal discussion

The Middle East crisis had gravely strained the Western Alliance and in particular had created a deep strain in the United States-Canada-UK-ANZAC relationship. The crisis led to closer cooperation in the United States and Britain and France on the other. Various speakers from both sides explained the policies of their respective Government departments and the reasons which underlie these policies. Discussion of specific issues and events enabled the Conference to clear up misunderstandings which had been based on inadequate or even false information—due for example, the history of negotiations on Western aid for the Armistice Line, the conduct of the great Powers during the Suez negotiations and the military conflict which followed them. Several speakers emphasized the surprising lack of communication and collapse of understanding which had developed between the allies.

The main purpose of the discussion, however, was to analyze and evaluate the past as a basis for discussion of future policy. Though the debate did not aim directly at settling the records straight, by doing so it removed many misunderstandings on both sides of the Atlantic. At the same time it enabled the Conference to make some sound judgments on the future effect on public opinion in all the countries concerned. It emerged that in Britain and the USA particularly, public opinion was by no means united on the issue of policies which had developed inside Britain on the subject, but most speakers were optimistic about the chances of a speedy healing of the breach.

Several speakers pointed out that the breakdowns in diplomatic contact between the Governments was paralleled by a general breakdown of public information. Many clashes were quoted of distortion and falsification of facts, indeed many participants were alarmed to find how far the distortion had gone, and how high it had penetrated into the top levels of public opinion.
of immense importance since for the first time it had become possible to mobilize world opinion quickly and effectively against any aggression on the part of the Soviet Union. Before October, the clear-cut division between the West and the neutral bloc had made this impossible. But the last-ditch acts of moral force could now be brought to bear on the Western side. In the long run this may be decisive importance, since world opinion is one of the few means of exercising pressure on the Soviet leaders.

This was one of the reasons why the United Nations was so strongly supported by the American people, who in a recent poll had indicated that only 7 per cent of them favoured America's withdrawal from the United Nations. There were obvious difficulties. The same speaker pointed out that the immaturity and intransigence of the Afro-Asian countries, many of which had dictatorships, prevented obstacles to American victories in the United Nations—there was no automatic Western majority. Another American speaker felt that though his country was right on the whole in considering the United Nations as an effective framework for solving the Suez Canal dispute and preventing further aggression, and right in giving so much importance to world opinion, both in the short and long run, it should have done more to convince Europe and Britain that this was practical politics.

This led to a discussion on the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. A European participant observed that the real difference between America and Europe on the Suez Canal problem concerned not aims but methods—and in particular the role of force. While America had consistently opposed the use of force unless absolutely inevitable, on the other side there had been a certain predilection for it since both France and Israel were already committed to the use of force. France was fighting in North Africa and Israel had committed to use force in defending her frontiers. The attack on Egypt was for them a natural extension of a conflict in which they were already engaged.

America saw the problem in a quite different light. One of the speakers remarked that when President Eisenhower took his decision on the matter in October 1956 he was fundamentally convinced with two questions—whether aggression was obstinate as a means of settling a dispute in one's favour and whether it was right and possible to reserve the use of force to the application of a collective action within a particular group, whether it be NATO or the United Nations or any other group to which his country belonged. Though it is not easy to weigh the moral content of a policy, he believed that its morality must depend on the answer to these two questions. Commenting on this statement, one of the participants observed that the conditions of diplomacy have changed today since the development with American support of effective world opinion—it was with this that Great Britain and France had finally complied. The fact that
But the fundamental interests of the United States were not divergent, and indeed were often much closer to one another than appeared. Middle Eastern oil was an example. Moreover, the United States was interested in its determination to assume the responsibilities imposed by its power.

One of the European participants pointed out that the cardinal feature of the post-war world was that, through the rise of the Soviet Union, of Communist China, and of national movements in other areas, the great European powers had themselves dangerously overestimated. Whether they liked it or not, they could not hope to maintain the old imperial structure by which they secured their world interests. If the structures crumbled, without being replaced in time by another which could secure the real needs of Europe and the United States, Communism was bound to win. Our task, therefore, was to work out such a new international system synergizing with America no less than Europe.

Throughout the day's discussion, there was frequent mention of Eastern Europe. Since these references were mainly related to an analysis of Soviet policy in the area and of the possible Western reaction to it, they will be reported in their appropriate place during the discussion of the European policy of the alliance which took place on the second and third days of the Conference.

Influence in the Middle East which their power and proximity might have seemed to offer them. But when they saw the apparently provided opportunities by the Egyptian and Syrian demands for area they quickly took advantage of it by stepping in with military aid and traditional forms of penetration. They thus succeeded in upsetting the existing balance of power and starting a cycle of excess of which we have not yet seen the end.

Another speaker pointed out that the Soviet Union attached with great importance to the Middle East that it was prepared to sacrifice advantages gained in Europe by its policy of alliances if by it he could do it to gain advantages in that region. Russia had interested her officials on the so-called transit countries Syria and Egypt, to afford the possibility of disrupting Western oil supplies and the prosperity of Western Europe. It was clear that Moscow had found herself a very elastic disrupter in the Arab world and wanted to keep it so.

The Eisenhower doctrine strengthened the Western hand in Middle Eastern negotiations. This was particularly important since the overall weakness of the Western position had resulted from the Suez crisis. Several American speakers commented on the Eisenhower doctrine and in particular insisted that the difficulties it had encountered in Congress and, as the cold war continued, would be as a diplomatic instrument it had received almost unanimous support in the United States.

Arab nationalism came high among the problems complicating Western diplomacy in the region. One of the speakers criticized the efforts made by Egypt to extend its influence throughout the Moslem world and to inaugurate propaganda and agents not only in other Middle Eastern countries and along the southern shore of the Mediterranean but also deep into Africa. Moreover, the Middle East was a breeding ground for dictatorships and for types of authoritarian regimes with which, as one of the United States participants observed, the American people were psychologically ill-equipped to deal. They found it difficult to understand or to accept the fact that the countries in question were so high on the list of issues on which they could focus the attention and feelings of their people, but it might sometimes be possible to substitute constructive aims for the negative aims which they were often led to adopt. In other words, change could possibly be transformed into progress.

The West must find some technique for handling authoritarian regimes, since the social changes resulting from rapid economic development often created favorable conditions for the rise of dictatorships.

Several speakers felt that the West could strengthen its hand in the Middle East by bringing the Arab nations to play, since their contributions to the stability of the scene both as a source of oil and as communications centers were comparable to those of European. They could help to moderate the force of Arab nationalism and could help the West reach a solution of some of the political problems. In this respect it was suggested that we could try to improve relations between Israel and India as well as between some other Asian countries.

There was a large consensus of opinion at the Conference that the West must present a united front as the Middle East by so exploiting its political. There was a wide consensus of opinion of the World Court and of the United Nations that the United States should use its voice and its vote to help bring about a new order in the area. In this way the United States could help to bring about a new order in the area.

Several speakers urged that patience was essential in the present Suez crisis. Simultaneously, the Egyptian army needed to be rebuilt. But new forms of aggression should be reexamined and submitted. Several speakers made constructive suggestions which might help in solving the Suez crisis.
III. THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF THE ALLIANCE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PROBLEMS OF EASTERN EUROPE, GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Throughout the discussion there were frequent references to developments in Eastern Europe. One of the speakers saw recent developments inside the Communist system as falling conveniently under these main heads. First of all, political turmoil of the system had shifted from the police to the Party level. After the death of Stalin and the subsequent downfall of Brezhnev, the Party re-stabilized its control over the security services. This had considerable importance for the functioning of the Communist empire outside the Soviet Union. For example, it made possible recent events in Poland. In the second place, Russia had resumed friendly relations with Jugoslavia on Tito’s terms. In the third place, Khrushchev had found it necessary to make reconciliations concerning Stalin, whose reputation proved to be very far-reaching. As a result of these three developments, the Soviet leaders were forced to turn to the defensive on the home front. They were under heavy pressure from new demands for national and individual freedom. These demands revealed a wide range of possible reactions and there were signs that the Soviet leaders were prepared to consider the most moderate variants. Even in Hungary they hesitated at first to reject the demands outright, and ultimately acted with some reluctance when they felt the situation was getting out of hand.

There was general agreement on the view of several speakers that Soviet difficulties arose from structural defects in the regime and had their roots deep in the nature of the Communist system. The present system of dictatorship by remittance already showed serious elements of instability. In many other fields also, the burden of ideological elaboration which could be met only by radical structural changes in the system as a whole.

Some of the greatest difficulties were thought to lie in the economic field. One of the speakers observed that the Soviet economy had to provide simultaneously for industrial expansion, higher living standards and armaments at home, and the development of China and the economic penetration of under-developed countries abroad. This was bound to impose great strains on the Soviet economy. Russia’s reserves were not as great as the statistics of industrial expansion seemed to suggest. It was impossible to compare Soviet and Western economic progress, since Russian expansion took place almost exclusively in the basic industries—in whose favour Soviet indices were weighted—while the West aimed at all-round development in which consumer industries and services played an important part. By limiting expansion to the basic industries, the Soviet leaders imposed a severe burden on their people. Yet, though it seemed that greatest Soviet policy had nearly reached its limits, any change in the balance of the Soviet economy would bring far-reaching consequences in other fields. For example, it would be very difficult in expanding secondary industries to maintain the sort of central control possible for the basic industries. In any case, it was doubtful whether under the present system Russia’s economic development could ever catch up with that of the West. The One aspect of the race which could reasonably cause apprehension was the high annual output of technicians and engineers from Soviet schools. On the other hand educated people were more difficult to deal with and this might in time produce favourable repercussions in the political field.

The basic weakness of the Communist economic system was its inability to evolve and adapt itself quickly to changing circumstances. It had abolished the market forces which performed this function in the capitalist system without yet finding anything to take their place.

Many speakers felt, however, that in spite of economic difficulties Soviet political aims and methods had not changed. Moreover, until recently Soviet leaders seemed as self-confident as ever. For example, they had even given notice of their intention in Latin America. Though the Hungarian and Polish revolutions had reduced Soviet influence in Europe, Russia’s total military power was still immense. Some speakers felt that domestic difficulties might increase the dangers of external adventures, since the Soviet leaders might wish to use foreign events as an excuse for or distraction from troubles at home.

The Conference spent some time examining events in Hungary and Poland as well as the situation in Eastern Europe as a whole. It was emphasized that the satellite countries had lost much of their value to Russia, since their military forces could no longer be considered as a net addition to Soviet strength, and Russia had had to reduce her economic exploitation of Eastern Europe in order to keep up its outré regimes. But even from the ideological and political viewpoint, the advances were a doubtful one, since they had been demonstrated that none of the regimes in Eastern Europe would be able to survive without the direct support of the Red Army. The Communist parties alone were no longer adequate instruments of government—or of Soviet policy.

However, there was no sign that Moscow’s attachment to its European conquest had diminished. Its attitude towards German reunification was unchanged.
and while it was prepared to tolerate the Gomulka regime in Poland there was evidence that it did so reluctantly. One of the speakers pointed out the implications of the fact that in its declaration of a Gomulka-type regime in Poland the Soviet Union had given warning that it would go to war if the West intervened to liberate any of the satellite countries.

For this reason the situation in Eastern Europe was highly dangerous. If further explosions occurred they might well result in a Third World War. And it was reasonable to assume that there would be further upheavals in the future. If the Hungarian revolution was not repressed in Eastern Germany, Western Europe, and the United States might be involved whether they wished it or not. German reunification had therefore become a matter of urgency.

German speakers described the respective positions of their Government and Opposition and pointed out that there were large areas of agreement between them concerning the aims and conditions of a settlement; while their divergences mainly concerned the method of approaching negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The Conference had an extensive debate on the timing, methods, and objective of a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union for the reunification of Germany and the liberation of Eastern Europe. Several speakers put forward ideas and proposals which had in common a reciprocal withdrawal of foreign armed forces from both sides of the Iron Curtain and the creation of a zone between them which would be subject to various security controls. It was possible to envisage a wide range of possibilities both in the geographical limits of such a zone and in the conditions governing its security, such as control and limitation of armaments and a system of international guarantees. The specific proposals put forward in discussion were tested at examples of a possible solution rather than as the only feasible basis for negotiation. All speakers agreed that any combinations could be envisaged and all would require exhaustive study before they could be adopted. The fundamental principle governing all such solutions was that they should not substantially change the existing military balance in Europe or offer substantially less stability than the existing conditions.

Though the reunification of Germany was aimed to imply free elections in the Soviet zone, some speakers felt that in the satellite countries the withdrawal of the Red Army would itself produce an internal movement towards greater democracy.

If the existing balance of power were to be maintained and the current situation were to remain unchanged, there would be no built-in physical guarantees against the violation of the neutrality of the intermediate zone whether by armed force, subversion, or even by the free choice of peoples inside the area. The present NATO defense strategy would require revision. Some speakers suggested the possibility of an international agreement like that of the Locarno Treaty.

In view of the risks involved in proposing and negotiating such a settlement it was strongly emphasized that it presupposed a complete ideology of unity among the allies—above all Western Germany. Moreover, the West could afford to enter such negotiations only from a position of strength. This meant the reinforcement of NATO and the inclusion in it of a West German army. Any plans or proposals would require careful preparation both in content and diplomatic handling. The crucial importance of these pre-conditions was repeatedly stressed. The main argument offered for proposing such military disembarkation was the danger that a dramatic international situation; the division of Europe and of Germany might easily result in the West's being dragged into a dangerous war however much it might wish for peace. Events in East Berlin, Poland, and Hungary had taught how suddenly and unpredictably such a crisis could develop. One of the speakers pointed out that since Hungary had demonstrated that the West was unwilling to maintain and recreate the satellites by force, the West had an obligation to adjust its diplomacy so as to achieve liberation by peaceful means.

There was a prolonged discussion on the relevance of NATO's military posture to such negotiations. One speaker contended that Europe's security depended on present assurance that America's Strategic Air Command would inflict atomic retaliation on the Soviet Union in case of attack. NATO's existing and prospective forces were too small to hold a major Soviet advance on their own, yet they were much larger than was needed to ensure a step-by-step release of all-out atomic retaliation. It might be possible and desirable to change NATO's present strategic posture and to develop a military organization and doctrine which would give Europe total dependence on the threat of massive atomic retaliation. But until or unless this was done the consequences of such a policy were damaging and dangerous. Because the peoples of NATO did not believe in the possibility of an effective Allied attack, they were reluctant to make the sacrifices required to provide for the forward advance strategy which was offered doctrine at present. Indeed, the simultaneous commitment by official spokesmen to the principle of military consistency, together with the risk of massive atomic retaliation, force and liberation, were stumping popular confidence in the alliance. At the immediate danger of war seemed to exude, public opinion could be persuaded to accept the sacrifices for increased defense effort only if the idea of a second front had been convinced that no lesser assurance was practicable. If the alliance did not develop a convincing collective approach towards negotiations with the Soviet Union, its members might be tempted to seek unilateral settlements with her. Supporters of the disengagement theory argued that the West would gain considerably even if France rejected such proposals. One of the speakers felt in particular that the West was mentioning great propaganda advantages by not at present. We must first of all restore our unity and increase our strength. Moreover, since Russia's internal difficulties might be only at the beginning, it might be in our interest not to involve but to take our time in the hope of a more favorable bargaining position later on.

Another speaker argued that Russia's present weakness was a case for strengthening the Western position still further. Some of the updates of a European disarmament put forward alternative policies which might be practical. It was pointed out, for example, that the decision to re-arm Western Germany started a chain of events which included the signature of the Nuremberg arms control agreements, and the Soviet apathy to Tito. It was reasonable to expect that when NATO was further strengthened by the actual emboldenment of German forces Russia might yield to a new series of concessions.

On the other hand, we must vigorously pursue our efforts for general disarmament in the framework of the United Nations. In this respect the majority resulting from superior economic strength would prove an important weapon. It was already influencing opinion among the uncommitted peoples and was a significant factor in defusing Communist propaganda against NATO's satrellites. A European participant stressed the importance of maintaining the right posture towards the Russians and its particular of avoiding giving the impression that we were always prepared to capitulate.

There was much we could do to help the satellite countries within the framework of existing policy. There were also opportunities to carry the struggle against Russian Communism into its own ground. Our diplomacy could gain much if it were accompanied by more effective propaganda.

The debate on military disengagement in Europe led to the related problem of Western defence strategy. One speaker contended that NATO was following too many incompatible lines at once. Western defence still rested essentially on the threat of massive thermonuclear retaliation in atomic weapons and their delivery systems should persuade us to revise our strategy. Though international laws were bound to consider nuclear risks, persistence in our present policies was no less dangerous. Several participants discussed the problem of nuclear warfare. One of the background papers maintained that the prevention of global war depended on the West's maintaining a deterrent power which could not be knocked out by a surprise attack and on making it quite clear at what point this power would be exercised. Bluff was inescapable and the aggressor would not be left to decide. Many participants were concerned about the possibility of limiting nuclear warfare. It was emphasized that nuclear warfare could not be limited unless both sides understood and agreed on the specific limitations to be observed. There was wide agreement with a statement in one of the papers that the old doctrine that war is an extension of policy was no longer true.
It is the prevention of war that is the essence of policy today, and the prize will go to the side which discovers how to achieve the prevention of war in modern conditions on the best possible terms to itself and to the maintenance of its social and political standards of value. Several speakers favored a thorough reappraisal of Western defense strategy which might lead to equipping the West European countries with atomic weapons and to a closer union between strategy and diplomacy. The Conference agreed that discussion of this topic should be continued at the next meeting of the Bilderberg Group.

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED AT NEW YORK ON 2 FEBRUARY 1957

Seventy European and American leaders yesterday concluded a private and unofficial three-day meeting at St Simon's Island, Georgia. This "Bilderberg Group" meeting, chaired by Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, covered a wide range of matters of concern to the Western community—such as the Middle Eastern situation, Eastern European developments, and German unification. While the discussions did not attempt to reach conclusions on recommended policies, there was substantial emphasis on the desirability of promoting better understanding and more effective co-ordination among the Western nations in dealing with common problems.

The discussion of the Middle Eastern situation, for example, produced a frank examination of the recent differences among the Western nations on the Suez Canal episode. As a result, several misconceptions in both American and European minds were cleared away. This, in turn, led to a position approach to the exploration of measures to facilitate the renunciation of Suez Canal traffic, to help improve relationships among Middle Eastern countries, to assist the economic development of these countries, and to help safeguard the area from Soviet aggression or subversion.

Considerable stress was laid on the proposition that the Western nations could best help realize these objectives by clearly articulating their interest in the Middle East with the interests and aspirations of the Middle Eastern peoples themselves. Conversely, there was general expression that more Middle Eastern countries would recognize that their own interest could best be served in the context of closer partnership with the West. It was pointed out, for example, that the Western nations were best able to help Middle Eastern countries undertake irrigation and other development projects, that the West provides the best opportunity for Middle Eastern countries to trade oil and crops for needed capital and consumer goods, etc.

Eastern European developments were approached by an examination of the resultant efforts of certain Eastern European peoples to obtain a greater measure of national independence and individual freedom. There was general discussion of various peaceful ways in which the Western nations might further help Eastern European peoples realize such objectives.

CONJECTURES ON THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST

By a European Participant

After a few introductory remarks, and having assured that we should deal as a matter of priority with problems resulting directly from the Soviet threat to the Middle East, the speaker reviewed the principal problems of the area:

Under-development of the Area

Although the degree of under-development varies from one country to another, the problem is common to all Middle Eastern countries and bears both political and psychological consequences. Some under-developed countries which have appreciated the need for a military force have not been able to build a strong army owing to the absence of any sound economic basis; moreover, the economic weakness of the region favours political and psychological manoeuvring at home and abroad.

Since the countries cannot solve the economic problem by their own means, external economic aid and foreign investment are required.

We shall briefly review the main problems of economic aid for these countries:

What Countries Should be Aided?

Political questions cannot be excluded when foreign aid is dealt with. In present circumstances, countries which require economic and military aid fall into three categories: those which have undertaken firm commitments to collaborate actively in the policy of collective security and opposition to Soviet penetration; secondly, those countries which, although they have not yet taken firm commitments in this direction, are endeavouring to follow a policy favourable to the countries in the first category; lastly, those countries pursuing a negative and hostile policy towards countries in the first group and their policies.

It seems to us essential that aid should be concentrated on the first group, a reasonable proportion reserved for the second, and the third turned away until they give irrefutable proof of a fundamental change in behaviour.

Experience of recent years has amply proved that underestimating aid only increases the opportunities for blackmail by the third group, discourages the
first, and makes the position of the second group more difficult in the face of
domestic public opinion. It has been said that discrimination has an immoral aspect. There can be no
good moral in rewarding or encouraging those who pursue a harmful policy.
As for the ill-conceived propaganda which represents discrimination as painful-
ness or pressure, it must be countered by showing that aid stems from mutual
understanding and agreement, and is therefore naturally reserved for those with
whose agreement has been reached.

Soviet Economic Aid
Until about 1995, economic aid was a preserve of the West, especially the
United States—but Russia is now competing in this field. This has enabled some countries to exercise pressure amounting almost to blackmail with the classical excuse that the selfish and unthinking policy of the West obliges them to seek aid from any source.

A delicate problem arises—how can the Soviets be prevented from extending
their grip by economic or military aid?
We believe that a policy of over-bidding must be rigorously avoided, since
experience has shown that it has the two disadvantages of encouraging blackmail and
giving Western aid the appearance of being wildly directed to removing
Russia from the field. It is most revealing to observe that in quite considerable
and actually financed programmes of the United States, Russia is barely noticed, i.e., by actually expending little or nothing—manage to become very popular.

This shows that in countries where the leaders are following a policy hostile to
the West, Western economic aid is considered in advance, and in countries
where the leaders hesitate between the West and Russia, the determining factor
is not to be found in the aid itself.

In long-run, many countries remain under Russian influence or pressure, any Western aid will either be without effect or be reded in an
impermissible measure. There is thus no one to supplying aid to such countries without thereby obtaining change in their political policy.

As for the second-category countries, we consider the determining factor to be
the choice of the psychological moment for granting aid and the way in which
it is granted. Russia carefully concentrates on the psychological factor. Aid is in fact granted not
on economic considerations but purely with a view to capturing public
sympathy and attention. The West must therefore show imagination in managing its aid programmes.

It is complicated by emotional factors and as a result countries not directly
affected by the problem are drawn into the conflict; and many other problems
which either have nothing to do directly with Russia, or are by-products of Middle Eastern
safety against the Russian threat, collective organization for economic im-
provement of the region, etc.—are in fact affected by the Palestine problem.

It is quite suggested that a solution to the Palestine problem is a necessary pre-
condition of any basic problem affecting the security and economic development of
the Middle East. However that may be, a solution to the Palestine problem
would certainly constitute a solution to the basic problem I have mentioned. But
it is quite possible that there can be no solution of the basic problems without a
solution of the Palestinian problem. The Baghdad Pact is a striking example of
a partial solution to the basic problems which does not affect the problem of
Some economic progress is also being made. It can in fact be said that
any improvement of the basic problems will prepare the ground for a solution to
the Palestinian problem.

On the Palestinian problem itself, my views are briefly these. Several attempts
as a solution to this problem have been made. But progress has been set at naught by the recent events in Egypt with which all Arab
countries are virtually associated. Which makes me think that perhaps by chosing
the suitable moment and acting swiftly a bold attempt could be made to
apply a balanced and imaginative solution to the Palestinian problem.

As a sort of appendix to the work of one rapporteur I will examine the
present political situation, first dealing with Russian advance in the Middle East.

Consequently, Russia has established three footholds. These are Afghanistan, to
be used chiefly against Pakistan and Iran; Syria, to be used chiefly against
Turkey and Iraq; and Egypt, to be used against Saudi Arabia and also to
some extent against Jordan, Libya, and Lebanon.

The Russians are best installed and most at ease in Afghanistan, and that by
economic aid, military aid, loan of specialists, and construction of airfields and
strategic roads.

Next comes Syria where Russia penetration is so far far advanced but where
all the necessary bridgeheads have already been established, and the situation is such
that it can install military bases. Russian arms and specialists are already there and Moscow has the administration well in hand.

A little while ago, Russia was better installed in Syria than in Egypt; but almost is wholly bad, and Anglo-Russian military operations have at least
destroyed a certain quantity of Russians stocks and installations. But stock-piling
has continued.

Does this mean it will never be possible to dislodge the Russians from these

footholds? That depends on us. If we manage to improve the situation around
these countries they will themselves react in the desired way.

As to the country for which Libanon is sound. It does not declare
itself open to our side, it is because of its geographical position and its weak-
ness. We can be optimistic about Saudi Arabia. The visit of King Ibn Saud
and the speeches and press communiques alluding to this are sufficient comment.
Libya has the right road. The awakening of the tribes and the Islam of
Russia is satisfactorily established in this country and beyond, in Tunisia,
Morocco, the Sudan, Ethiopia too is sound.

So the situation is not too bad. We must help those countries which have taken
or are about to take the right road.

Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine
I am full of praise for the Baghdad Pact.

The first attempt at collective security after the Second World War was MEGO. This was an attempt encouraged from outside which began with Egypt.
But it immediately became apparent that the other Arab countries must also be
associated with it, and an effort was immediately made to do this. True it was an attempt at collective organization inspired from outside aimed at including
the whole Middle East. The effort met with failure, but attempts have been continued.

The only formula which has succeeded has been the Baghdad Pact. This is the best solution because it is a local undertaking, because it contains the Western
Powers which have the means and will to contribute and without which
contributions no arrangement can be strong and effective, and because all the
pavements are equal.

Thus, in the Pact, military and economic aid is distributed anonymously on a
basis of perfect equality. This is important because if a great power wished
independently to aid this or that country in the Middle East, then Imperialist,
Colonialist, and what-have-you would be accused to. In the Baghdad
Pact an idea is achieved and its activity go by the touchstone of joint free will.
In both aims and its methods the Baghdad Pact is the NATO of the Middle
East. That is why Turkey is coveting for the establishment of some suitable link
between the two organizations, not only between these two but also between
the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, since to Turkey there is a firm conviction that
collective security should take the form of a united and unbroken front; failing
this, all the value of the security organizations would be damaged by the gap
between them.

The Baghdad Pact in its fact the backbone of the Middle East.

As to the Eisenhower doctrine, any comment would be heartily associated with
the enthusiastic reception accorded to it. This doctrine is based on previously
the same ideas as the Baghdad Pact and consequently it strengthens the Pact. With-
out wishing to push the official interpretation, I would say that the Eisenhower
doctrine in the United States' contributions to the Baghdad Pact. Let us await
events to see how far and in what way this doctrine will bear fruits.
The United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
May 28, 1957

Honorable Gabriel Hauge
Administrative Assistant to
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hauge:

I am enclosing herewith a letter from one of my constituents concerning what he describes as a secret meeting of men in the top level of politics of several nations.

I do not question the right of anyone else to meet with anyone else at any level, but because your name has been brought into this letter, it occurs to me that you might wish to give me some information on which I can base a reply to him.

With very best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Gordon Allott, U.S.S.

GL\r\cks

-2-

Dear Gordon:

In reply to your letter of May twenty-fourth concerning the letter of Merle D. Jenkins of Denver, let me supply certain information for your use in a letter to him.

Jenkins' letter is based on, and is in effect a paraphrase of, two articles by Westbrook Pegler in his column provided a somewhat lurid account of this sixth session of the so-called Bilderberg Conferences, which was held at the King and Prince Hotel on St. Simon's Island, near Brunswick, Georgia in February.

The Bilderberg Conference is an informal group of private citizens and public officials in their capacity as private citizens, which has met intermittently for the last three years in an effort to analyze and ameliorate frictions among the nations of the Atlantic community. The first session was held at Bilderberg in Holland in 1954 under the chairmanship of Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands. The last session in Georgia was the sixth meeting. I have attended five of them and have found them a very interesting and useful opportunity to exchange views with leading individuals from the countries of the Atlantic community.

The meeting was private but not secret. The talk about security guards, etc., is certainly a lot of impressionistic romancing. I saw no security guards at the Georgia meeting.

Following the 1957 Bilderberg conference on St. Simon's Island off the coast of Georgia, America's famed populist columnist, Westbrook Pegler, wrote a column in which he exposed the meeting. As a result, angry Americans wrote their lawmakers in Washington and demanded answers. At left is an exact photoreproduction of a letter sent by Sen. Gordon Allott (R-Colo.) to Gabriel Hauge, assistant to President Eisenhower, asking for answers about Bilderberg. Below (left and right) is Hauge's somewhat flippant response to Allott explaining that the Bilderberg meeting was nothing to worry about and that media reports were, in his words, a "Peglerized fairy tale." The friendly media reports noted by Hauge appear on the following page.

except from time to time a county police car drove by. I imagine the management of the hotel had requested the cooperation of the local authorities to insure a certain degree of privacy for the meeting, in view of the fact that the hotel had been taken over fully for that purpose. None of its facilities were available to other customers during those three days.

As I say, the meeting was private and not secret. A press release was issued at the end of the meeting indicating the broad subjects that were discussed and, as I recall, listing the names of the participants. Congressional members have attended from time to time. At that particular session, Senators Fulbright and Wheeler and Representatives Brooks Yaw and John Vorys were in the group.

I enclose a couple of clippings, which I would appreciate your returning to my files when you have read them.

I do not know who Mr. Jenkins is but I fear he has swallowed a Peglerized fairy tale.

I appreciate your bringing this to my attention and, of course, will be indebted to you for helping straighten out your correspondent.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Gabriel Hauge
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Gordon Allott
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
“Spooky,” Official, Secret?
Not True, Reply To Pegler

By Philip Swalek
Explorer Correspondent

Washington, D.C. — A meeting
on St. Simon Island off the Georgia
Coast last February, described as "spooky" and "secre
" as it was held by an Amer
ican official who was there.

Pegler’s description of the meeting: "* * * * * a
wired con
clave, as spooky as any milit
ary meeting of the Nazis in a
spicy word * * * * appears
ucked on the Esquire’s ed

There was nothing spooky about it," insisted Dr. Gabriel
Hague, who was there, accord
ing to Pegler, as President Eisen
hower’s "mysterious" economic
adviser. Hague is a member of the administration’s Coun
cil of Economic Advisers.

At the White House today Dr. Hague said that was "screw
only in the same way that a
porter is a screw porter was present. Radio
McClure editor of the Atlanta
Constitution, and Arthur Hays
Sulzberger, publisher of the New
York Times, were present, but not as participants.

Hague, Johnson, president, Econo
Economic Advisers (in New York City), explained that it was an inter
national gathering of the leading of
traders and citizens of the Un
States and European nations.

The meeting was held in a
militant United Nations cham
ber for the meeting, which will
last through Sunday. Electronic
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ervise enabling members to


Although syndicated columnist Westbrook Pegler slammed the Bilderberg Group in his hard-hitting report, the Establishment media took a different view of Bilderberg and rushed to assure its readers (in these news reports reproduced here) that the Bilderberg Group was, among other innocuous things, actually “a backdoor approach to better relations” among the nations of NATO. These clippings, from the New York Times and the Cincinnati Enquirer, are among the very few formal Establishment media reports about the Bilderberg that have appeared over the years (and these clippings actually come from the personal files of a Bilderberg member). Other reports have been few and far between, particularly in recent years. Interestingly, although by all indications it was Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly who was the tourist visiting St. Simon’s Island who first called the attention of the Bilderberg meeting to Westbrook Pegler (based upon claims by Mrs. Schlafly in her famous 1964 pro-Barry Goldwater tract, A Choice Not an Echo), Mrs. Schlafly, in recent years, has avoided public criticisms of the Bilderberg Group and even went so far as to back George Bush (a member of the Bilderberg-affiliated Trilateral Commission) over his 1992 populist Republican challenger Pat Buchanan who has publicly scored the Trilateralists and the Bilderbergers for their pernicious, anti-American philosophies. Like Mrs. Schlafly, other “conservative” voices such as National Review (founded by William F. Buckley, Jr., who attended at least one Bilderberg Group meeting) and Human Events, a tabloid with long-standing CIA connections, are loathe to even mention that the Bilderberg Group exists. The latest “conservative leader” to participate in a Bilderberg Conference is William Kristol who attended the 1995 Bilderberg conference in Switzerland. Kristol, who is also a key figure in the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, is now promoting a new internationalist journal called The Standard (financed by media magnate Rupert Murdoch) which seeks to influence conservative and Republican thinking—and will do so from a Bilderberg-oriented point of view.
The Secretariat has the honour to enclose the minutes of the meeting of the Steering Committee held at the Bürgenstock in the morning of May 29th 1960.

The Prince has expressed the suggestion that members of the Steering Committee, after having assisted at a conference or at a meeting of the Steering Committee, should contact as much as possible their Bilderberg friends from their own country in order to inform them about the proceedings of the meetings.

A lunch might be appropriate for this purpose.


In an exact photoreproduction above is a letter on official "Bilderberg Meetings" stationery noted as being "Confidential." This is the cover letter that accompanied the minutes of the Bilderberg steering committee meeting that were sent to interested Bilderbergers. The 1960 Bilderberg meeting referenced here was held in Burgenstock, Switzerland, the site of the most recent (1995) Bilderberg conference. Note that the memorandum suggests that Bilderbergers "should contact as much as possible their Bilderberg friends from their own country in order to inform them about the proceedings of the meetings...[and that] a lunch might be appropriate for this purpose." In other words, it was being suggested that Bilderbergers should quietly advise other Bilderberg "friends" who were not in attendance at the meeting about what transpired and to do it quietly—by word of mouth—at a face-to-face meeting—that is, "a lunch." So much for the Bilderberg "secrecy" that Bilderberg defenders say does not exist.
Dear Gabe:

Thank you so very much for your letter of March 6th giving me the details of the Bilderberg Meeting in Canada. I have now cancelled out my engagements for the 21st and 22nd of April and will plan to stay for the entire conference.

It was pleasant to talk to you by phone and I certainly look forward to seeing you in April.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Hugh Scott
U. S. Senator

Dr. Gabriel Hauge
Chairman, Finance Committee
Manufacturers Trust Company
44 Wall Street
New York 15, New York

In this letter (right), then-Congressman Jerry Ford of Michigan sends Hauge his regrets about not being able to attend the 1961 Bilderberg meeting. No problem, however. Ford did attend the 1964 and 1966 Bilderberg meetings and by 1974 became the first Bilderberg Group member to achieve the American presidency. Today (1995) another Bilderberger, Bill Clinton, sits in the White House, having attended the 1991 Bilderberg meeting in Baden-Baden, Germany.

By 1961 long-time top Bilderberg member and former Eisenhower “assistant” Gabriel Hauge had become chairman of the finance committee of the powerful Manufacturers Trust of New York. In this letter (left) Senator Hugh Scott (R-PA) thanks Hauge for details of the upcoming Bilderberg conference in Canada and promises to attend the meeting.

Dr. Gabriel Hauge
Chairman, Finance Committee
Manufacturers Trust Company
44 Wall Street
New York 15, New York

February 21, 1961

Mr. Gabriel Hauge
Chairman, Finance Committee
Manufacturers Trust Company
44 Wall Street
New York 15, New York

Dear Gabe:

Many thanks for your kind and thoughtful letter inquiring whether or not it would be possible for me to accept an invitation from H.R.H. Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands to join the next meeting of the Bilderberg Group near Quebec from April 21st to 23rd.

I am sure this would be a very wonderful and interesting experience and I certainly appreciate your kindness in thinking of me. However, during the past few weeks our children have been quite ill with scarlet fever. After they had almost recovered, our youngest boy, Steve, had a recurrence which our physician tells us could be very serious. As a result the doctor has advised us to keep him very quiet for the next several weeks.

Because of this and since my committee work and the legislative program is particularly heavy during the latter part of April, I feel that it would be unfair for me to make such a commitment.

I am most grateful for your invitation and certainly hope you will keep me in mind for a meeting with the Bilderberg group at some future date.

Thank you again and warmest personal regards

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford, Jr., M. C.
June 19, 1962

Dear Gabe:

Thank you for sending me the copy of the Eastern Banker with the little note about the Bilderberg Meetings.

There have been a number of unfavorable stories, originally stemming I think from a Swedish newspaper account of the meeting of "multi-millionaires." The AP, in an instance of almost unparalleled irresponsibility, picked this up and the Times and Washington Post printed it. I have just now been shown a copy of an article in the London Observer for 3 June, which is not nearly so critical, although it does start out by speaking of "a curious conclave (that) just ended." It talks about Retinger and the Prince and mentions the Reston piece, so someone must have talked more than he should have.

Frankly, I am a bit concerned about this adverse publicity. It should be wonderful grist for Westbrook Pegler's and/or Fulton Lewis, Jr.'s mills.

The piece you sent is the first one that dignifies me by mentioning my name. But so it goes. I guess we will just have to ride this one out.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph E. Johnson

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Gabriel Hauge, Esq.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York

In this rather intriguing letter reproduced above, long-time Bilderberg functionary, Joseph E. Johnson, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, complains about "unfavorable" stories about Bilderberg that have appeared in the media and comments that "someone must have talked more than he should have" and that he is "a bit concerned about this adverse publicity." In other words, a Bilderberg Group member had a big mouth and shouldn't have revealed too much and given "grist" to the critics.
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

Atlantic Policy Studies

Conспектus of Policy Problems:
A Preliminary Outline:

Prepared by Philip E. Mosely

Some Assumptions About the 1960s

I. Strategic assumptions

A. The development of nuclear-missile power seems to be moving toward a more or less stable condition of nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States; nevertheless, the race for technological gains and strategic power will continue at an intensive rate, and the balance of strategic power may be changed substantially by scientific and technological break-throughs.

B. By the end of the 1960s Communist China will have an independent nuclear capability and will endeavor to use it to weaken the political prestige and will of other Asian powers and to neutralize the U.S. ability to bring its nuclear deterrent to bear in Asian conflicts.

C. It is in the U.S. interest to explore all possible ways of organizing and controlling the nuclear-missile power of the West so as to maximize its deterrent power against the Soviet Union and Communist China and to promote maximum unity of political planning and action by the major free-world powers.

D. The Soviet Union and China will maintain a superiority of conventional forces, plus, in the Soviet case, powerful tactical nuclear armaments, in order to be ready to use its strategic weight to effect political gains in areas adjacent to their territories.

E. The Soviet Union will be prepared to promote subversive political and guerrilla action wherever favorable opportunities appear within the free world.

This "confidential" memorandum to the 1962 steering committee meeting of the Bilderberg Group indicates the close ties between the Council on Foreign Relations and the Bilderberg Group. Based upon all that is known about the CFR and Bilderberg, it appears that the CFR effectively functions both as a "think tank" and as a "mouthpiece" (i.e. a public relations apparatus) for the higher-level elites who attend the annual Bilderberg conferences. CFR members serving in public offices and in public opinion-influencing positions generally carry out and promote the policies laid down at Bilderberg meetings.
On this page and on the following four pages is reproduced an official "confidential" and "not for publication" history of the Bilderberg Group as of April 1982, explaining the origins of the group and summarizing its membership and structure. This history was prepared for Bilderberg members only and was never intended for the eyes of the world public. Only media figures such as Washington Post publisher, Katharine Graham, among others in the media who have attended Bilderberg meetings, would receive such a document.

The idea of the "Bilderberg Meetings" originated in the early fifties. Drastic changes had taken place on the international, political and economic stage. The great coalition which had been maintained up to the end of World War II had, for practical purposes, broken up; the antagonism between the democratic states and the communist countries increased constantly and many of the countries belonging to what became known as the "Western" world felt the necessity of an ever closer collaboration to protect their moral and ethical values, their democratic institutions, and even their independence against the growing communist threat. The United States government gave the lead in the economic field when it decided on a plan to aid the European countries to overcome the chaos resulting from four or five years of war and devastation. In June 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall made his famous offer which resulted in the Marshall Aid Program. When Czechoslovakia, a bulwark of Western democracy, disappeared behind the Iron Curtain, it became clear that for the sake of survival it would be unavoidable for the Western countries to join hands also in the military field. N.A.T.O. was set up in 1949 with a view to bring together the United States and Canada with twelve European countries.

It was certainly not the first time in history that the United States had linked its fate with that of Europe; it had happened during both World Wars. But never be-
The initiative was wholeheartedly endorsed and it was decided to form a nucleus in order to study the possibility of arriving at a concrete plan. The following persons declared themselves willing to join: Max Brauer, Hugh Gairsarki, the late Alcide de Gasperi, Major-General Sir Colin Gubbins, Ole Bjorn Kraft, Guy Mollet, Rudolf Mueller, Antoine Pinay, Panayiotis Pipinakis and Pietro Quaroni.

Most of the year 1952 was spent in private consultations. The first meeting was held in Paris on 25 September 1952 and was attended by all the three, Mr. Max Brauer and the late Alcide de Gasperi - of the original members of the group.

The European group thus having been set up, the next step was to establish a corresponding organisation in the United States. For this purpose, H.R.H. Prince Bernhard accompanied by Mr. Reitinger and Mr. van Zeeland visited the United States. Certain members of the Democratic Administration which was then in office were approached, all of whom, in particular Mr. Averell Harriman, were very interested in the ideas and proposals submitted to them. The newly elected Administration had also to be consulted and several Republican leaders were approached. In each case, the reactions were most encouraging. Owing to the change of Administration and for other reasons it took some time to complete arrangements. Finally, however, through the good offices of Mr. G.D. Jackson and Mr. John Coleman, an American Group was set up.

For reasons of convenience and in order to ensure a flexible procedure, it was decided that each group should choose, within the general framework, its own form of organisation. The post of Honorary Secretary was offered to Mr. Reitinger.

When the American group was formed, Mr. Coleman was elected Chairman*. In 1955 it was thought advisable to appoint an Honorary Secretary for the United States and Mr. Joseph E. Johnson accepted this function.

When Canadians were invited to join, it was decided that matters concerning Canadian participation should be dealt with by the European Secretaries.

The necessary space work having been completed, the first conference of the combined American and European Groups under the chairmanship of Prince Bernhard took place at the Bilderberg Hotel in Holland from 29 to 31 May 1954. Ever since, the name of “Bildereberg” has been associated with the organisation.

II. WHY BILDERBERG?

In the preliminary discussions there was no difference of opinion as to the object of Bilderberg. However, the important question to be decided was how this aim could best be achieved and it was necessary to lay down the general lines which the new organisation should follow.

It was of course clearly realised that improving international relations is primarily the task of statesmen and diplomats through bilateral contacts and at multilateral international conferences. But the scope and possibilities of these official contacts are limited and certainly do not cover the entire field that the originators of Bilderberg had in mind. Besides, statesmen, diplomats and politicians are bound by their instructions: they have to defend specific interests and standpoints, even if personally they do not agree with them. Moreover, the group from

* In 1955 Mr. Coleman had to retire for reasons of health. He was succeeded by Mr. Dean Rusk, with General Walter Bedell Smith as Co-Chairman. Both retired in 1957 and were succeeded by Mr. Arthur Dean and Mr. Henry J. Heims II.

which the official negotiators are selected, it of course, restricted. As a rule, they are officials, sometimes members of a government. In discussions of this kind, leaders in other fields - such as finance, industry, cultural affairs, trade-unionism, etc. - have hardly any opportunity to express their views on international problems which are not their direct concern. Finally, it is the object of international discussions to come to conclusions which will commit the various governments. This again restricts the scope of such negotiations.

None of these disadvantages arise from the rules laid down for Bilderberg. Everybody who attends the meetings does so in a private capacity. Even if a participant is a member of a government, a leader of a political party or of an unofficial organisation, he does not commit his government, his party or his organisation by anything he may say in the meetings. On the other hand, he can express his views on all the matters under discussion even if these have no connection with his function or profession.

There is another point to consider. Important official international discussions and conferences are usually targets for journalists whose duty it is to report to their papers and magazines. They try, sometimes successfully, to gain and to publish inside information which may create awkward situations. This danger is avoided in the Bilderberg meetings which are of a strictly private nature, so that participants can express themselves freely and in a completely confidential atmosphere without running the risk of indiscretions in the press.

The same confidential surroundings remove any incentive to make personal propaganda; the danger of inimicable speeches for the sake of publicity does not exist in Bilderberg.
Moreover, it should be mentioned that Bilderberg presents a framework that is unique in concept. Anyone who belongs to a country that believes in defending Western ethical and cultural values, and himself shares these ideals, is eligible to be invited to Bilderberg meetings.

Finally, Bilderberg provides a platform where Americans and Europeans can exchange opinions and views. The "List of Participants" contains the names of representatives from the N.A.T.O. countries, from Sweden, Austria and Switzerland and also from various international organizations. Even persons from Australia and New Zealand have attended Bilderberg meetings and on one particular occasion a Pakistani authority attended as an observer.

III. CHARACTERISTICS

H.R.H. Prince Bernhard is the Chairman of Bilderberg. He presides over the meetings of all of Bilderberg's institutions. He appoints on suggestion of the respective committee the members of the various committees and decides after consultation with the members of the Steering Committee who will be invited to the Conferences. The Prince has no deputy, but he is assisted and advised by a small staff composed of an Honorary Secretary General for Europe and his Deputy as well as an Honorary Secretary General for the United States.

From the outset it has been the intention to have Bilderberg remain a loosely knit association without rules of procedure, or terms of reference except those dictated by experience.

Bilderberg is not a group in the sense of a club with members, since that would make its structure too rigid and not sufficiently adaptable to discuss subjects of varied nature.

For this reason, invitation to one conference does not imply an standing invitation to subsequent meetings. On the other hand, the name of every person who has ever attended a meeting, is permanently inserted in the "List of Participants".

A nucleus of persons belonging to the Steering Committee, to be discussed below, is invited to all meetings; in addition, it is customary to invite to every conference persons who for different reasons can be expected to make a valuable contribution to the discussions. Since subjects of ever changing nature are being discussed at the various meetings, different persons have attended each meeting. In this manner, the circle of participants has steadily been enlarged and diversified. Moreover, the system has the advantage that younger people can regularly be included in the list of participants which today counts 547 names belonging to 16 countries and 8 international organisations.

Bilderberg is not meant as a policy-making body. Its aim is to reduce differences of opinion and conflicting trends among countries and to encourage understanding, if not always agreement, by hearing and considering the various points of view and trying to find a common approach to the major problems on which the various countries of the Western World may disagree. Direct action has never been contemplated, the object being to draw the attention of people in responsible positions to Bilderberg's findings.

Though general conclusions may be drawn, there is no voting nor are any resolutions passed.

IV. PARTICIPANTS

It is obvious that the success of such an arrangement depends primarily on the level of the participants. Therefore only influential and universally respected people are invited, who through their special knowledge or experience, their personal contacts and their influence in national and international circles can help to further the objects set by Bilderberg. They should have no obvious nationalistic bias or prejudices, and be broad-minded when discussing other people's problems or standpoints even if these may differ from their own. And last but not least participants should be animated by the highest public spirit. It has been the aim to attract as participants people from as many different circles as possible.

V. CONFERENCES

The conferences are, of course, Bilderberg's most important activity. This was clearly expressed when, in 1960, the name "Bilderberg Group" was changed to "Bilderberg Meetings".

The conferences have been held at irregular intervals. In the beginning, they were relatively frequent. By March 1959 it was felt that in general it was no longer necessary to hold more than one conference a year.

So far as practicable, it is customary to hold the conferences in a different country each time. The first conferences were held in Europe, but in 1957 it was decided that, if possible, every fourth conference be held on the American side of the Atlantic in order to provide a convenient opportunity for more American and Canadian participants to attend such a conference. So far, ten conferences have been held:

1. 29-31 May 1954
   Bilderberg, Oosterbeck, The Netherlands
2. 18-20 March 1955
   Barbizon, France
3. 23-25 September 1955
   Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany
4. 11-13 May 1956
   Fredensborg, Denmark
5. 15-17 February 1957
   St Sinning Island, United States
6. 4-6 October 1957
   Frugi, Italy
7. 13-15 September 1958
   Buxton, United Kingdom
8. 18-20 September 1959
   Yealbloy, Turkey
9. 28-29 May 1960
   Burgersoek, Switzerland
10. 21-23 April 1961
    St-Castri, Canada.

In order to establish a closer contact between participants outside, as well as during the formal meetings, it is considered of the utmost importance to hold the conferences in a hotel in a secluded position and which is at the exclusive disposal of the participants during the
conference. It has always been possible for the host-
country to comply with this wish.
For reasons mentioned above the press is not admitted
to the meetings, publicity being restricted to a very short
general press-statement issued at the end of every meeting.
These statements contain no details and do not mention
any participant by name.
A certain balance in the composition of the participants
is aimed at for each meeting, so that it will reflect as much
as possible the general opinion prevailing in the different
countries with regard to the subjects to be discussed.
Although no hard and fixed rules exist in this connec-
tion, it may be said that roughly one third of the persons
invited to a meeting are politicians and statesmen, one
fifth businessmen, the remainder consisting of professional
men, intellectuals, trade-unionists, diplomats, officials and
other leaders of public opinion. The number of partici-
pants in the meetings has varied between 35 and 70.
The agendas of the conferences have covered the
most important international problems of a political,
economic or military nature in so far as they were of
topical interest at the time of the meetings. The subjects
to be discussed are mostly introduced by rapporteurs
who have prepared papers on the subjects which are
circulated before the meetings.
The subjects chosen for the agenda of the first con-
ferece were:
1. The attitude of Bilderberg towards:
a) Communism and the Soviet Union;
b) Dependent areas and peoples overseas;
c) Economic policies and problems;
d) European integration and the European De-
fence Community.

The European policy of the Alliance, with special
reference to the problems of Eastern Europe, Ger-
man reunification, and military strategy.
6. Modern weapons and disarmament in relation to
Western security.
a) The impact of technological progress in arma-
ments in strategy and diplomacy.
b) Limitation of armaments and its effects on
N.A.T.O..
Are existing political and economic mechanisms
up to the Western Community adequate?
Western economic co-operation, with special refer-
cence to the political consequences of the existence of
separate currency areas within the Western world
and to the Soviet economic challenge in the under-
developed countries.
The Western approach to Soviet Russia and Com-
munism.
8. Unity and Division in Western Policy.
a) What are the positive and negative implica-
tions of recent strategic developments for the
West?
b) What are the Western objectives in inter-
national economic development and how can
we achieve them?
c) What are the elements in the evolving picture
in tropical Africa that may affect Western
unity?
9. State of the world situation after the failure of the
Summit Conference. New political and economic
developments in the Western world.

The choice of these subjects has proved successful
and far sighted. The agendas of subsequent meetings
all contained items which in some way or other
were connected with the four subjects dealt with at
the first meeting. They were:
2. Communist infiltration in various Western countries.
Western policy towards the uncommitted peoples:
a) Political and ideological aspects;
b) Economic aspects.
3. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The political and strategic aspects of atomic energy.
The reunification of Germany.
European unity:
The industrial aspects of atomic energy.
Economic problems:
a) East-West trade;
b) The political aspects of convertibility;
c) Expansion of international trade.
4. The causes of the growth of anti-Western blocks, in
particular in the United Nations.
The role played by anti-colonialism in the relations
between Asians and Westerners.
A common approach by the Western world towards
China and the emergent nations of South and
East Asia.
The Communist campaign for political subversion
or control of the newly emancipated countries of Asia.
How best the West can meet Asian requirements in
the technical and economic fields.
5. Nationalism and neutralism as disruptive factors
inside the Western Alliance.
The Middle East.

10. What initiatives are required to bring about a new
sense of leadership and direction within the Western
community?
a) The role of N.A.T.O. in the world policy of
the member countries;
b) The role and control of nuclear weapons
within N.A.T.O.
The implications for Western Unity of changes in
the relative economic strength of the United States
and Western Europe.

In May 1962 a conference will be held at Salzjo-
baden, Sweden, with the following agenda:
I. The political implications for the Atlantic Commu-

nity of its members' policies in the United Nations:
a) Concerning relations with the developing
countries;
b) Concerning possible changes in the role and
authority of the United Nations.
II. Implications for the Atlantic Community of pros-
tpective developments in:
a) The European Common Market;
b) The Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development.
It is impossible to give within the scope of this booklet,
even a superficial summary of the discussions of the ten
major meetings which have so far been held. It may be
mentioned, however, that a final report of the discussions
is drafted by the Secretariat after each conference, in
which the main points of view developed during the meetings are summarised. These final reports are sent not only to the persons who attended the meeting in question but to all participants in previous conferences as well. In order to keep this latter group better informed, the Secretariat introduced a new procedure in 1961 for drafting the final reports: the introductory reports are summarised at length and individual contributions are reproduced in far greater detail, but anonymously. It is hoped that the new form chosen will meet the wishes expressed in many quarters to have a clearer and more complete picture of the proceedings of the Bilderberg meetings.

The summaries are of a confidential nature. On request, the Secretariat will provide copies of the summaries of one or more meetings, it being understood that the supply is limited.

VI. STEERING COMMITTEE

In 1956 a Steering Committee was set up, composed of persons who had proved particularly valuable to Bilderberg. On the European side, the founders of Bilderberg were nominated members of the Steering Committee, the late Signor de Gasperi, however, having been replaced by Signor Antonore Fantini. In addition, the following persons have become European members of the Steering Committee: Sir Terence Airey, Charles C. Arliaiz, Wilfrid Baumgartner, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, Mihálym K. Bérgy, Walter E. Bovenl, Hakon Christiansen, Jean G. Hauge, Denis Healey, Leif Hoegh, Erleko N. van Kleef, Manuel M. Sarmento Rodrigues, Pasquale Saraceno, Carlo Schmid, Terkel M. Tercielsen, Vittorio Valletta, Marcus Wellenberg, Otto Wolff van Ammersen and James S. Duncan is the Canadian member.

On the American side, in addition to Mr. Joseph E. Johnston, the Honorary Secretary General for the United States, fourteen members were nominated, of whom Dean and Henry J. Heinz II (Co-Chairmen of the American Group), George Ball, Emilio O. Collado, Gardner Cowles, John Fugates, Gabriel Hauge, C.D. Jackson, Robert Murphy, George Nehobine, David Rockefeller, Dean Rusk, Shepard Stone, James D. Zellerbach.

The Steering Committee met on a regular basis, and was invited to attend the meetings of the Committee.

The Committee also met to discuss the various details connected with the convocation of the plenary conferences. Later it was decided that a small Committee would assist the Secretariat in preparing those conferences (vide par. VII). However, all members of the Steering Committee are welcome to attend the meetings of the small Committee.

During the first years, the Steering Committee, at that time composed of about eight members, met sometimes to discuss problems which in themselves did not justify the calling of a major conference and which did not require much preliminary work. Thus, on two such occasions it was found desirable to invite also persons, not members of the Steering Committee, to attend these meetings which resulted in the attendance of about 50 persons. This contributed to the final selection of the Steering Committee in its present number.

VII. ADVISORY COMMITTEE

In 1956 it was decided that, in order to assist and advise the Secretariat in organizing the conferences, a Management Committee should be set up. At a later stage, the name of this body was changed to Advisory Committee. The following participants, all members of the Steering Committee, were nominated: Wilfrid Baumgartner, Denis Healey, Henry J. Heinz II or George Neboine, Rudolf Meuler, Pierre Quarni and Paul Rykken.

The Advisory Committee meets whenever it is felt necessary, generally in Europe, and in New York in 1961 in order to give the American members of the Steering Committee a clearer impression of the way in which the conferences are organized and, more generally, to ensure a still closer cooperation and understanding between the members of the Steering Committee on both sides of the Ocean.

VIII. SECRETARIAT

The Secretariat is in charge of the preparation of the meetings and, more generally, of all the secretarial work during and between the meetings.

The first Honorary Secretary was the late Mr. Re-

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tinger, who was assisted by a small staff. When, a few months before his death, Mr. Reinger retired for reasons of health, a reorganisation took place. Mr. Ernst H. van der Beugel assumed the functions of Honorary Secretary General for Europe and Mr. Arnold T. Lamping, former Netherlands Ambassador in Bonn, was appointed Deputy Secretary General for Europe, with one assistant. Mr. Joseph E. Johnston has been Honorary Secretary (later Honorary Secretary General) for the United States since 1955 and he still holds this position today.

IX. FINANCE

The running expenses of Bilderberg are very small. Apart from the costs of the small Secretariat, the expenses consist mainly of the costs connected with the Conferences (the expenses of board and lodging of participants being borne, however, by the host-country) and the meetings of the various committees. The whole expenditure is covered by private subscriptions, so that no "strings" - political or otherwise - are attached to the financing of Bilderberg.

X. PRESENT AND FUTURE

It was never intended to carry on any promotional activity, as in several cases ideas discussed at the meetings have led to some specific actions, partly or directly associated with Bilderberg. Since Bilderberg is not a policy-making body and no publicity it gives to the meetings, it is very difficult to evaluate the usefulness of the group and its debates and impossible to claim concrete achievements.

On the other hand, it may be assumed that taking decisions on problems affecting the interests of the United States, Canada and Western Europe, those responsible will certainly remember and be influenced by the discussions they attended in the confidential and friendly atmosphere of Bilderberg.
BILDERBERG CONFERENCES

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRMAN:
H.R.H. The Prince of the Netherlands

HONORARY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR EUROPE:
ERNST H. VAN DER BEUGEL

HONORARY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE UNITED STATES:
JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

HONORARY TREASURER:
PAUL RYKERS

DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR EUROPE:
ARNOLD T. LAMFING

**

Abi, Hermann J. Germany
Achord, Dean United States
Achille, Theodore C. United States
Agnelli, Giovanni Italy
Ailey, Sir Terence United Kingdom
Alpert, Nathaniel Friedman Turkey
Amex, Robert France
Amicis, Humbert Belgium
Anklott, Eberhard Italy
Apostolou, Tsar inefficient Turkey
Arlotto, Charles C. Greece
Aron, Raymond France

Astor, Francis D. L. United Kingdom
Athanasides, Bodosaris Greece
Auker, Albert G. Netherlands
H.R.H. Prince Axel of Denmark
Ball, George W. United States
Barbour, Walworth United States
Barrett, John W. H. Canada
Baumgartner, Wilfred S. Switzerland
Beaumont, Guérin de Canada
Becu, Omer L. France
Beignon-Behrens, Sir Edward Belgium
Beitz, Berthold United Kingdom
Belas, Burian Czechoslovakia
Bell, Elliott V. United States
Bennett, Frederick United States
Berg, Fritz United States
Beyer, Johan W. United States
Bingham, Barry United States
Birgi, Muhammet Nur Turkey
Birkenbach, Kurt Germany
Black, Eugene R. United States

Blaire, Pierre A. France
Blum, Robert United States
Bogic, Hans C. Germany
Bolt, Baron United States
Boheman, Erik Sweden
Bolling, Richard United States
Bonin, Baron Pierre Belgium
Boon, Hendrik N. United Kingdom
Boothby, Tit Lord United Kingdom

Bourbon-Buhot, Comte Jacques de France
Boveri, Walter E. Switzerland
Bowte, Robert R. United States
Brandt, Karl Germany
Brauer, Max United States
Brown, George A. United States
Bruce, Isaiah United States
Bueschel, Carl J. Switzerland
Burgess, W. Randolph United States
Buzzard, Sir Anthony United Kingdom
Cahiers, Raphael United States
Cam, Louis Italy
Carli, Guido Italy
Case, Clifford P. United States
Cavendish-Bentinck, Victor United Kingdom
Christian, H. United Kingdom
Chilvers, Walker L. United States
Clement-Cuvin, René Switzerland
Clothier, The Lord France
Cochrane, Sir Ralph United Kingdom
Coldwell, M. J. Canada
Collen, John S. United States
Collodo, Emilio G. United States
Cohn, Pierre United States
Conklin, R. D. United States
Cook, Pierre-Auguste France
Cowles, Gardner United States
Crozatier, François France
Crowther, Sir Geoffrey United Kingdom
Davies, Clement United Kingdom

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<tr>
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Confidential

Dear Sir,

I have pleasure in enclosing a copy of the summary of the Bilderberg Conference held at Wiesbaden, Germany, on 25, 26 and 27 March 1966, together with copies of the speeches of Sir Andrew Cohen, Prof. Mason, Mr. Woods and Mr. Bell, held during the Conference.

I may remind you of the personal and strictly confidential character of these summaries.

If you wish, for future correspondence, any changes in the way Bilderberg correspondence is sent to you (title, name, function, address) you are kindly requested to inform the Secretariat of the modifications you may desire, if possible in a short delay.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Arnold T. Lamping

Shown above is yet another “confidential” letter to a Bilderberg “friend” which accompanied a summary of the 1966 Bilderberg conference in Wiesbaden, Germany. Note that the author of the letter, Arnold Lamping, reminds the recipient of “the personal and strictly confidential character of these summaries.” Attached to the letter was the calling card of Joseph E. Johnson, the Carnegie Endowment official who also served as “honorary secretary general for the United States” for the “Bilderberg Meetings”—quite an impressive title indeed for a functionary with an organization that proclaims its to be “unofficial.”
On this and the following four pages is reproduced a summary (dated October 1982) of all of the preceding Bilderberg meetings. Note on the cover sheet that it was "RECEIVED FOR WINSTON LORD." Lord, another Bilderberger, has been a long-time top-level official of the Council on Foreign Relations and has served, in among other posts, as U.S. Ambassador to China. Note (below) that Bilderberg had two mailing addresses: one at its official headquarters in the Netherlands and one at an entity in New York known as "American Friends of Bilderberg, Inc." which is a public relations group that appears to have the Bilderberg Group as its sole client. Any time investigative reporters have contacted the "American Friends" for details on upcoming Bilderberg conferences, Charles W. Muller, the "friend" in charge, has little to say, thereby forcing investigative reporters such as Jim Tucker, correspondent for The SPOTLIGHT, to infiltrate Bilderberg meetings on his own and to rely on his own friendly sources who agree that the Bilderberg's secrecy is wrong.

Bilderberg Meetings

RECEIVED FOR

October 1982

WINSTON LORD

BILDERBERG

1. Origin

The Bilderberg meetings are held annually to discuss important issues affecting Western Europe, the United States and Canada.

Bilderberg takes its name from the Bilderberg Hotel in Oosterbeek, Holland where the first meeting took place in May 1954.

That pioneering meeting grew out of the concern expressed by many leading citizens on both sides of the Atlantic that Western Europe and North America were not working together as closely as they should on matters of critical importance.

It was felt that regular, off-the-record discussions would help create a better understanding of the complex forces and major trends affecting Western nations in the difficult postwar period.

2. Character of meetings

What is unique about Bilderberg, as a forum, is (1) the broad cross-section of leading citizens, both in and out of government, it brings together for nearly three days of informal discussion about topics of current concern especially in the fields of foreign affairs and the international economy, (2) the strong feeling among the participants that in view of the differing attitudes and experiences of the Western nations, there is a clear need to develop a consensus in which these concerns can be accommodated and (3) the privacy of the meetings, which has no purpose other than to allow men and women of standing to speak their minds openly and freely.

In short, Bilderberg is a high-ranking, flexible and informal international forum in which different viewpoints can be expressed and mutual understanding enhanced.
3. Chairman

The first meeting was convened under the chairmanship of H.R.H. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, who served as chairman for twenty-two years. He was succeeded by Lord Home of the Hirsel, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who chaired the meetings for four years. At the 1980 meeting in Aachen, Federal Republic of Germany, Lord Home turned over the chairmanship to Walter Scheel, former President of the German Federal Republic.

4. Participants

Each year, the members of the Steering Committee compile an invitation list for the following year’s meeting. To ensure full discussion, individuals representing a wide range of political and economic points of view are selected. The overall goal is to have approximately 75 participants from Western Europe and Canada and 25 from the United States. Within this framework, an average about one-third are from the government and political sector and the remaining two-thirds from a variety of fields including finance, industry, labor, education and communications. Participants are selected for their knowledge, experience and standing and with reference to the topics on the Agenda.

Participants attend Bilderberg in a private and not in an official capacity.

5. Conferences

Bilderberg’s principal activity is its Conference program. In the beginning, they were relatively frequent and restricted in attendance. Subsequently, it became the practice to hold no more than one major conference a year. Working papers, prepared by experts form the groundwork for Bilderberg discussions. At the meetings themselves, no resolutions are proposed, no votes taken, and no policy statements issued.

Members Steering Committee

Chairman:
Walter Scheel
Former President, Federal Republic of Germany

Hea. Secretary-General for Europe:
Victor Halberstad
Professor of Public Finance, Leyden University

Hea. Secretary-General for U.S.A.:
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Hen. Treasurer:
Willem F. Duisenberg
President, De Nederlandsche Bank N.V.

Austria:
Hannes Androsch
Chairman of the Managing Board, Creditanstalt-Bankverein

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Theo Sommer
Editor-in-Chief, "Die Zeit"

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Director, French Institute of International Relations and Professor of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique
Antoine Seillière
Dep. Director-General, Compagnie Générale d’Industrie et de Participations

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Costa Carras
Member of the Board, Union of Greek Shipowners

Iceland:
Geir Halldórsson
Member of Parliament

Italy:
Romano Prodi
Professor of Industrial Economics, University of Bologna
Stefano Silvestri
Vice-Director, Institute International Affairs

Norway:
Niels Werring Jr.
Senior Partner, Wilh. Wilhelmsen

Sweden:
Sten Gustafsson
Managing Director, SAAB-SCANIA AB
Switzerland:
Franz Lütolf
General Manager and member of the Executive Board,
Swiss Bank Corporation

Turkey:
Selahattin Beyazit
Director of Companies

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Andrew Knight
Editor, "The Economist"

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Chairman, Sainsbury PLC

United States of America:
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President, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
AFL-CIO, CLC

Paul B. Finney
Editorial Director, Thomson Magazines

Charles Getchell
Lawyer and private trustee; Rapporteur, Bilderberg Meetings

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Former Secretary of State

Winston Lord
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Bruce K. MacLaury
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Italy:
Giovanni Agnelli
President Fiat S.p.A.

Netherlands:
Ernst H. van der Beugel
Professor International Relations, Leyden University; Director of Companies

ANNEX II

Conferences
1954-1982

1. 29-31 May 1954
Oosterbeek, Netherlands

Subjects:
A. The attitude towards communism and the Soviet Union;
B. The attitude towards dependent areas and peoples overseas;
C. The attitude towards economic policies and problems;
D. The attitude towards European Integration and the European Defence Community.

2. 18-20 March 1955
Barbizon, France

Subjects:
A. Survey of Western European-USA relations since the first Bilderberg Conference;
B. Communist infiltration in various Western countries;
C. The uncommitted peoples:
   1. Political and ideological aspects;
   2. Economic aspects.

3. 23-25 September 1955
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Fed. Rep. of Germany

Subjects:
A. Review of events since the Barbizon Conference;
B. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
C. The political and strategic aspects of atomic energy;
D. The reunification of Germany;
E. European unity;
F. The industrial aspects of atomic energy;
G. Economic problems:
   1. East-West trade;
   2. The political aspects of convertibility;
   3. Expansion of international trade.

* All former members of the Steering Committee
4. 11-13 May 1956
Fredensborg, Denmark

Subjects:
A. Review of developments since the last Conference;
B. The causes of the growth of anti-Western blocs, in particular in the United Nations;
C. The role played by anti-colonialism in relations between Asians and the West;
D. A common strategy towards the Western world towards China and the emergent nations of South and East Asia;
E. The communist campaign for political subversion or control of the newly emancipated countries of Asia;
F. How the West can best meet its requirements in the technical and economic fields.

5. 15-17 February 1957
St. Simons Island, U.S.A.

Subjects:
A. Review of events since the fourth Bilderberg meeting in May 1956;
B. Nationalism and neutralism as disruptive factors inside the Western Alliance;
C. The Middle East;
D. The European policy of the Alliance, with special reference to the problems of Eastern Europe, German reunification and military strategy.

6. 4-6 October 1957
Fluggi, Italy

Subjects:
A. Survey of developments since the last conference;
B. Modern weapons and disarmament in relation to Western security;
C. Are existing political and economic mechanisms within the Western community adequate?

7. 13-15 September 1958
Buxton, United Kingdom

Subjects:
A. Survey of events since the last conference;
B. The future of NATO defence;
C. Western economic cooperation;
D. The Western approach to Soviet Russia and communism.

8. 18-20 September 1959
Yesilkoy, Turkey

Subjects:
A. Review of developments since the last conference;
B. Unity and division in Western policy.

9. 28-29 May 1960
Bürgenstock, Switzerland

Subjects:
A. State of the world situation after the failure of the Summit Conference;
B. New political and economic developments in the Western world

10. 21-23 April 1961
St. Castin, Canada

Subjects:
A. What initiatives are required to bring about a new sense of leadership and direction within the Western community?
B. The implications for Western unity of changes in the relative economic strength of the United States and Western Europe.

11. 18-20 May 1962
Saltsjöbaden, Sweden

Subjects:
A. The political implications for the Atlantic community of its members' policies in the United Nations;
B. Implications for the Atlantic community of prospective developments.

12. 29-31 May 1963
Cannes, France

Subjects:
A. The balance of power in the light of recent international development;
B. Trade relations between the U.S.A. and Europe in the light of the negotiations for Britain's entry into the Common Market;
C. Trade relations between the Western world and the developing countries.

13. 20-22 March 1964
Williamsburg, U.S.A.

Subjects:
A. The consequences for the Atlantic Alliance of:
   Apparent changes in the communist world
   a) Soviet internal development;
   b) The Communist Bloc;
   C. Recent developments within the Western world:
      a) political;
      b) military;
      e) economic.

14. 2-4 April 1965
Villa d'Este, Italy

Subjects:
A. Monetary cooperation in the Western world;
B. The State of the Atlantic Alliance.

15. 25-27 March 1966
Wiesbaden, Fed. Rep. of Germany

Subjects:
A. Should NATO be reorganized and if so how?
B. The future of world economic relations especially between industrial and developing countries.

16. 31 March - 2 April 1967
Cambridge, United Kingdom

Subjects:
A. 1) Do the basic concepts of Atlantic cooperation remain valid for the evolving world situation?
   2) If not, what concepts could take their place?
B. The technological gap between America and Europe with special reference to American investments in Europe.

17. 26-28 April 1968
Mont Tremblant, Canada

Subjects:
A. The relations between the West and the Communist countries;
B. Internationalization of business.
18. 9-11 May 1969
Martinby, Denmark

Subjects:
A. Elements of instability in Western society;
B. Conflicting attitudes within the Western world towards relations with the USSR and the other Communist states of Eastern Europe in the light of recent events.

19. 17-19 April 1970
Bad Ragaz, Switzerland

Subjects:
A. Future function of the University in our society;
B. Priorities in foreign policy.

20. 23-25 April 1971
Woodstock, U.S.A.

Subjects:
A. The contribution of business in dealing with current problems of social instability;
B. The possibility of a change of the American role in the world and its consequences.

21. 21-23 April 1972
Nooske, Belgium

Subject:
The state of the Western community in the light of changing relationships among the non-communist industrialized countries and the impact of changing power relationships in the Far East on Western security.

22. 11-13 May 1973
Salsjöbaden, Sweden

Subjects:
A. The possibilities of the development of a European energy policy and the consequences for European-North American relations;
B. Conflicting expectations concerning the European Security Conference.

23. 19-21 April 1974
Mégève, France

Subject:
Prospects for the Atlantic world.

24. 25-27 April 1975
Çeşme, Turkey

Subjects:
A. Inflation: its economic, social and political implications;
B. Recent international political developments:
   1. The present status and prospects to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and the effect on relations among NATO countries;
   2. Other recent developments affecting the relations among NATO countries.

In 1976 no Conference was held.

25. 22-24 April 1977
Torquay, England

Subjects:
North American and Western European attitudes towards
   a. the future of the mixed economies in the Western democracies;
   b. the Third World's demand for restructuring the world order
and the political implications of those attitudes.

26. 21-23 April 1978
Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.

Subjects:
A. Western defense with its political implications;
B. The changing structure of production and trade: consequences for the Western industrialized countries.

27. 27-29 April 1979
Baden, Austria

Subjects:
A. The present international monetary situation and its consequences for World cooperation;
B. The implications of instability in the Middle East and Africa for the Western World.

28. 18-20 April 1980
Aachen, Fed. Rep. of Germany

Subject:
America and Europe: Past, Present and Future.

29. 15-17 May 1981
Bürgenstock, Switzerland

Subjects:
A. What should Western policy be toward the Soviet Union in the 1980's?
B. Obstacles to effective coordination of Western policies;
C. How can the Western economies put their house in order?

30. 14-16 May 1982
Saunders, Norway

Subjects:
A. Divergent Policies and Attitudes in the North Atlantic Community
B. What can Arms Control Achieve?
C. Middle East: Issues at Stake
D. Economic Issues: Dogmas and Realities
E. Current Events
And just for the record...

Here’s proof—from the Arkansas press, if you can believe them—that former Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton did indeed attend the 1991 Bilderberg conference in Baden-Baden, Germany—a year before he was nominated for president by the Democratic Party (and long before the average American voter had ever heard his name). But the Bilderbergers knew who Clinton was. That’s why he was the lone American governor—from a small, poor, rural state, no less—to be invited to the high-level international conference that year. Was Bill Clinton “appointed” by the Bilderbergers to become U.S. president at the conference? Some people think so...

This obscure news item appeared buried in the business section of the Arkansas Democrat on June 6, 1991...

Clinton to attend trade conference

Gov. Bill Clinton will attend the 1991 Bilderberg Meeting today through Sunday, a conference of North American and Western European leaders, in Baden-Baden, Germany, according to a statement from his office.

“Of particular interest to the governor are trade and economic development opportunities for Arkansas,” the statement said.

And this item appeared in the same newspaper on June 12, 1991...

Governor’s visits abroad paid with private money

BY RACHEL O'NEAL AND LARRY YEEDE
Democrat Staff Writers

Private sponsors picked up the tab for Gov. Bill Clinton's recent trips to Germany and the Soviet Union—a journey he made without staff aides, spokesman said Tuesday.

Mike Gauldin, the governor's spokesman, said the Bilderberg Conference paid for Clinton's trip to Germany and a Washington, D.C., philanthropist paid for the Soviet Union visit.

Susie Whiteacre, another Clinton spokesman, said Clinton usually travels with staff members, but he chose to go to Europe alone.

"The reason he didn't have staff with him was due to limited space and limited provisions," Whiteacre said. "The sponsors asked that they not bring staff members with them."

Clinton left the United States June 5 to attend the Bilderberg Conference, a three-day meeting in Baden-Baden, Germany.

Clinton's trip to Germany was a result of an invitation for the governor to visit the Soviet Union.

Clinton was in Moscow on Monday where he met with John Matlock Jr., the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union.

The governor was invited to attend the meeting in the Soviet Union by Ester CooperSmith, a Washington philanthropist and former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

CooperSmith and other American philanthropists arranged the trip to Moscow to present antibiotics to the Soviet government for the children of Chernoby, the site of a massive radioactive disaster in 1986.

"He had planned for the trip to Moscow, but it was not confirmed until after he had left," Gauldin said.

Clinton returned to Little Rock on Tuesday night.

The June 6-8 conference focused on issues involving the Middle East, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Clinton's interests in the conference were trade and economic development for Arkansas which will be made possible by the unification of European economics under the European Economic Community in 1992, the emergence of Eastern European nations from communism and recent economic changes in the Soviet Union, a news release said.

"It was a natural extension of the trip to Baden-Baden," Gauldin said.

Clinton attended the conference at the invitation of Vernon Jordan, the former president of the National Urban League.

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FOR FURTHER READING...

Over the years, LIBERTY LOBBY and The SPOTLIGHT have made available a number of valuable reports relating to the topic of the Bilderberg Group, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Trilateral Commission. Shown here are four of the most recent reports, all of which are available from The SPOTLIGHT at the address below. SPOTLIGHT on the Bilderbergers (a 63-page booklet) is available at $7 per copy; Who’s Behind the New World Order?, a report on the CFR, is available at 10 copies for $3. The Bilderberg Group and the World Shadow Government is available at 8 copies for $6; and The Trilateral Commission is available at 8 copies for $5. (A free book list will be included with your order.)

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A subscription to The SPOTLIGHT for 52 weekly issues is only $38 per year.
July 10, 1992

Dear Mrs. [Redacted]

Thank you for your letter. Apparently, the only publication that has access to information on the so-called "Bilderbergs" is The Spotlight.

To my knowledge, such an organization does not exist and a media conspiracy to keep its existence a secret would be ludicrous.

Sincerely,

Larry Pope
Executive Editor

Some supposedly “well-informed” newspaper editors don’t even know what they’re talking about . . .

The letter reproduced here is not an attempt at humor. This letter is real. Only the name of the recipient has been “blackened out” to protect her privacy. We have not made an effort, however, to protect the identity of the letter writer. The author of the letter, Larry Pope, then the executive editor of the Asheville Citizen-Times, was responding to the reader’s inquiry as to why his newspaper never reported on the activities of the Bilderberg Group, a powerful organization of international bankers, industrialists and political figures who meet annually with little or no coverage by the major media. Note Pope’s reference to the “so-called” Bilderberg organization (suggesting that it perhaps does not exist) and his snide—but still strikingly accurate—suggestion that The SPOTLIGHT is “apparently, the only publication that has access to information” on the Bilderberg Group. However, Pope says, “to my knowledge, such an organization does not exist and a media conspiracy to keep its existence a secret would be ludicrous.” Now, in the pages of this volume, here’s all the evidence Mr. Pope needs to see to be convinced that the Bilderberg Group does exist and that it does try to operate under a veil of secrecy.

See inside for a remarkable collection of actual documents taken from inside the Bilderberg Group itself—documents never before published anywhere . . .