Future Talk: Building the Hybrid Security Community in the Euro-Mediterranean

P. H. Liotta

February 2002

The United States Naval War College
P. H. Liotta is the Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College. During two decades of service in the U.S. Air Force, he flew the Mirage 2000, C-12, UV-18, T-38, and KC-135 aircraft, and his assignments included a Fulbright scholarship to Yugoslavia during its breakup as a nation-state and work as a military attaché to the Hellenic Republic. He has traveled extensively throughout the former Soviet Union, Europe, and the Balkan peninsula. He is the author of ten books and numerous articles in fields as diverse as poetry, criticism, education, international security, intervention ethics, and foreign policy analysis; his work has been translated into Arabic, Bosnian, Bulgarian, French, Greek, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Macedonian, Portuguese, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, and Spanish. He has received a Pulitzer Prize nomination and National Endowment for the Arts literature fellowship, as well as the first International Quarterly Crossing Boundaries Award and the Robert H. Winner Award from the Poetry Society of America. A member of the advisory board for the Research Institute for European and American Studies, he has been a visiting lecturer at the University of Athens and Complutense University in Madrid and visiting writer at SUNY Binghamton and the California Institute for the Arts.

© 2002 by P. H. Liotta
Series edited by
P. H. LIOTTA
Jerome E. Levy Chair
of Economic Geography and National Security

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

---

Jerome E. Levy Occasional Papers

Paper 1..............................................................Jeffrey D. Sachs
The Geography of Economic Development

Paper 2..............................................................Robert D. Kaplan
A Sense of the Tragic:
Developmental Dangers in the Twenty-first Century

Paper 3 .........................................................P. H. Liotta
Future Talk:
Building the Hybrid Security Community
in the Euro-Mediterranean
# Table of Contents

Preface ................................................. iii

Introduction ........................................ 5

Economics and Conflict ............................. 8

Democracy and Stability ............................ 11

The Environment as Vulnerability ................. 16

Too Many Spokes, Not Enough Hubs?
NATO, OSCE, CSCM, the EU, the WEU, and
the Security Architecture ......................... 20

Attraction versus Compellance ................... 27

Building the “Hybrid” Community:
The “Fate” of the Euro-Mediterranean ........... 30

In Lieu of Closure:
Towards a Culture of Confidence in the Mediterranean . . . . 32

Appendix A .............................................. 36
BARCELONA DECLARATION
ADOPTED AT THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE
(27 and 28 November 1995)

Appendix B .............................................. 59
FOURTH EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
(Marseilles, 15 and 16 November 2000)
Presidency’s formal conclusions

Notes ...................................................... 71
Preface

This paper is about an extraordinarily complex topic: How the political, cultural, economic, and security geographies of Greater Europe and the Greater Near East converge in the Euro-Mediterranean region, and how the success or failure of this convergence will shape future relations and shared security interests. In addition to describing the “mental map” of the area known as the “Euro-Mediterranean,” this work addresses how economic influence, identity and governance, and environmental stresses influence security. This paper also integrates the coöperative initiatives that have been launched in recent years to address issues of common concern—and mutual benefit—for a region that is neither well defined nor understood.

Despite the progress since the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference held in Barcelona in November 1995, it remains true that to speak honestly about Mediterranean security is to enter a conceptual minefield. But the reality remains that Europe and the Mediterranean are not simply divided by a North-South relationship, and that events in Europe will impact regions far beyond the Mediterranean during this century. A grand experiment in security architecture is taking place; it is not clear that this experiment is doomed to failure. The success or failure of the Euro-Mediterranean process has enormous implications for future U.S. security and interests.

In addition to the occasional paper itself, this work includes the texts of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and the fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Marseilles in November 2000.
It may be a cliché, but it is also an evident truth that how we view the world subtly but definitely affects how we act in it. After all, the roots from the ancient Greek for the word “geography” betray the idea of a “mental map,” an illustration of the world as we choose to see it. How we “draw” that map subtly but vitally determines not only what we see but how we will act in that world.

Equally, when we speak of the business of security—for the individual, the state, the community, and for entire geographic entities—we soon find ourselves mired in a complex web of seemingly endlessly complex contradictions. Nowhere do these contradictions seem more present than when we consider the geography of the Euro-Mediterranean region. Yet when we speak of the Euro-Mediterranean, especially in terms of future issues of security and stability, our conceptual “mental maps” should consider not just physical geography—but political, economic, and cultural geography as well.

One of the often-overlooked (from an American perspective) aspects of the broadening future security architecture in Europe has, over the last decade, represented a challenge to these notions of the Euro-Mediterranean as a geopolitical community where common aspects of security and common interests can be addressed. NATO expansion, in other words, is not the only security measure being tested in the evolving Europe. In November 1995,
the foreign ministers of twenty-seven European and Mediterranean countries agreed on the need to develop long-term partnership building measures—organized into three “baskets” (political, economic, and cultural)—in the region, as well as to focus on global stability and the common (mis)perceptions that contribute to it.\(^1\)

Despite the symbolic progress that has occurred since the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference held in Barcelona in November 1995, it remains true that to speak honestly about Mediterranean security is to enter a conceptual minefield.\(^2\) While some observers insist that it remains impossible to consider the Mediterranean as a geopolitical “whole,” the concept of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue perhaps further aggravates itself when the competing notions of security—“hard” versus “soft,” human security vice state security, cultural integrity as opposed to economic interdependence—begin to threaten the entire strategic construct by which one could even envision a system architecture that would ensure a more certain Euro-Mediterranean relationship, particularly in terms of the “North-South” dynamic.

The reality remains, nevertheless, that Europe and the Mediterranean are not simply divided by a North-South relationship (as some critics of the Barcelona process might suggest the dialogue implies). Equally, since the United States was not a participant in the original Barcelona conference, other admittedly Americo-centric critics might argue that future European-Mediterranean dialogue, without U.S. support, is predestined for failure. From yet another perspective, it could well seem both that the United States lacks interest and that it desires more that Europe and the Mediterranean nations work out their own particular partnerships in the future. Despite the frequent declaration that the Mediterranean region is a vital American interest, for example, the two national security strategies of the United States published in 2000 mention explicitly neither the Mediterranean \textit{per se} as an intrinsic identity, nor the Barcelona process even once.\(^3\)

While all of these criticisms and omissions reveal certain truths, they bring their limitations as well. What is happening in Europe, whether one refers to it as \textit{coöperative security} or \textit{comprehensive security}, has implications for regions far beyond the Mediterranean in the
next century. In essence, a grand experiment in security architecture is taking place. It is not clear that this experiment is doomed to failure.

In April 2000, for example, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, spoke of moving from the balance-of-power Realpolitik among major states that fundamentally characterized much of nineteenth-century Europe to an alternative approach of security communities, “in which states concentrate on shared interests in peaceful development and actively promote diplomacy and negotiation to resolve disagreements.” Admiral Blair’s remarks, notably, draw on the work of a European, Karl Deutsch, who wrote about the importance of security communities for Cold War Europe over four decades ago.

More recently, the idea of such communities has been updated through the work of various scholars dealing with how states and regions deal with mutual, overlapping interests. Scholarship has, for example, addressed the development of “epistemic communities”—in essence, networks of knowledge-based experts who might help develop common interests, frame issues for collective debate, propose specific policies, and identify issues that require negotiation, compromise, and agreement. Such communal approaches, rather than focusing on a realist-based state-to-state interaction, acknowledge changing patterns of information diffusion and decision making, and rely on transnational relationships, state administrators, and international institutions.

Thus, regarding various communal approaches in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue that may have been empowered by the Barcelona process of 1995, there are several conceptual recognitions that might prove useful to consider. Granted, these concepts prove less useful than specific and immediate policy recommendations; at the same time, an appreciation for what these concepts might address would seem an essential first step in any policy implementation process.

First, regarding the Mediterranean region in particular, what may well be changing is the notion that of all the issues of security, issues of military security matter most. Indeed, security—whether one insists on a distinction between “hard” and “soft” security—is about more than protecting the country from external threats;
security includes economic security, environmental security, and human security.\(^8\) (And, in light of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, human security—viewed as emerging from the conditions of daily life and accounting for the basic necessities of food, shelter, employment, health, safety—is, officially or not, part of the dynamic when we speak of creating conditions for a “favorable world order.”\(^9\)) Thus, military forces may well be used for more than simply protecting a nation and its people from traditional, threat-based challenges.

Secondly, there are a number of interlinked issues—economic reform and progress, democratic transition, and environmental stress—that will dramatically determine the success or failure of conflict prevention. Thirdly, there is the consideration that the process itself of Mediterranean dialogue is moving on too many sometimes parallel, sometimes dissimilar, tracks. Finally, there is the issue of “soft” power and its relevance for attraction rather than compellance as a powerful conflict-prevention incentive.

Conceptual frameworks built from these recognitions should incorporate flexibility enough to allow for inevitable contradiction yet provide structure able to accommodate change and provide the potential for progress. As the security environment evolves and as relationships between states and regions grow and become increasingly linked in complex interdependence, so too will the understanding, application, and relevance of new confidence and partnership-building measures. The following conceptual “tensions” are therefore intended to “disturb” the image of what will most cause or deter potential conflict in the future Mediterranean.

**Economics and Conflict**

The desired goal of economic prosperity would seem to be the obvious goal of any state or alliance of like-minded actors in the Mediterranean region. As Roberto Aliboni points out, the Barcelona Declaration proposes a systemic interplay among democracy, integration, and peace as the basic factors affecting root causes of instability.\(^10\) This notional interplay is itself descended from earlier efforts to find means of cooperation in the region, such as those ideas found in the 1993 European Union Commission document
related to the “Future Relations and Coöperation between the Community and the Middle East”:

The Community’s own experience demonstrates that war between previously hostile parties can be made unthinkable through economic integration. While this model cannot easily be transposed to the Middle East, it does suggest that the development of regional economic coöperation can be a powerful tool in reducing the level of conflict, making peace irreversible and encouraging the people of the region to learn to live in peace.¹¹

In 1848, John Stuart Mill made similar claims for the pacific tendencies that commerce had upon conflict: “Commerce, which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by strengthening and multiplying the personal interests which act in natural opposition to it. . . . The great extent and rapid increase of international trade . . . [is] the principal guarantee of the peace of the world.”¹²

While the optimism of the above statements is clear, their certainty is not. At the beginning of the twentieth century, for example, two works focused on the impossibility of future war. The first, which focused on economic integration, was Norman Angell’s *The Great Illusion*, which claimed that war had become so devastating from an economic point of view that no one would ever choose to fight. The second work, and perhaps even more relevant in our age of weapons proliferation, lethal missile technologies, and the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction, comes from the writings of Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch. His perceptive book (now out of print and often difficult to find) bears a revealing, contemporary title: *Is War Now Impossible? Being an Abridgement of the Future in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations (Modern Revivals in Military)*. Bloch argued wars had become so horrible because of the available means that no one could survive one. The avoidance of such devastation itself thus became an ultimate deterrent. Indeed, such logic may well have prevented the Cold War from turning “hot.” Equally, in the contemporary Mediterranean environment, where the perceived threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a security concern, Bloch’s earlier insight has continuing relevance. But it remains worthwhile to remember that only a few short years after Angell and Bloch published their works, World War I broke out.

Offsetting the optimism that economic integration brings greater general prosperity is the inevitability that such integration also
ushers in larger economic disparity. As the political scientist John Mueller notes, the systemic interplay between democracy, integration, and peace can lead to disparity as well as integration: “Democracy is fundamentally a system in which people are (equally) free to become politically unequal.” Such a democracy, of course, seems driven by capitalism more than social responsibility, and seems to promote dangers Ralf Dahrendorf speaks of in his work After 1989: Morals, Revolution, and Civil Society. Dahrendorf suggests that economic values should not dominate politics or else the very idea of liberty would be at risk. A new economism of capitalism would in such case be no less illiberal than that of Marxism.

A even more disparaging review of the perils of economic integration can be found in Martin Feldstein’s by now-infamous-article “EMU and International Conflict,” which contends that the dream of European integration as a means to prevent conflict may well be a delusion. A European central bank might be unresponsive to necessary change, political union might eliminate competitive pressures for structural reform, and inherent protectionism might also bring inevitable confrontation with the United States. By extension, it might seem that a strategy based exclusively on economic integration in the Mediterranean could be condemned at conception.

The Barcelona Declaration is, however, far more than simply a statement of future economic strategy. It remains pertinent to recall that other driving forces—both common and disparate history, culture, religion, regional identity, and past conflictual relations—will shape the future dynamic and that the Barcelona Declaration attempts to recognize this. Further, as argued in Amartya Sen’s 1999 book Development as Freedom, “freedom” itself is the ultimate “end” of development—not economic well-being. In open, democratic societies, individuals have greater capability (which Sen argues is itself a form of freedom) to pursue the lifestyle they desire and have the means to achieve. As one evidence of the power of his argument, Sen suggests that at no time in history has a famine ever occurred within a functioning democracy. Such an outcome thus indicates more than a passing relationship between economics and democracy.
With such contrary arguments in hand, the most conclusive determination one could reasonably make is that the evidence is inconclusive regarding economic integration and conflict prevention. With specific reference to the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, the evidence also points to the tensions that in the North-South relationship, trade and commerce are driven by a “vertical” relationship (with roughly 95 percent of commercial trade flowing between the Maghreb and Southern Europe) while culture, religion, a shared history and identity are defined by “horizontal” relationships (among the nations of Southern Europe and the Maghreb). Such cross-axis relationships do not necessarily suggest that conflict is an inevitable outcome. They do, however, make any dialogue process more dynamic. Further, economic integration, linked with issues of democratic change and environmental stress, will inevitably make conflict prevention an even more daunting challenge.

Democracy and Stability

The concept of a democratic “peace thesis,” although often contested in some quarters these days, cannot be completely dismissed. This thesis suggests that democracies rarely go to war against each other; and further, that democratic states have low levels of internal violence compared with nondemocracies. While admittedly the concept of “democracy” is itself open to much debate, the more positive conceptualization of the democratic peace thesis accepts, as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has phrased it, that “democracy is a non-violent form of internal conflict management.”

Thus, we have the notion of a “democratic security community” in which the rule of law, tolerance of minority and opposition groups, civilian control of military forces, transparent political processes, independent judiciaries, dynamic civil and social institutions, and open and free elections would appear to be a desired end-state for any future European security community. On reflection, nonetheless, the only sine qua non for democracy itself in the above examples is “open and free elections”; all the other qualities can exist in a society not functioning under fully democratic principles.
Yet the political symbolism of the Barcelona Declaration—just as with the symbolism of a European military union independent of NATO—is significant. Perhaps most importantly, the Mediterranean nations who signed the Barcelona process have—without perhaps sufficiently realizing completely what communal interests they now, symbolically, embrace—signed on to support human rights and democratic principles. In light of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, this also means that these Mediterranean nations will not be able to “hide” behind the veil of sovereignty as cleanly as they might have hoped. Perhaps no one expressed this better than the president of the Czech Republic, Václav Havel, when he spoke about the significance of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in March 1999. For Havel, the intervention marked a watershed event suggesting that human beings are indeed more important than the state:

This is probably the first war that has not been waged in the name of “national interests,” but rather in the name of principals and values. If one can say of any war that it is ethical, or that it is being waged for ethical reasons, then it is true of this war. Kosovo [unlike Kuwait] has no oil fields to be coveted; no member nation in the alliance has any territorial demands; Milošević does not threaten the territorial integrity of any member of the alliance. And yet the alliance is at war. It is fighting out of concern for the fate of others. It is fighting because no decent person can stand by and watch the systematic, state-directed murder of other people. It cannot tolerate such a thing. It cannot fail to provide assistance if it is within its power to do. . . . This war places human rights above the rights of state.17

Whether one agrees with the concept or not, there should be some recognition of how “human security” has entered the arena of state, nongovernmental, and international organizational thinking. In an age when supposed such “nontraditional” threats as terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and ethnic conflicts are linked to security challenges like population growth, environmental decline, denial of human rights, lack of development, and poverty rates that foster economic stagnation, social instability, and state collapse, it ought to become obvious that a new set of traditional problems has emerged. These problems require a fundamental rethinking of conflict prevention.

Havel may well be correct in insisting that modern democratic states are defined as much by such qualities as respect for human rights and individual liberties, by the equality their citizens enjoy,
and the existence of a civil society within them, as by their self-interest and ability to protect and enforce their own survival interests. As Havel would have it, the ultimate survival at stake is "universal civic equality and the rule of law—a global civil society."\textsuperscript{18}

As there are regarding the influence of economic integration as the \textit{sole} determining factor in conflict prevention, there are reasons to be cautious of viewing democratic change as exclusively a force for conflict prevention in the Mediterranean. To the contrary, democracy—taken to the extreme and without sufficient recognition of other complex and interdependent factors, such as economic integration, cultural integrity, religion, shared history, divergent national and regional interests—can be the \textit{cause} of conflict. As Mansfield and Snyder have argued, there are limits to the logic that democracy is inherently a more stable form of government. \textit{Mature} democracies—and one would hope that the emerging European Union is the best example of a \textit{mature} democracy that is simultaneously in a state of transition—are likely to be less belligerent, while emerging democracies, those in \textit{transition}, are almost definitely, based on an assessment of the past two centuries, less stable and more prone to war.\textsuperscript{19} Witness the conflicts between "declared democracies" in the former Yugoslavia, between Abkhazia and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan over mountainous Karabakh, Chechnya and the central government of Russia, and one might suspect that democracy itself is a \textit{cause} of war. Even the secretary-general, an obvious advocate of the “democratic peace thesis,” admits to the dangers of democracy of transition:

Democracy is, in essence, a form of non-violent conflict management. But a note of caution is in order. While the end result is highly desirable, the \textit{process} of democratization can be highly destabilizing—especially when states introduce “winner-take-all” electoral systems without adequate provision for human rights. At such times, different groups can become more conscious of their unequal status, and nervous about each other’s power. Too often, they resort to pre-emptive violence.\textsuperscript{20}

Perhaps, in most cases, \textit{peace} may have been a necessary precondition to make democracy \textit{possible} rather than the other way around; if so, this is an important consideration with respect to conflict prevention in the Mediterranean. It would certainly seem that ideological struggles at the end of Cold War allowed democracy to take
hold throughout Europe, just as internal violence is apparently lower in democracies than in non-democracies.

Clearly, the promise of ever-closer union and even of future membership in the EU has helped mitigate the actions of a number of Eastern and Central European nations. In such cases, the attraction of EU association has lessened the potential for violence and even promoted levels of tolerance. As evidence, one need only consider the tendencies to move toward democratic openness in Croatia; the stubborn refusal of Macedonia to become a “failed” state and its almost constant struggle to balance competing tensions among ethnic Slavs and Albanians in its demographic makeup; and the quelling of tensions between Romania and Hungary over ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania. Conversely, the cancellation of the final round of parliamentary elections to prevent a victory by the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria in 1992 and the inclusion of Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party in the Austrian government in 2000 indicate that Europe and the Mediterranean face numerous challenges in both appreciating and incorporating complex democratic principles and processes.

As regards the United States and its support for democracy and human rights, it remains true that the United States takes a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean. Rather than explicitly supporting “promoting democracy and support for human rights”—as the third pillar of American strategic ends—recent American declaratory strategy breaks the Mediterranean region into specific foci, often pointing out “violations” of democratic principle in the Balkans or noting continued tension over Cyprus and in the Aegean. While praising democratic and market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, and the increasingly interlocking relationships of NATO, OSCE, the EU, and the Council of Europe, the document that articulates U.S. national strategy makes no explicit reference to support for democracy or human rights in the Arab world. At best, American strategy (in the section titled “Promoting Democracy”—in the Middle East, North Africa, and Southwest and South Asia) recognizes a “profound respect for Islam. . . . We recognize and honor Islam’s role as a source of inspiration, instruction and moral guidance for hundreds of millions of people. U.S. policy in the region
is directed at the actions of governments and terrorist groups, not peoples or faiths.”22 By implication, nonetheless, this declaration does not expressly support either the influence of Islam on democratic process or even acknowledge that democracy has a specific role to play in these regions. Indeed, some dissident voices in the Arab world have suggested that the United States portrays a hypocritical stance regarding support for democracy and human rights, by refraining from any mention of them in policy statements.

At the same time, some believed there emerged from the war in Kosovo a “Clinton Doctrine,” in which the world community would have an obligation to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide whenever able, and to protect the individual rights of citizens wherever and whenever possible. Yet the mandate itself seemed far from certain. Former secretary of state Madeleine Albright was far less sanguine on the issue; speaking after the president first pronounced support for the new “doctrine,” Albright said: “Some hope . . . that Kosovo will be a precedent for similar interventions around the globe. I would caution against such sweeping conclusions. Every circumstance is unique. Decisions on the use of force will be made . . . on a case-by-case basis.”23 National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, a month later, complicated the case for humanitarian intervention by suggesting (in the specific case of East Timor) that the United States should “weigh its national interests” in a country before deciding to use military power.

The above examples, nonetheless, rather than implying the vacillation of decision makers, only suggest how difficult it is initially to distinguish between core strategic and other significant interests. As regards the issue of conflict prevention in the Mediterranean, all dialogue partners should recognize the danger of absolute conviction when planning mechanisms for future coöperation rather than confrontation in the region. Democracy—just as economics—indeed matters; however, other factors matter as well.

There may well also exist an intriguing relationship between economic practice and democracy. At the conceptual level, for example, Boris Tihi of the University of Sarajevo has made the provocative suggestion that as regards the notion of a market-based economy and democratic practice—two underpinning elements of
the American national security strategy, which most clearly defines post-Cold War American policy—there seems to be an obvious, though often overlooked relationship: While the market-based system exists independently of democratic practice in some nations of the contemporary world, there are apparently no democratic nations with anything other than a market-based economic system. In specific terms, Tihi suggests that democratic practice cannot exist without some form of market practice. Indeed, the pillars of market practice are supportive also of democratic governance: private property, profit as measure of success, latitude of choice and action, and competition. Thus, empirical evidence seems to suggest that it is possible to have some form of “open” economic system in a state that is not completely democratic, while democracy itself cannot exist without open and transparent economic practices.

Finally, evidence from the United Nations University suggests that countries that are afflicted by war also suffer from inequality among social groups. Such inequality may be based on ethnicity, religion, economic class, or national identity, and it is reflected in unequal access to forms of political and social power. The data also suggest that inequality among such social groups predominates even poverty as an explanation for conflict. The implications that such possibility engenders relative to conflict prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue—as well as to future relations in the “North-South dynamic”—seem profound.

The Environment as Vulnerability
In February 1994, the journalist Robert Kaplan published in The Atlantic Monthly an essay titled “The Coming Anarchy,” that struck a nerve in Washington policy circles. Kaplan contended that scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease were destroying the social fabric of West Africa and that such disintegration could be a marker for much of the planet in the future. Kaplan in particular pointed to a Canadian academic, Thomas Homer-Dixon, whose work detailed a bleak future in which growing shortages of water, arable, land, fish, along with rapid population growth and other ills, would breed civil war and strife. The environment would become the national security issue of the twenty-first century.
Although there was an inevitable backlash against Kaplan’s “anarchy” thesis—from defense planners, academics, and environmentalists (who objected to defining the environment as a “security” issue)—there subsequently emerged a recognition that environmental stress does play a role in structural support of societies and states, just as more traditionally understood political, economic, social, and military factors have influenced the causes of conflict. Further, the influence of such stress is immediate and growing: The struggle for water in the Levant is now taken almost as an article of faith as a potential cause of conflict; increased urbanization, pollution, resource depletion, desertification, and soil erosion all will impact the future Maghreb. According to the World Health Organization, the AIDS epidemic has now lowered life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa to forty-five.

Since the publication of Homer-Dixon’s essay, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” a “second wave” of research has focused on how the environment might contribute to conflict, and a “third wave” now seeks to examine why the environment contributes to conflict in specific cases but not in others.

This third wave of research has been addressed by the U.S. government-sponsored State Failure Task Force (as well as by Norwegian peace researchers Wenche Hauge, Tanja Ellington, and Nils Petter Gleditsch). The task force seeks to demonstrate the causal links between environmental security issues (which include environmental scarcity) and state failure. Employing both regression models and a computer “neural network” program, the task force has made some interesting discoveries. Their predictive “mediated environmental model” considered factors of democratization, trade openness, environmental stress, material well-being, vulnerability, and capacity as they contribute to the likelihood of state failure. They also attempted to identify specific vulnerabilities of states and to measure what they term a state’s “capacity” to deal with environmental challenges.

How, for example, is a state dependent on subsistence agriculture? How does a state’s capacity for handling telephone lines influence technological adaptability? How do infant mortality rates, because of their broader effect on other aspects of well-being,
influence the interaction among other factors? Clearly, the lack of a foundational database on issues such as deforestation, water quality, and other environmental “stress” issues is regrettable; the need for further research seems crucial. Notably, as regards the issue of democracy, a separate model based on sub-Saharan Africa results has revealed the not surprising though disturbing indicator that partial democracies—all other conditions being relatively equal—face a risk of failure eleven times greater than an autocratic states under similar conditions of stress.31

Regarding the issue of conflict prevention in the Mediterranean, the influence of environmental factors seems obvious. The perceived disparities between Europe and other Mediterranean nations are also compelling. In particular, population growth rates should be considered as part of the conflict prevention dynamic. From 1950 to 2030, for example, based on 1994 population projections for various countries, the population of Spain was projected to rise by 6 percent; Italy, to rise by 17 percent; Libya by 175 percent; Algeria by 536 percent—and much of this changing demographic was expected to occur in urbanized rather than rural centers of gravity. In the 1999 UN Human Development Report, however, demographic trends indicated a population growth-rate decline for Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal—all southern European countries—and only a 0.2 growth rate for France.32 Whereas, in the previous example, some feared a mass exodus of immigrants from the Maghreb into Europe, the more recent data suggests less alarming and more positive trends. Indeed, some observers suggest that both Spain and Italy may need as many as 300,000 migrants per year to maintain “zero” growth in the years 2000 to 2015.33

Environmental factors, however, may be more reasonably shown to have a causal connection to communal and societal stress. In North Africa, endogenous environmental factors include increased soil salinization, drought, desertification, the depletion of oil and gas resources, and the potential flow of “environmental refugees”—presumably to Europe. Perhaps the most obvious exogenous environmental factor is climate change, including a predicted general temperature rise (from previous centuries) of as much as 3.5°C by 2100.34 Further, the issue of pollution and energy use will
impact future security. In 1990, for example, Spain emitted as much CO\textsubscript{2} as all Northern Africa; that same year, Germany emitted as much CO\textsubscript{2} as all Africa.\textsuperscript{35}

Hans Günter Brauch, of the Peace Research and European Security Studies (AFES-PRESS), has made a specific study of environmental influences as causes of conflict in the future. In the book, *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21st Century*,\textsuperscript{36} Brauch proposes a complex dynamic, in the form of a *survival hexagon*, that illustrates direct and indirect effects and interactions of the six structural causes that may pose a “survival dilemma” for the Mediterranean region, particularly for the Levant and the Maghreb. These factors should not be dismissed lightly. While analysis of historical precedents seems to indicate that scarcities of renewable resources have rarely been direct causes of war between states, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that such input factors as described in the “survival hexagon” below do contribute to wars within nations and among formerly peaceful though different communal identities.

According to Brauch, these six *structural causes* are instrumental in medium-term (2000-2020) and long-term (2020-2050) socio-economic effects. At best, these causes offer possible “conjunctural” outcomes without specification as to when and how they will occur, simply because no methodology exists for foreseeing singular events. The absence of empirical evidence or specific methodology to predict more accurately outcomes does not, however, obviate the implication that environmental change—just as with the influences of democratic change and economic openness—will affect future security stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

While the expectation remains low that *interstate* war will occur between European and the Mediterranean states at the beginning of this century; the possibility of “ethnic” clashes—often fuelled by religious differences, societal infrastructure collapse, and *intragroup* war in the Mediterranean remains. Yet the terms “ethnic,” “religious,” or “tribal” warfare are themselves counterproductive, and problematic in their all too frequent usage as explanation for conflict. As Michael Renner has noted concerning the Rwandan apocalypse of 1994, the conflict itself was not “a simple case of tribal bloodletting [but was instead] rooted in a complex web of explosive
population growth, severe land shortages, land degradation, and rapidly falling food production, lack of non-agricultural employment, dwindling export earnings, and the pain of structural economic adjustment.”37

Too Many Spokes, Not Enough Hubs? NATO, OSCE, C SCM, the EU, the WEU, and the Security Architecture

During the 1990s, the evolving concept of a European security architecture focused on the synergistic interaction of institutional structures, norms and procedures, and processes. As one of the institutions that underpinned the strength of this architecture, NATO, for example—as its 1999 Strategic Concept demonstrated—appeared to be transforming itself from a collective self-defense alliance (directed against an external threat, the former USSR) into a coöperative security arrangement that could deal with security aggression or concern from within member states or—as the interventions in former Yugoslavia illustrate—beyond the geographic borders of alliance members.38
Some scholars, such as Martin Ortega (of the European Union Institute for Security Studies), have called for a furthering of multilateral Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in military and defense issues in order to “prevent tensions and crises and to maintain peace and stability by means of coöperative security,” as the 1999 Stuttgart conclusions phrased it. Others, such as Mohamed Kadry Said, have noted that although the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue has no specifically mentioned military dimension, the opportunities for improved coöperation and dialogue in this security dimension are today better than ever. Skeptics from the Arab world, however, who can provide historical precedent in justification, express strong misgivings about how the Euro-Mediterranean process would affect the individual state economies and the structure of the Middle East peace process. Indeed, unilateral, or perhaps increased European Union military involvement in the Mediterranean may only deepen Arab suspicions.

In terms of conflict prevention, it might be prudent to emphasize some perhaps obvious perception discrepancies. The most fundamental self-interest of European partners in the future Mediterranean is security and stability; “southern” partners, on the other hand, look to the North for economic coöperation, as well as for prosperity and development. Yet one should not ignore the evidence that recognition of and respect for cultural integrity, social realities, and human identities constitute yet another driving force in the Euro-Mediterranean process. These contrary perceptions do not always envision similar means or similar ends. Failure to recognize these contradictions nonetheless, might well lead to conflict in the future because of perception discrepancy.

A review of previous attempts to make progress in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue demonstrates that Europe has undertaken numerous regional and subregional approaches to the furthering the cause of peace and stability. In some cases, as with the Conference on Security and Coöperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM)—a reflection of the earlier Helsinki and CSCE processes that came about during the height of the Cold War—the United States objected to specific discussions (because of Libyan involvement). As the table below indicates, goals, tasks, and participants in these fora varied.
Given the efforts illustrated above, and the wide diversity of security interests and concerns, one should recognize that while NATO was and remains the main defense organization for Europeans, it might not prove the most effective primary driving force in furthering security dialogues in the Mediterranean. Moreover, even as the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) seeks to provide a more capable power projection force for Europe, as part of a legitimate military arm of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and even as there are legitimate military security concerns in Mediterranean subregions (such as the Balkans or North Africa), neither NATO, the WEU, nor any of its successor organizations should be the primary driver in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. If anything, the current dialogue suffers from too much dialogue. A further illustration of the ongoing Mediterranean dialogues points to a complicated security dynamic in the region.
| FORA, PARTICIPANTS, AND STATUS OF CBM EFFORTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| FORA                          | START           | EUROPEAN       | MEDITERRANEAN                  | STATUS OF THE   |
|                               |                 | PARTICIPANTS   | DIALOGUE PARTNERS              | DEVELOPMENT     |
| Euro-Arab Dialogue            | 1973            | 6 & 9 EC members | members of the Arab League     | defunct         |
| CSCE (Helsinki)               | 1975            | 35 CSCE countries | not specified                  | little relevance|
| OSCE (Budapest)               | 1994-1999       | 55 OSCE countries | MPFC: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia |
| C SCM Proposal (Spain, Italy) | 1990/92         | 24 coastal countries | Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia |
|                              |                 |                 | Albanian, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia | USA opposed |
| C SCM Proposal (Inter-         | 1992-97(Malta)  | parliamentarians of 24 coastal countries, plus USA, Russian Federation, UK | 1999 conference in Tunis |
| parliamentariy Union          |                 |                 |                               |                  |
| 5+5 Dialogue                  | 1990(Malta)     | Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta | Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya, Tunisia, | failed due to problems of Algeria and Libya |
| Summit                        |                 |                 |                               |                  |
| Mediterranean Forum for       | 1994 (Egypt)    | France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain | Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey | continues as a tool for the Barcelona process |
| Dialogue and Cooperation      |                 |                 |                               |                  |
| Declaration and Work Programme: |               |                 |                               |                  |
| Medieranean Subgroup          | 1992            | 10 WEU members (+ associate members) | Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania | ongoing |

Source: Adapted with permission from Hans Günter Brauch, Antonio Marquina, Abdelwahab Biad, Chapter 1, “Introduction” Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships for the 21st Century (London: Macmillan, 2000). The authors note the contribution of Alberto Bin, Political Affairs Division, NATO, in stimulating the formation of this table.
## Members of the Mediterranean Security Dialogues: NATO, OSCE, WEU, EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogue Forum</th>
<th>Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation</th>
<th>Mediterranean Cooperation Group</th>
<th>Mediterranean Subgroup</th>
<th>Barcelona Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Members</strong></td>
<td>55 countries</td>
<td>19 countries</td>
<td>10 of 15 EU members, 5 EU observers, 5 associated members (Island, Norway, Turkey), 10 associated partners (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic)</td>
<td>15 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Members</strong></td>
<td>Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia</td>
<td>Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Algeria (as of March 2000)</td>
<td>Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania</td>
<td>Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brauch, and others. The author also thanks Alberto Bin, Political Affairs Division, NATO, for discussion that led to the formation of this table.

The positive aspect of such dialogue, of course, is that discussions on security are taking place at all. These overlapping organizations form part of what could best be termed “epistemic communities,” which, in their ideal and most innovative applications, are not only self-adaptive but also learning organizations. Communal dialogue provides a means to define individual and “common” interests, as well as to formulate policies and establish norms based on articulated cause-and-effect relationships. As such, the diffusion of new ideas may well lead to new and more cooperative patterns of behavior. Such cooperative security mechanisms could one day provide worldwide what Henry Kissinger wrote of as:

> creative solutions [that will] build overlapping structures, some based on common political and economic principles as in the Western Hemisphere; some combining shared principles as in the Western hemisphere; some combining shared principles and security concerns as in the Atlantic area and Northeast Asia; others based largely on economic ties as in the relations in Southeast Asia.
Such organizational dialogues can also contribute to what Brauch terms “anticipatory learning” as a tool of crisis prevention, recognizing, respecting, and making commitment to solve future challenges. The danger of multiple dialogues, however, is that they may ultimately complicate the specific goal of regional peace and stability and thus inadvertently lead to conflict, rather than prevent it.

As one example of this specific cause and unintended effect, one could adduce the Kosovo crisis of 1999. While many consider that the Paris Peace Agreement of 1995 (commonly referred to as the Dayton Accord) led to the (so-far continuous) cessation of conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the specific omission of, or even consideration for, ethnic Albanians in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo directly contributed to the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the eventual outbreak of conflict and the worst humanitarian refugee crisis in Europe since World War II.

What seems most logical for the above dialogues is simplification, closer coördination among participants, and more specific focus on desirable outcomes. At the most basic, conceptual level, future regional or subregional dialogues should center on a metaphor of a “hub and spoke” with respect to coördination among different (and sometimes apparently disparate) organizations in the Mediterranean. Such a system would allow flexibility in any future Euro-Mediterranean dialogue so that different processes could at least establish some form of common goals, even perhaps codes of conduct and procedural measures by which to address future issues—not the least of which is conflict prevention.

Perhaps multilateral “core” architecture, with bilateral or specific subregional “spokes” would help overcome perceptions of intimidation from the North and provide assurances of “voice” and “partnership” both with and within the South. The time for an OSCE model—in effect, an Organization for Security and Coöperation in the Mediterranean, based on partnership building measures (PBM)s and partnership building projects (PBPs)—has arrived. Such an instrument for building confidence and partnership in the future Mediterranean, despite earlier American and French objections to the C SCM initiative, may have merit. Although the 1975 Helsinki accords provided CBMs between distrustful adversaries during the
Cold War, an OSCM would establish positive and coöperative partnership measures between European and Mediterranean states.46

The timeline may be more pressing than we realize. Conflict prevention, with peace and stability, economic progress, and stabilization, and support for environmental or human security challenges would represent the central hub; the controlling organizations might be a joint EU-Mediterranean Council, or even a U.S.-EU-Mediterranean Partnership Council. Within governments themselves, there is a immediate need to break down institutional barriers and bring about “horizontal,” interdisciplinary policy networks. Just as states in the Euro-Mediterranean process seek coördination on a wide variety of security and development issues, so too must security policy experts within governments expand their knowledge bases to consider developmental issues and development experts might do well to incorporate their experience in security terms.

If anything—again, as the Kosovo crisis of 1999 may demonstrate—the Mediterranean cannot expect to rely consistently on supraregional or “international” organizations such as the UN to mediate or even affect security issues so as to forestall critical events. Equally, making a reasoned and logical argument against an early-warning system for conflict prevention, especially in humanitarian emergencies, James Miskel and Richard Norton have offered a blistering critique of why conflict-prevention early-warning systems are bound to fail—because of those who would have to act:

Ultimately, early warning systems envision a world where decisions about early humanitarian intervention are made by foreign policy experts in Western governments and the UN as soon as indications of an impending catastrophe manifest themselves. . . . [Yet] foreign policy experts are reluctant to commission early intervention and . . . their reluctance is not based on the absence of early-warning information. The implication is that construction of a formal early-warning system will not improve the international community’s responsiveness during the early stages of humanitarian crises. . . . [Thus] we see little value in investing in scarce intellectual and financial resources in the construction and maintenance of a formal, international early-warning system for humanitarian emergencies. Our analysis of three RBZ [Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire] crises suggests that such a system will not improve the responsiveness of the UN or its leading member states during the early phases of humanitarian emergencies.47

Early warning, in essence, admittedly means little or nothing without some form of commitment to early action, in the form of
military, civil, or joint civil-military responses; political will is therefore absolutely necessary. Equally, such a mechanism for early intervention requires the right action, in terms of timing, goals, forms of response, and actors or coalitions involved. Yet because there is a perception discrepancy in the Mediterranean, there might well be unintended and negative outcomes from the immediate establishment of a joint early-warning/crisis intervention mechanism. Specifically, due to the fear or mistrust, some states would resist such a system and would not act coöperatively. Indeed, an early-warning/crisis intervention mechanism might actually prove dangerous.

What might be lost in terms of effectiveness could nonetheless be offset in terms of significance. As such, early warning would be an important and symbolic, if modest initial approach to the entire partnership-building framework. Toward that end, Stephen Calleya of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies has recently tabled a specific proposal for the establishment of a Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Center.48

Again, as with those who are suspicious of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership process because of historical precedent, states, communities, and alignments must move beyond traditional recognitions of interests toward more common interests. To be blunt, there is a financial reason for doing so. The staggering cost of natural disasters (approaching $100 billion in 1999) and the seven wars of the 1990s (not including Kosovo), of $199 billion could have been avoided had greater attention been given to prevention.49 The challenges for the future Euro-Mediterranean partnership are pressing and real.

Attraction versus Compellance
Thus far, much of the discussion regarding conflict prevention, as well as confidence and partnership-building measures, has centered on aspects of security—both “hard” and “soft” security.50 Perhaps not enough discussion has centered on aspects of “hard” and “soft” power—and why inevitably the United States will be drawn into a Euro-Mediterranean “trialogue.” The identity of power and its distribution, the argument suggests, have become
multidimensional, structures are inherently more complex, and states themselves are more permeable.51

Perhaps equally important as the notion of what constitutes a nation’s—or a region’s—security are the considerations of power. Aside from the necessary aspects of protection of territory and the lives of citizens, other dynamics affect security as well. Along with the information transformation that is occurring throughout the world, reflected in the proliferation of technology, globalization, and increasing linkages among nations and regions comes the attraction of styles of governance and openness of economic systems. America, for example, for good or ill, is the world’s predominant military power. Yet, leaving aside America’s ability to compel potential allies or adversaries to its will, “soft” power provides incentive for attraction to become an incentive for other nations and regions to involve themselves with America.

“Soft” power—whether it be cultural, technological, or ideological appeal, or simply efficiency—suggests attraction rather than compellance and can prove persuasive in securing compliance to norms and institutions, or making one’s position legitimate in the eyes of other actors. In the contemporary environment, it seems that a nation’s “soft power” may be at least as important as a nation’s “hard power” (a state’s ability to compel).

Specifically, “soft power” focuses on attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing other states and actors to follow, and by leading groups to agree on common norms and institutions that produce desired behavior. Through the use of soft power, a state can make its power legitimate without the expenditure of traditional economic or military resources.52

The implications for the future Euro-Mediterranean are tremendous. One need only recognize how the attraction of EU membership has furthered compliance with expected standards of civil society. The rights of ethnic minorities, in the Baltics and in Central and Southeast Europe, for example, were upheld because of community expectations that civil societies recognize entire populaces rather than privileged majorities. One need not look for incentives much beyond nearer-term NATO and EU membership for Bulgaria and Romania, and even far-distant possibilities for Macedonia and Albania—all of whom supported the intervention
against Yugoslavia in 1999, even at the expense of great economic, social, and civil distress within these nations. The election results in Austria in 2000 show how Europe sought to mandate perceived standards for government leaders.

“Soft” power is far more than an ethereal concept and could prove a powerful influence in the Euro-Mediterranean. In terms of “soft” power, the United States is an information technology superpower. As such, the indifference and ambiguity the United States has thus far shown toward Euro-Mediterranean partnership should not imply a permanent distance. Perhaps there should be compelling evidence presented as to why and how future U.S. involvement would seem essential. Indeed, one of the critical issues of the future will be inclusion rather than exclusion. With the furthering of the Barcelona process, there seems to be powerful evidence of working toward inclusion not only in the Levant and the Maghreb but in the wider Mediterranean as well. Iraq, whatever future form it takes, as well as the emerging Iran, should form part of this dynamic of inclusion.

Finally, it should be noted that in providing “assistance” to other nations, “soft” power itself can prove a more powerful incentive than simply foreign aid or foreign military assistance. In correcting their original argument for “foreign aid” in their article “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy,” made in the January 1996 issue of Foreign Affairs, Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy note the error of their original assumptions:

U.S. foreign aid is neither focused enough to enhance U.S. national security nor generous enough to make a real contribution to the needs of the poorest developing countries. . . . [Our] subsequent, more concentrated look at the pivotal states, and at existing patterns of U.S. foreign aid, led us to amend that argument. For the most part, we learned, the pivotal states not only do not need foreign aid per se, but they also do not want it. Rather than seeking a relatively few dollars from USAID [United States Agency for International Development], the more developed pivotal states are instead looking for assistance in the form of technology transfers, trade and investment, and high-level political support for their diplomatic initiatives.53

Again, the “soft” power parallel for the Euro-Mediterranean process seems profound, not only with respect to the issue of aid and sustainable development. The desired end-states of peace and stability are better fostered through incentive and political support,
through technologies that allow social transformation—through partnership—rather than through subordination.

**Building the “Hybrid” Community: The “Fate” of the Euro-Mediterranean**

Admittedly, the phrase “epistemic security community” is at best a mutating hybrid and at worst an undeniable oxymoron. Yet the need for such a hybrid is powerful: to further the intent of the original Barcelona Declaration, to build a long-term knowledge base able to respond to uncertainty in an age of new technology, and to deepen understanding of root causes that strain the future Euro-Mediterranean relationship. The epistemic security community is more than a bureaucratic coalition with a common information base embracing disparate beliefs. On the contrary, the epistemic security community would comprise a “community bridge” (to include a substantive research program), one that would increasingly shape the decisions and policies of political leaders during conditions of complexity and change. The epistemic security community, therefore, would comprise more than a “knowledge elite” to whom political leaders would defer to for policy guidance and information.

Previously suggested characteristics of the epistemic community thus include:

- common principle beliefs that provide rationale for social action among community members;
- shared causal beliefs, understandings, and practices derived from analysis of common problems and which serves to demonstrate multiple linkages between policy actions and desired outcomes;
- shared notions of valid actions and the criteria appropriate to resolve dispute;
- a common policy endeavor based on common practice and in the belief that consequent actions support human welfare;
- the solidarity of common interests in collective betterment as well as shared aversion to policies that are non-supportive of the community.

While this hybrid community would possess much of the characteristics of the above descriptions of the epistemic community—with the exception of cultivating a dedicated “knowledge elite”—such a group should also embrace the similar conceptual
frameworks that Karl Deutsch originally outlined in the 1950s in attempting to describe the idea of security communities. Specifically, Deutsch used the phrase “security community” in 1957 to describe a group of states whose members share norms and values, and whose “dependable expectations of peaceful change” drive common resolution of differences and rule out force as a means of resolving differences. In perhaps overly elaborate terms, Ernst Haas suggests that such communities “profess beliefs in extracommunity reality tests.”

The Euro-Mediterranean region, nonetheless, does not share common norms and values, and it would likely fail the extracommunity reality test. The Barcelona Declaration recognized this problem by not mentioning “military” interregional coöperation because such a suggestion might immediately thwart the larger purpose and significance of recognizing differences and finding common solutions. That said, a number of observers, particularly Martin Ortega, argue for such an outcome in order to address larger linkages, and commonalities, between issues of “hard” and “soft” security.

The contending tensions between idealistic principles and pragmatic realities thus dictate the hybrid necessity of epistemic security communities for the Euro-Mediterranean. The failure to recognize the increasing complexities and to build a network of committed community specialists will only lead to more frequent crises in which policy makers will be largely in the dark. Whether one considers the increased pressures of globalization or regional environmental issues, an informed “community bridge”—of diplomats, scientists, researchers, academics, regional leaders—will be needed to perceive cause-and-effect relationships, make sound choices, and take appropriate courses of action. Further, such communities can shed light on the complex interlinkages of particular policy choices, help define the interests—both the self-interests of states and communal interests of the region—and help formulate policies.

Decision makers, sadly, do not always recognize until crises or structural shocks occur that there exists a methodology for analysis and comprehension of complex issues and linkages. While one purpose of the epistemic security community may well be to
induce systemic shocks, their larger purpose is to prevent them. Thus, community members share relatively similar interests as well as often similar aversions to certain unanticipated or unforeseen outcomes. John Ruggie, for example, has noted that communities that share these tensions might tend to form around an episteme, providing a social reality for shared symbols, reference, mutual expectations, and mutual predictability.61

As regards the epistemic security community in the Euro-Mediterranean, the intent is to develop the “habit”—or, as the ancient Greeks termed it, the ethos—of cooperation and to emphasize the benefits of participation for all regional members. General principles for the future Euro-Mediterranean security might thus include the expectations that members

- generally will not plan or intend to confront each other through the use of force, and instead rely on alternative methods and principles of community resolution;
- remain committed to supporting collective efforts to resolve communal and regional pivots of friction (to include the ever-present dynamic of the “cold peace”—rather than “hot war”—between Israel and the Arab world);
- contribute to humanitarian and other human security issues as they arise, and support initiatives to prevent foreseeable future crises;
- are open to contributing forces, material, and financial support to regional operations, and support diplomatic solutions;
- may eventually consider joint operations between community defense forces in the future to build trust, enhance confidence, and create the expectation of further cooperation.

In Lieu of Closure: Toward a Culture of Confidence in the Mediterranean

What occurred in Barcelona in 1995 was not a beginning but a continuation, just as the process of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue—no matter how slow or even aimless it may seem—proceeds in a forward direction. Time, nonetheless, may be more critical than any of us realize. But there are warning indicators in the Mediterranean. The time to streamline organizational structures, integrate cooperative measures and general codes of conduct, and establish partnership-building measures is now.

Just as we faced a security dilemma in the Cold War, so may some states in the future Mediterranean face what Brauch refers to as a “survival dilemma.” Equally, just as the concept of security
once meant either the absence of an ability to control fear and distrust through confidence-building measures, the future Mediterranean may need to define itself through a commitment to a new “mental map” of security—as the presence of trust, confidence, and commitment to internal or external conflict prevention. The establishment of sound partnership-building measures now will likely help alleviate future conflictual situations.

In conclusion, there appears to be a relation between economics and expanded trade as keys to building democratic societies. Just how applicable this link is and how it can be best exploited (as, say, in the Balkans) is perhaps a central question. Further, Europe wants to be an actor. The Barcelona “process” was an attempt to show Europe’s interest and intent to become more involved in the Mediterranean—even, if possible, to secure some credit for Middle East peace. Yet the effect of such perhaps eventual peace may well represent a “post-Middle East peace process” environment as ambiguous and profound as the post-Cold War effect had on the North Atlantic relationship. As we know, the end of the Cold War brought conflict to Europe, rather than prevented it.

The Mediterranean nations of both the Maghreb and the Levant, as well as Europe, will likely continue to look to the United States for assistance. Even as the Middle East peace process moves haltingly forward, the inevitability that some form of “cold peace” will come to the Middle East will impact the region in much the same way that the end of the Cold War impacted Central Europe. NATO, in the view of some, is increasingly irrelevant to any future Euro-Mediterranean framework. Nonetheless, while little apparent progress has been made since the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, the political symbolism—just as with the symbolism of European military union independent of NATO—is very significant. Perhaps most importantly, Mediterranean nations that signed the Barcelona Declaration have—without perhaps sufficiently realizing what they have done—signed on to support human rights and democratic principles. In light of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, this also means that these Mediterranean nations will not be able to “hide” behind the veil of sovereignty as safely as had been previously hoped.
There is limited complementarity between NATO and the European Union. The dissolution of the Western European Union by 2003 will help erase difference and tensions, perhaps, but it is not at all clear how the EUROCORPS and EUROMARFAR will smoothly “fit” within the security architecture of the region—both in Europe and in Mediterranean. In truth, NATO’s most recent Strategic Concept is viewed privately by some Mediterranean nations as a direct threat, and justification for NATO as a future intervention force. This view also influences the resistance of many nations to seriously consider forms of military cooperation for the area. Equally, such perspectives may well be myopic. Indeed, some (perhaps Americo-centric) observers suggest the notion of a Euro-Mediterranean dialogue as flawed from conception. Such observers argue that the U.S. cannot be ignored and must be incorporated into a U.S.-Euro-Mediterranean “trialogue” before any meaningful accomplishments can take place.

As the Mediterranean security environment evolves and as Euro-Mediterranean relationships between states and regions grow and become increasingly linked in complex interdependence, so will the understanding, application, and relevance of new confidence and partnership-building measures. The conceptual “tensions” discussed in this paper have been intended to “disturb” images of what will most surely cause or deter future potential conflict in the future Mediterranean. As such, these ideas represent neither beginning nor end but a continuance of what is a positive, progressive action in the Mediterranean region.

Regarding the image of conflict prevention, David Hamburg, president emeritus of the Carnegie Corporation, provides some appropriate concluding remarks:

If there is friendly contact in the context of equal status, especially if such contact is supported by relevant authorities, and if the contact is embedded in cooperative activity and fostered by a mutual aid ethic, then there is likely to be a strong positive outcome. Under these conditions, the more contact the better. Such contact is then associated with improved attitudes between previously suspicious or hostile groups as well as with constructive changes in patterns of interaction between them. (The) power of shared, highly valued superordinate goals can only be achieved by cooperative effort. Such goals can override the differences that people bring to the situation and often have a powerful, unifying effect. Classic experiments readily made strangers at a boys’ camp into enemies by isolating them from one another and heightening competition.
But when powerful superordinate goals were introduced, enemies were transformed into friends.63

One is reminded of Camus’s stunning novel set in Algeria, *The Stranger*, of its antiprotagonist’s untimely end brought about by his self-imposed isolation. As one looks at the future Euro-Mediterranean partnership, surely the incentives for inclusion vice exclusion, mutual involvement rather than mutual disregard, seem more compelling now than ever. Accordingly, to prevent future shock, the time for future talk has come.
APPENDIX A

BARCELONA DECLARATION
ADOPTED AT THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE

28 November 1995

° The Council of the European Union, represented by its President, Mr Javier SOLANA, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain,
° The European Commission, represented by Mr Manuel MARIN, VicePresident,
° Germany, represented by Mr Klaus KINKEL, ViceChancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
° Algeria, represented by Mr Mohamed Salah DEMBRI, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
° Austria, represented by Mrs Benita FERREROWALDNER, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
° Belgium, represented by Mr Erik DERYCKE, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
° Cyprus, represented by Mr Alecos MICHAELIDES, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
° Denmark, represented by Mr Ole Loensmann POULSEN, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
° Egypt, represented by Mr Amr MOUSSA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
° Spain, represented by Mr Carlos WESTENDORP, State Secretary for Relations with the European Community,
° Finland, represented by Mrs Tarja HALONEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
° France, represented by Mr Hervé de CHARETTE, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
° Greece, represented by Mr Károlos PAPOULIAS, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
° Ireland, represented by Mr Dick SPRING, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
° Israel, represented by Mr Ehud BARAK, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Italy, represented by Mrs Susanna AGNELLI, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Jordan, represented by Mr AbdelKarim KABARITI, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Lebanon, represented by Mr Fares BOUEZ, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Luxembourg, represented by Mr Jacques F. POOS, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Coöperation,

Malta, represented by Prof. Guido DE MARCO, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Morocco, represented by Mr Abdellatif FILALI, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

the Netherlands, represented by Mr Hans van MIERLO, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Portugal, represented by Mr Jaime GAMA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

the United Kingdom, represented by Mr Malcolm RIFKIND QC MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,

Syria, represented by Mr Farouk AL-SHARAA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Sweden, represented by Mrs Lena HJELM-WALLEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Tunisia, represented by Mr Habib Ben YAHIA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Turkey, represented by Mr Deniz BAYKAL, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

the Palestinian Authority, represented by Mr Yassir ARAFAT, President of the Palestinian Authority, taking part in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona:

...stressing the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and moved by the will to give their future relations a new dimension, based on comprehensive coöperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history;
Future Talk: Building the Hybrid Security Community in the Euro-Mediterranean

aware that the new political, economic and social issues on both sides of the Mediterranean constitute common challenges calling for a coordinated overall response;
resolved to establish to that end a multilateral and lasting framework of relations based on a spirit of partnership, with due regard for the characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each of the participants;
regarding this multilateral framework as the counterpart to a strengthening of bilateral relations which it is important to safeguard, while laying stress on their specific nature;
stressing that this Euro-Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interests of the peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute to their success. The participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and principles mentioned in the letter of invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including the principle land for peace, with all that this implies;
convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership,
hereby agree to establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants the Euro-Mediterranean partnership through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, these being the three aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.
Political and Security Partnership: Establishing a Common Area of Peace and Stability

The participants express their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are a common asset which they pledge to promote and strengthen by all means at their disposal. To this end they agree to conduct a strengthened political dialogue at regular intervals, based on observance of essential principles of international law, and reaffirm a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability.

In this spirit they undertake in the following declaration of principles to:

- act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international law, in particular those arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are party;
- develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system;
- respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex;
- give favourable consideration, through dialogue between the parties, to exchanges of information on matters relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, racism and xenophobia;
- respect and ensure respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies, promote tolerance between different groups in society and combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia.

The participants stress the importance of proper education in the matter of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

- respect their sovereign equality and all rights inherent in their sovereignty, and fulfil in good faith the obligations they have assumed under international law;
- respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States, as reflected in agreements between relevant parties;
- refrain, in accordance with the rules of international law, from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of another partner.
respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners;

settle their disputes by peaceful means, call upon all participants to renounce recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another participant, including the acquisition of territory by force, and reaffirm the right to fully exercise sovereignty by legitimate means in accordance with the UN Charter and international law;

strengthen their cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism, in particular by ratifying and applying the international instruments they have signed, by acceding to such instruments and by taking any other appropriate measure;

fight together against the expansion and diversification of organized crime and combat the drugs problem in all its aspects;

promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons free zones including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.

The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.

Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms.

Refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW.

Promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation.

consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an “area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean”, including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.

**Economic and Financial Partnership: Creating an Area of Shared Prosperity**

The participants emphasize the importance they attach to sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view to achieving their objective of creating an area of shared prosperity.
The partners acknowledge the difficulties that the question of debt can create for the economic development of the countries of the Mediterranean region. They agree, in view of the importance of their relations, to continue the dialogue in order to achieve progress in the competent fora.

Noting that the partners have to take up common challenges, albeit to varying degrees, the participants set themselves the following long-term objectives:

° acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development;
° improvement of the living conditions of their populations, increase in the employment level and reduction in the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean region;
° encouragement of regional coöperation and integration.

With a view to achieving these objectives, the participants agree to establish an economic and financial partnership which, taking into account the different degrees of development, will be based on:

° the progressive establishment of a free-trade area;
° the implementation of appropriate economic coöperation and concerted action in the relevant areas;
° a substantial increase in the European Union’s financial assistance to its partners.

A) FREE-TRADE AREA

The free-trade area will be established through the new Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and free-trade agreements between partners of the European Union. The parties have set 2010 as the target date for the gradual establishment of this area which will cover most trade with due observance of the obligations resulting from the WTO.

With a view to developing gradual free trade in this area: tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in manufactured products will be progressively eliminated in accordance with timetables to be negotiated between the partners; taking as a starting point traditional trade flows, and as far as the various agricultural policies allow and with due respect to the results achieved within the GATT negotiations, trade in agricultural products will be progressively liberalized
through reciprocal preferential access among the parties; trade in services including right of establishment will be progressively liberalized having due regard to the GATS agreement.

The participants decide to facilitate the progressive establishment of this free-trade area through

° the adoption of suitable measures as regard rules of origin, certification, protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and competition;

° the pursuit and the development of policies based on the principles of market economy and the integration of their economies taking into account their respective needs and levels of development;

° the adjustment and modernization of economic and social structures, giving priority to the promotion and development of the private sector, to the upgrading of the productive sector and to the establishment of an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework for a market economy. They will likewise endeavour to mitigate the negative social consequences which may result from this adjustment, by promoting programmes for the benefit of the neediest populations;

° the promotion of mechanisms to foster transfers of technology.

**B) ECONOMIC COÖPERATION AND CONCERTED ACTION**

Coöperation will be developed in particular in the areas listed below and in this respect the participants:

acknowledge that economic development must be supported both by internal savings, the basis of investment, and by direct foreign investment. They stress the importance of creating an environment conducive to investment, in particular by the progressive elimination of obstacles to such investment which could lead to the transfer of technology and increase production and exports;

affirm that regional coöperation on a voluntary basis, particularly with a view to developing trade between the partners themselves, is a key factor in promoting the creation of a freetrade area;

encourage enterprises to enter into agreements with each other and undertake to promote such coöperation and industrial modernization by providing a favourable environment and regulatory framework. They consider it necessary to adopt and to implement a technical support programme for SMEs;

emphasize their interdependence with regard to the environment, which necessitates a regional approach and increased coöperation, as well as better coordination of existing multilateral programmes, while confirming their attachment to the Barcelona Convention and the Mediterranean Action Plan. They recognize the importance of reconciling economic development with environmental protection, of integrating environmental concerns into the relevant aspects of economic policy and of mitigating the negative environmental consequences which might result. They undertake to
establish a short and medium-term priority action programme, including in connection with combating desertification, and to concentrate appropriate technical and financial support on those actions;

recognize the key role of women in development and undertake to promote their active participation in economic and social life and in the creation of employment;

stress the importance of the conservation and rational management of fish stocks and of the improvement of cooperation on research into stocks, including aquaculture, and undertake to facilitate scientific training and research and to envisage creating joint instruments;

acknowledge the pivotal role of the energy sector in the economic Euro-Mediterranean partnership and decide to strengthen cooperation and intensify dialogue in the field of energy policies. They also decide to create the appropriate framework conditions for investments and the activities of energy companies, cooperating in creating the conditions enabling such companies to extend energy networks and promote link-ups;

recognize that water supply together with suitable management and development of resources are priority issues for all Mediterranean partners and that cooperation should be developed in these areas;

agree to cooperate in modernizing and restructuring agriculture and in promoting integrated rural development. This cooperation will focus in particular on technical assistance and training, on support for policies implemented by the partners to diversify production, on the reduction of food dependency and on the promotion of environment-friendly agriculture. They also agree to cooperate in the eradication of illicit crops and the development of any regions affected.

The participants also agree to cooperate in other areas and, to that effect:

stress the importance of developing and improving infrastructures, including through the establishment of an efficient transport system, the development of information technologies and the modernization of telecommunications. They agree to draw up a programme of priorities for that purpose;

undertake to respect the principles of international maritime law, in particular freedom to provide services in international transport and free access to international cargoes. The results of the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations on maritime transport services being conducted within the WTO will be taken into account when agreed;

undertake to encourage cooperation between local authorities and in support of regional planning;

recognizing that science and technology have a significant influence on socioeconomic development, agree to strengthen scientific research capacity and development, contribute to the training of scientific and technical staff and promote participation in joint research projects based on the creation of scientific networks;
agree to promote cooperation on statistics in order to harmonize methods and exchange data.

C) FINANCIAL COOPERATION

The participants consider that the creation of a free-trade area and the success of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership require a substantial increase in financial assistance, which must above all encourage sustainable indigenous development and the mobilization of local economic operators. They note in this connection that:

- the Cannes European Council agreed to set aside ECU 4 685 million for this financial assistance in the form of available Community budget funds for the period 1995-1999. This will be supplemented by EIB assistance in the form of increased loans and the bilateral financial contributions from the Member States;
- effective financial cooperation managed in the framework of a multiannual programme, taking into account the special characteristics of each of the partners is necessary;
- sound macro-economic management is of fundamental importance in ensuring the success of the partnership. To this end they agree to promote dialogue on their respective economic policies and on the method of optimizing financial cooperation.

Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs: Developing Human Resources, Promoting Understanding between Cultures and Exchanges between Civil Societies

The participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other.

In this spirit, the participants agree to establish a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. To this end:

- they reaffirm that dialogue and respect between cultures and religions are a necessary precondition for bringing the peoples closer. In this connection they stress the importance of the role the mass media can play in the reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures as a source of mutual enrichment;
- they stress the essential nature of the development of human resources, both as regards the education and training of young people in particular and in the area of culture. They express their intent to promote cultural exchanges and knowledge of other languages,
respecting the cultural identity of each partner, and to implement a lasting policy of educational and cultural programmes; in this context, the partners undertake to adopt measures to facilitate human exchanges, in particular by improving administrative procedures;

they underline the importance of the health sector for sustainable development and express their intention of promoting the effective participation of the community in operations to improve health and well-being;

they recognize the importance of social development which, in their view, must go hand in hand with any economic development. They attach particular importance to respect for fundamental social rights, including the right to development;

they recognize the essential contribution civil society can make in the process of development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and as an essential factor for greater understanding and closeness between peoples;

they accordingly agree to strengthen and/or introduce the necessary instruments of decentralized cooperation to encourage exchanges between those active in development within the framework of national laws: leaders of political and civil society, the cultural and religious world, universities, the research community, the media, organizations, the trade unions and public and private enterprises;

on this basis, they recognize the importance of encouraging contacts and exchanges between young people in the context of programmes for decentralized cooperation;

they will encourage actions of support for democratic institutions and for the strengthening of the rule of law and civil society;

they recognize that current population trends represent a priority challenge which must be counterbalanced by appropriate policies to accelerate economic takeoff;

they acknowledge the importance of the role played by migration in their relationships. They agree to strengthen their cooperation to reduce migratory pressures, among other things through vocational training programmes and programmes of assistance for job creation. They undertake to guarantee protection of all the rights recognized under existing legislation of migrants legally resident in their respective territories;

in the area of illegal immigration they decide to establish closer cooperation. In this context, the partners, aware of their responsibility for readmission, agree to adopt the relevant provisions and measures, by means of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in order to readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation. To that end, the Member States of the European Union take citizens to mean nationals of the Member States, as defined for Community purposes;

they agree to strengthen cooperation by means of various measures to prevent terrorism and fight it more effectively together;

by the same token they consider it necessary to fight jointly and effectively against drug trafficking, international crime and corruption;
they underline the importance of waging a determined campaign against racism, xenophobia and intolerance and agree to cooperate to that end.

Follow-Up to the Conference

The participants:

considering that the Barcelona Conference provides the basis for a process, which is open and should develop;

reaffirming their will to establish a partnership based on the principles and objectives defined in this Declaration;

resolved to give practical expression to this Euro-Mediterranean partnership;

convinced that, in order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to continue the comprehensive dialogue thus initiated and to carry out a series of specific actions;

hereby adopt the attached work programme:

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs will meet periodically in order to monitor the application of this Declaration and define actions enabling the objectives of the partnership to be achieved.

The various activities will be followed by ad hoc thematic meetings of ministers, senior officials and experts, exchanges of experience and information, contacts between those active in civil society and by any other appropriate means.

Contacts between parliamentarians, regional authorities, local authorities and the social partners will be encouraged.

A “Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona process” at senior-official level, consisting of the European Union Troika and one representative of each Mediterranean partner, will hold regular meetings to prepare the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, take stock of and evaluate the follow-up to the Barcelona process and all its components and update the work programme.

Appropriate preparatory and follow-up work for the meetings resulting from the Barcelona work programme and from the conclusions of the “Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona process” will be undertaken by the Commission departments.

The next meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs will be held in the first semester of 1997 in one of the twelve Mediterranean partners of the European Union, to be determined through further consultations.
ANNEX

WORK PROGRAMME

I. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this programme is to implement the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, and to respect its principles, through regional and multilateral actions. It is complementary both to the bilateral cooperation, implemented in particular under the agreements between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, and to the cooperation already existing in other multilateral fora.

The preparation and the follow-up to the various actions will be implemented in accordance with the principles and mechanisms set out in the Barcelona Declaration.

The priority actions for further cooperation are listed below. This does not exclude Euro-Mediterranean cooperation being extended to other actions if the partners so agree.

The actions may apply to States, their local and regional authorities as well as actors of their civil society.

With the agreement of the participants, other countries or organizations may be involved in the actions contained in the work programme. The implementation must take place in a flexible and transparent way.

With the agreement of the participants, future Euro-Mediterranean cooperation will take account, as appropriate, of the opinions and recommendations resulting from the relevant discussions held at various levels in the region.

The implementation of the programme should start as soon as practical after the Barcelona Conference. It will be reviewed at the next Euro-Mediterranean Conference on the basis of a report to be prepared by the European Commission departments, particularly on the basis of reports from the various meetings and Groups mentioned below, and approved by the “Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona process” set up by the Barcelona Declaration.
II. POLITICAL AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: ESTABLISHING A COMMON AREA OF PEACE AND STABILITY

With a view to contributing to the objective of progressively creating a zone of peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean, senior officials will meet periodically, starting within the first quarter of 1996. They will:

—conduct a political dialogue to examine the most appropriate means and methods of implementing the principles adopted by the Barcelona Declaration, and

—submit practical proposals in due time for the next Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

Foreign policy institutes in the Euro-Mediterranean region will be encouraged to establish a network for more intensive cooperation which could become operational as of 1996.

III. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PARTNERSHIP: BUILDING A ZONE OF SHARED PROSPERITY

Meetings will take place periodically at the level of Ministers, officials or experts, as appropriate, to promote cooperation in the following areas. These meetings may be supplemented, where appropriate, by conferences or seminars involving the private sector likewise.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A EURO-MEDITERRANEAN FREE TRADE AREA

The establishment of a free trade area in accordance with the principles contained in the Barcelona Declaration is an essential element of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

Cooperation will focus on practical measures to facilitate the establishment of free trade as well as its consequences, including:

—harmonizing rules and procedures in the customs field, with a view in particular to the progressive introduction of cumulation of origin; in the meantime, favourable consideration will be given, where appropriate, to finding ad hoc solutions in particular cases;

—harmonization of standards, including meetings arranged by the European Standards Organisations;

—elimination of unwarranted technical barriers to trade in agricultural products and adoption of relevant measures related to plant health and veterinary rules as well as other legislation on foodstuffs;
—coöperation among statistics organizations with a view to providing reliable data on a harmonized basis;
—possibilities for regional and subregional coöperation (without prejudice to initiatives taken in other existing fora).

**Investment**

The object of coöperation will be to help create a climate favourable to the removal of obstacles to investment, by giving greater thought to the definition of such obstacles and to means, including in the banking sector, of promoting such investment.

**Industry**

Industrial modernisation and increased competitiveness will be key factors for the success of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. In this context, the private sector will play a more important role in the economic development of the region and the creation of employment. Coöperation will focus on:

— the adaptation of the industrial fabric to the changing international environment, in particular to the emergence of the information society;
— the framework for and the preparation of the modernisation and restructuring of existing enterprises, especially in the public sector, including privatisation;
— the use of international or European standards and the upgrading of conformity testing, certification, accreditation and quality standards.

Particular attention will be paid to means of encouraging coöperation among SMEs and creating the conditions for their development, including the possibility of organising workshops, taking account of experience acquired under MED-INVEST and inside the European Union.

**Agriculture**

While pointing out that such matters are covered under bilateral relations in the main, coöperation in this area will focus on:

— support for policies implemented by them to diversify production;
— reduction of food dependency;
— promotion of environment friendly agriculture;
—closer relations between businesses, groups and organizations representing trades and professions in the partner States on a voluntary basis;

—support for privatization;

—technical assistance and training;

—harmonization of plant health and veterinary standards;

—integrated rural development, including improvement of basic services and the development of associated economic activities;

—coöperation among rural regions, exchange of experience and knowhow concerning rural development;

—development of regions affected by the eradication of illicit crops.

**Transport**

Efficient interoperable transport links between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, and among the partners themselves, as well as free access to the market for services in international maritime transport, are essential to the development of trade patterns and the smooth operation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

The Transport Ministers of Western Mediterranean countries met twice in 1995 and, following the Regional Conference for the Development of Maritime Transport in the Mediterranean, the Mediterranean Waterborne Transport Working Group adopted a multiannual programme.

Coöperation will focus on:

—development of an efficient Trans-Mediterranean multimodal combined sea and air transport system, through the improvement and modernization of ports and airports, the suppression of unwarranted restrictions, the simplification of procedures, the improvement of maritime and air safety, the harmonization of environmental standards at a high level including more efficient monitoring of maritime pollution, and the development of harmonized traffic management systems;

—development of east-west land links on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and

—connection of Mediterranean transport networks to the Trans-European Network in order to ensure their interoperability.
Energy

A high-level Conference was held in Tunisia in 1995 with a follow-up meeting in Athens and an Energy Conference in Madrid on 20 November 1995.

With a view to creating appropriate conditions for investment in and activities by energy companies, future coöperation will focus, inter alia on:

—fostering the association of Mediterranean countries with the Treaty on the European Energy Charter;
—energy planning;
—encouraging producer-consumer dialogue;
—oil and gas exploration, refining, transportation, distribution, and regional and trans-regional trade;
—coal production and handling;
—generation and transmission of power and interconnection and development of networks;
—energy efficiency;
—new and renewable sources of energy;
—energy-related environmental issues;
—development of joint research programmes;
—training and information activities in the energy sector.

Telecommunications and information technology

With a view to developing a modern, efficient telecommunications network, coöperation will focus on:

—information and telecommunications infrastructures (minimum regulatory framework, standards, conformity testing, network interoperability, etc.);
—regional infrastructures including links with European networks;
—access to services, and
—new services in priority fields of application.

Intensification of Euro-Mediterranean exchanges and access to the nascent information society will be facilitated by more efficient information and communications infrastructures.
A regional conference is planned for 1996 with the aim of paving the way for pilot projects to show the concrete benefits of the information society.

**Regional planning**

Coöperation will focus on:

— defining a regional planning strategy for the Euro-Mediterranean area commensurate with the countries’ requirements and special features;
— promoting cross-border coöperation in areas of mutual interest.

**Tourism**

The Ministers for Tourism, meeting in Casablanca, adopted the Mediterranean Tourism Charter in 1995. The coöper-ation actions to be initiated will relate in particular to informa-tion, promotion and training.

**Environment**

Coöperation will focus on:

— assessing environmental problems in the Mediterranean region and defining, where appropriate, the initiatives to be taken;
— making proposals to establish and subsequently update a short and medium-term priority environmental action programme for intervention coordinated by the European Commission and supplemented by long-term actions; it should include among the main areas for action, the following: integrated management of water, soil and coastal areas; management of waste; preventing and combating air pollution and pollution in the Mediterranean sea; natural heritage, landscapes and site conservation and management; Mediterranean forest protection, conservation and restoration, in particular through the prevention and control of erosion, soil degradation,
— forest fires and combating desertification; transfer of Community experience in financing techniques, legislation and environmental monitoring; integration of environmental concerns in all policies;
— setting up a regular dialogue to monitor the implementation of the action programme;
— reinforcing regional and subregional coöperation and strengthening coordination with the Mediterranean Action Plan;
— stimulating coördination of investments from various sources, and implementation of relevant international conventions;
— promoting the adoption and implementation of legislation and regulatory measures when required, especially preventive measures and appropriate high standards.
Science and Technology

Coöperation will focus on:

—promoting research and development and tackling the problem of the widening gap in scientific achievement, taking account of the principle of mutual advantage;

—stepping up exchanges of experience in the scientific sectors and policies which might best enable the Mediterranean partners to reduce the gap between them and their European neighbours and to promote the transfer of technology.

—helping train scientific and technical staff by increasing participation in joint research projects.

Following the Ministerial meeting at Sophia Antipolis in March 1995, a Monitoring Committee was set up; this Committee will meet for the first time immediately after the Barcelona Conference. It will focus on making recommendations for the joint implementation of the policy priorities agreed at Ministerial level.

Water

The Mediterranean Water Charter was adopted in Rome in 1992. Water is a priority issue for all the Mediterranean partners and will gain in importance as water scarcity becomes more pressing. The purpose of coöperation in this area will be as follows:

—to take stock of the situation taking into account current and future needs;

—to identify ways of reinforcing regional coöperation;

—to make proposals for rationalising the planning and management of water resources, where appropriate on a joint basis;

—to contribute towards the creation of new sources of water.

Fisheries

In view of the importance of conservation and rational management of Mediterranean fish stocks, coöperation in the framework of the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean will be reinforced.

Following the Ministerial Fisheries Conference held in Heraklion in 1994, appropriate follow-up action will be taken in the legal sphere through meetings to take place in 1996.
Coöperation will be improved on research into fish stocks, including aquaculture, as well as into training and scientific research.

IV. PARTNERSHIP IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND HUMAN AFFAIRS: DEVELOPING HUMAN RESOURCES, PROMOTING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CULTURES AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETIES

Development of human resources

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership must contribute to enhancing educational levels throughout the region, whilst laying special emphasis on the Mediterranean partners. To this end, a regular dialogue on educational policies will take place, initially focusing on vocational training, technology in education, the universities and other higher education establishments and research. In this context as well as in other areas, particular attention will be paid to the role of women. The Euro-Arab Business School in Granada and the European Foundation in Turin will also contribute to this coöperation.

A meeting of representatives of the vocational training sector (policy makers, academics, trainers, etc) will be organised with the aim of sharing modern management approaches.

A meeting will be held of representatives of universities and higher education establishments. The European Commission will strengthen its ongoing MED Campus programme.

A meeting will also be called on the subject of technology in education.

Municipalities and Regions

Municipalities and regional authorities need to be closely involved in the operation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. City and regional representatives will be encouraged to meet each year to take stock of their common challenges and exchange experiences. This will be organised by the European Commission and will take account of previous experience.
Dialogue between cultures and civilizations

Given the importance of improving mutual understanding by promoting cultural exchanges and knowledge of languages, officials and experts will meet in order to make concrete proposals for action, inter alia, in the following fields: cultural and creative heritage, cultural and artistic events, co-productions (theatre and cinema), translations and other means of cultural dissemination, training.

Greater understanding among the major religions present in the Euro-Mediterranean region will facilitate greater mutual tolerance and coöperation. Support will be given to periodic meetings of representatives of religions and religious institutions as well as theologians, academics and others concerned, with the aim of breaking down prejudice, ignorance and fanaticism and fostering coöperation at grassroots level. The conferences held in Stockholm (15/17.6.1995) and Toledo (4/7.11.1995) may serve as examples in this context.

Media

Close interaction between the media will work in favour of better cultural understanding. The European Union will actively promote such interaction, in particular through the ongoing MED-Media programme. An annual meeting of representatives of the media will be organised in this context.

Youth

Youth exchanges should be the means to prepare future generations for a closer coöperation between the Euro-Mediterranean partners. A Euro-Mediterranean youth exchange programme should therefore be established based on experience acquired in Europe and taking account of the partners’ needs; this programme should take account of the importance of vocational training, particularly for those without qualifications, and of the training of organizers and social workers in the youth field. The European Commission will make the necessary proposals before the next meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers.
Exchanges between Civil Societies

Senior officials will meet periodically to discuss measures likely to facilitate human exchanges resulting from the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, especially those involving officials, scientists, academics, businessmen, students and sportsmen, including the improvement and simplification of administrative procedures, particularly where unnecessary administrative obstacles might exist.

Social Development

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership must contribute to improving the living and working conditions and increasing the employment level of the population in the Mediterranean partner States, in particular of women and the neediest strata of the population. In this context the partners attach particular importance to the respect and promotion of basic social rights. To that end, actors in social policies will meet periodically at the appropriate level.

Health

The partners agree to concentrate cooperation in this area on:

—action on raising awareness, information and prevention;
—development of public health services, in particular health care, primary health centres, maternal and child health care services, family planning, epidemiological supervision systems and measures to control communicable diseases;
—training of health and health-administration personnel;
—medical cooperation in the event of natural disasters.

Migration

Given the importance of the issue of migration for Euro-Mediterranean relations, meetings will be encouraged in order to make proposals concerning migration flows and pressures. These meetings will take account of experience acquired, inter alia, under the MED-Migration programme, particularly as regards improving the living conditions of migrants legally established in the Union.
**Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, Organised Crime**

Fighting terrorism will have to be a priority for all the parties. To that end, officials will meet periodically with the aim of strengthening co-operation among police, judicial and other authorities. In this context, consideration will be given, in particular, to stepping up exchanges of information and improving extradition procedures.

Officials will meet periodically to discuss practical measures which can be taken to improve co-operation among police, judicial, customs, administrative and other authorities in order to combat, in particular, drug trafficking and organised crime, including smuggling.

All these meetings will be organized with due regard for the need for a differentiated approach that takes into account the diversity of the situation in each country.

**Illegal Immigration**

Officials will meet periodically to discuss practical measures which can be taken to improve co-operation among police, judicial, customs, administrative and other authorities in order to combat illegal immigration.

These meetings will be organized with due regard for the need for a differentiated approach that takes into account the diversity of the situation in each country.

**V. INSTITUTIONAL CONTACTS**

**EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARLIAMENTARY DIALOGUE**

An Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean was held in Valletta from 1 to 4 November 1995. The European Parliament is invited to take the initiative with other parliaments concerning the future Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue, which could enable the elected representatives of the partners to exchange ideas on a wide range of issues.
Other institutional contacts

Regular contacts among other European organs, in particular the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community, and their Mediterranean counterparts, would contribute to a better understanding of the major issues relevant in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

To this end, the Economic and Social Committee is invited to take the initiative in establishing links with its Mediterranean counterparts and equivalent bodies. In this context, a Euro-Mediterranean meeting of Economic and Social Committees and equivalent bodies will take place in Madrid on 12 and 13 December.
FOURTH EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
(Marseilles, 15 and 16 November 2000)

PRESIDENCY’S FORMAL CONCLUSIONS

1. The fourth Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers, held in Marseilles five years after the inaugural Barcelona meeting, bore witness to the desire of all partners to reinvigorate the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Ministers undertook to do their utmost to ensure that the positions agreed in Marseilles enable the Partnership to reach its full potential and attain the strategic objectives adopted in Barcelona in 1995.

2. As agreed at the informal meeting in Lisbon on 25 and 26 May 2000, the Ministers strove to make a faithful and shared assessment of the first five years of the Partnership in order to fix the guidelines necessary for reinvigorating it. While making a nuanced assessment of the implementation of the Partnership, the Ministers insisted on its unique contribution to peace, stability and development in the region. Since its inception the legitimacy and cohesion of the process had been maintained and constantly reaffirmed, against a sometimes difficult backdrop. All the Ministers reiterated their deep attachment to the institutional framework of the and the need for the parallel and balanced progression of its three complementary chapters. In that context the Ministers reaffirmed the central role of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee and stressed the need to enhance its strategic function for advancing, evaluating and following up the initiatives undertaken under the Partnership.

3. The Ministers noted with great interest the proposals for revitalising the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership put forward by the Commission in its communication “Reinvigorating the Barcelona process” and the contributions made by the Mediterranean partners. They welcomed the consultations conducted by
the Presidency, in liaison with the Commission and the Council General Secretariat, in the framework of organised visits to each Mediterranean capital in preparation for this Conference. For its part, the European Union confirmed its willingness to strengthen the Mediterranean dimension of its external relations. In that connection it drew attention to the objectives of the common strategy for the Mediterranean adopted by the Feira European Council and the priorities put forward by the Presidency for implementing it in the second half of 2000.

**CONTRIBUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP TO STABILITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION**

4. The Ministers held a lengthy discussion on the situation in the Middle East. They expressed their deep concern at the situation which has obtained for several weeks in the region and the risk it entails for the future of the Middle East Peace process and regional stability. They expressed their strong feeling at the loss of human lives and suffering of the civilian population, who should be protected.

5. Convinced that further confrontation and the use of armed force lead nowhere, the Ministers reiterated their support for the measures agreed in Sharm el Sheikh and in Gaza between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to put an end to the violence. They called upon them to act with determination for their full and immediate implementation of these measures with a view to returning to the situation obtaining prior to 28 September 2000. In this context, many Ministers stressed the importance of restoring free movement of goods and persons in the Palestinian Territories as soon as possible and of lifting current restrictions. They also welcomed the announcement of the establishment of the Fact-Finding Committee agreed on in principle at the recent Sharm el Sheikh Summit and expressed the wish that it be able to begin its proceedings without delay so that it could establish the causes of recent events and prevent their recurrence. The Ministers welcomed the participation of Mr Javier Solana, Secretary-General/High Representative of the Council of the European Union, in this work.
6. The Ministers stated their full support for the efforts currently being made by the United States President to relaunch the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Aware of the importance attaching to the restoration of a climate of understanding, mutual trust and respect between the parties, they called upon them to give consideration to initiatives that could be taken to that end.

7. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, on the basis of the faithful application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, to the terms of reference of the Madrid Conference—including the principle of land for peace—and of the agreements concluded in Oslo and thereafter. They called upon the parties to revive the Peace Process and restart their discussions at the earliest opportunity on all tracks, emphasising the urgency of also reviving the Syrian and Lebanese tracks.

8. The Ministers called for greater involvement of the European Union vis-à-vis all parties to foster dialogue and restore trust and confidence. The European Union reiterated its willingness to put its efforts at the service of the parties in order to facilitate the conclusion of peace agreements and to help implement them.

9. The Ministers of the European Union reiterated their common position based on the Declaration adopted in Berlin on 25 March 1999 and their support for the right of Palestinians to their own State, as well as their declaration adopted in Biarritz on 13 October 2000. They confirmed their attachment to seeing established in the near future, and preferably through negotiation, a sovereign, democratic, viable and peaceful Palestinian State, and urged the Palestinian Authority to continue with determination the gradual establishment of institutions representative of a constitutional State.
POLITICAL AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP SITUATION

10. The Ministers recalled that political dialogue is an important asset of the Barcelona process and plays a vital role in giving it its whole worth, in parallel with the other chapters. In spite of problems, which explain the poverty of the results attained, it has continued and broadened to include sensitive and important topics such as terrorism and, more recently, migration and human exchanges. The Ministers recorded that, although that dialogue had not made it possible to adopt new partnership measures, the measures already adopted had been maintained. Furthermore, the entry into force of new association agreements has enabled political dialogue to develop in a bilateral framework.

11. The Ministers considered that preparation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability had provided the opportunity for a useful deepening of the political dialogue. They welcomed the work that had been done by the Senior Officials in producing the draft. The draft is based on an overall approach to stability, taking into account all of its political, economic, financial, cultural, social and human aspects, and takes the form of an evolutionary, non legally binding, framework agreement serving as a political instrument for the gradual implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration with regard to the global issues of peace and stability. The Ministers nevertheless agreed, on a proposal from the Presidency, to defer adoption of the Charter owing to the political context.

GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE

12. The Ministers reaffirmed the need, without waiting for the Charter to be adopted, to enhance the political dialogue, at their level too, in order to contribute to clearing up misunderstandings, foster the approximation of analyses and perceptions and make it possible subsequently to agree on measures to strengthen confidence and transparency. They instructed the Senior Officials to continue it and deepen it in the specific areas of terrorism and of migration and human exchanges.
They took the view that there should no longer be any taboos where questions of mutual interest were concerned, and expressed a desire to extend the dialogue to other topics, such as regional trends as regards security, disarmament, the process of consolidating the rule of law, and respect for human rights and democratic principles. Furthermore, the Ministers felt that one worthwhile area for the dialogue might lie in the study of measures of particular importance for common security in the Mediterranean region, in sectors such as the environment, maritime safety or the fight against crime and illicit trafficking of all kinds. Those measures should be formulated in coordination with multilateral programmes already in existence or in preparation in the European or Mediterranean framework.

13. In conclusion, the Ministers confirmed the special importance they attached to the draft Euro-Mediterranean Charter, which should, in future, play a very useful role alongside the development of confidence and strengthening of stability in the region, notably with a view to the post-Peace Process. They took note of the report presented by the Presidency on the progress of work and instructed the Senior Officials to proceed with and complete the latter with a view to adoption of the text as soon as the situation permits, on the basis of the present draft, while taking into account the contributions submitted by the partners.

**ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL CHAPTER SITUATION**

14. The Ministers took note of the progress made by several partners, in particular those which had concluded association agreements with the European Union, in modernising their economies and implementing structural reforms. Particular attention should be paid to the social impact of the economic transition. But there is still much progress to be made in terms of improving public finances, of deepening reforms, in particular budget and tax reforms, of reforming the legal and regulatory framework and of reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers, with the technical and financial support of the European Union.

15. The Ministers noted that the level of investment, in particular foreign investment (FDT), was still insufficient to sustain the
partners’ growth and stimulate the supply side, as was emphasised by the conclusions of the Lisbon Conference on Investment in the Mediterranean (29 February and 1 March 2000), a topic which called for discussion at regular intervals and should be institutionnalized.

16. Lastly, the south-south regional integration process has only just begun and needs to be enhanced in order to promote the economic reforms and regional integration which are indispensable for attainment of the objectives of the Barcelona process.

GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE

17. The Ministers reaffirmed the full relevance of the objectives adopted in Barcelona in 1995 with a view to establishing an area of shared prosperity in the Mediterranean. Having reaffirmed the objective of creating a free-trade area by 2010, the Ministers stressed the need for the partner countries, with the support of the European Union, to open up further to one another economically in order to foster their successful integration into the world economy. In that regard the Ministers welcomed the desire already expressed by four countries—Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan—to establish closer links by creating a free-trade area amongst themselves, and emphasised the need for suitable back-up from the European Union to that end.

18. The Ministers felt that the efforts being made, firstly, to improve the legal, administrative and institutional framework, secondly, to develop financial intermediation mechanisms, thereby allowing the mobilisation and efficient allocation of savings and, lastly, to abolish restrictions on foreign investment, should all have a beneficial effect on the flow of investment towards the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

19. Taking account of the impact of the burden of debt on public investment and growth, the Ministers, encouraged by progress recently made in this area, expressed themselves in favour of a continuation of the dialogue in order to find solutions in the competent fora.
20. In order to promote improved coordination and give more specific encouragement to the implementation of reforms in the partner countries and make the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a still more efficient and credible preferential instrument for upgrading economies, the Ministers agreed to enhance the dialogue on the economic and trade chapter of the Partnership. That should be achieved through regular meetings of Senior Officials from the ministries responsible for such matters, within the existing institutional framework. That enhanced dialogue would relate in particular to the macro-economic environment, structural reforms and economic liberalisation of the partners, while making it possible for them to follow the European Union’s economic situation and trade policy. It would also facilitate exchanges of experiences between the partners. It could, in time, prepare for meetings of the competent Ministers of the 27.

21. The Ministers also agreed on the need for greater coherence in the work of the various existing fora in the economic and social fields (employers, trade unions, universities, etc.), and the need to take greater account of their views.

22. The Ministers placed emphasis on:

- the importance of the principle of free movement of goods and services in the Euro-Mediterranean area in all circumstances;
- the need to accelerate the negotiations under way with Algeria, Syria and Lebanon for the conclusion of association agreements; the European Union stated its wish to complete the negotiations in 2001;
- the urgency of signing the association agreement with Egypt and the importance of ratifying the agreement with Jordan, which should enter into force in the first half of 2001;
- the need to take new measures for greater liberalisation of agricultural trade, subject to gradual and reciprocal approach, in accordance with the principles set out in the Barcelona Declaration and the WTO rules;
- the advantage for the countries which had signed association agreements with the European Union to conclude free-trade agreements amongst themselves within five years, and to develop the European Union’s cooperation on initiatives that contribute to the attainment of that objective, including the introduction of diagonal cumulation between countries which have identical rules of origin and which are committed to conclude a free-trade agreement between themselves;
effective implementation of the existing regional programmes in the 6 priority areas confirmed in Stuttgart (industry, water, environment, transport, energy and information society) while ensuring their complementarity and the transfer of the results to national programmes;

° the value of establishing an indicative timetable for the adoption of harmonisation measures in certain priority sectors, enabling partner countries to benefit fully from the Euro-Mediterranean market;

° the advantage of initiating, in the context of industrial co-operation, new regional training and institutional support projects and of developing projects relating to innovation, technologies, including information technology, and quality;

° the strategic importance of water management and supply to regional co-operation, which demands the early launch of a call for proposals to implement the action plan approved at the Turin Conference;

° the particular attention that should also be paid to research sectors to develop synergies between MEDA and the Research and Development Framework Programme;

° the benefits, with a view to sustainable development, of considering the sectors of tourism, regional planning and territorial administration in particular.

SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND HUMAN CHAPTER SITUATION

23. The Ministers underlined the importance of the regional programmes under way in the fields of culture, audio-visual and youth. However, they regretted that not all the possibilities of this chapter had been fully exploited, especially as regards social aspects, civil society and the human dimension of the Partnership.

GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE

24. Consensus was reached on the need to take greater account of the social effects of economic transition in national programmes by placing the emphasis on training, employment, professional requalification and the reform of education systems. The Ministers also recommended establishing a regional programme covering training policies, promoting the role of women in economic development, the reform of social systems and co-operation on health matters, as agreed at the Conference of Health Ministers in Montpellier in December 1999.
25. Regarding culture in the broad sense, the Ministers advocated building up existing programmes, through the establishment of the second phase of Euromed-Heritage, the start as soon as possible in 2001 of preparations for Euromed-Audiovisual II, on the basis of the proceedings of the conferences in Thessaloniki (1997) and Rabat (September 2000), and the launching of Euromed-Human Sciences. In addition, they expressed their desire to see conditions making it possible to develop the dialogue among cultures and civilisations or other new initiatives.

26. The importance of the human dimension of the Partnership was stressed. In this respect the Ministers confirmed the conclusions reached by the first ad hoc meeting of Senior Officials (October 2000) on migration and human exchanges and emphasised the advantage of intensifying dialogue on this question by favouring a comprehensive and balanced approach and by strengthening the policies of co-development and integration of third-country nationals residing legally in the territory of the Member States.

27. The Ministers also recommended the joint preparation in 2001 of a regional programme in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. The Ministers also welcomed the recommendations of the seminar on operational customs coöperation in the Mediterranean (3 and 4 April 2000) and, the first initiative taken to organise a pilot scheme of joint checks at sea in 2001.

28. The Ministers reaffirmed the need to take into account the aspirations of civil society - an essential dimension of the Partnership. They took note in this respect of the recommendations made by representatives from trades unions, local authorities and NGOs meeting within the Civil Forum and those from Euro-Mediterranean business circles. The importance of decentralised coöperation and its contribution to the success of the Partnership were stressed. The Ministers encouraged players from civil society to take a full part in existing and future regional programmes. In that connection, it was suggested that consideration be given to establishing a regional programme.
of scientific exchanges. They also wanted increased support for civil society, particularly through the MEDA-Democracy programme. Lastly, the role played by the network of Economic and Social Councils was recalled.

FINANCIAL COÖPERATION SITUATION

29. The Ministers held in-depth discussions on the measures accompanying the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, particularly the MEDA programme. They regretted the complexity of procedures in the European Union as well as in partner countries and the slowness of disbursement of payments. They noted the volume of appropriations committed over the period 1995 to 1999 (EUR 3.4 billion for MEDA). They commended the action by the EIB over the same period (EUR 4.6 billion) and its provision of very long-term funding to the Mediterranean countries.

GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE

30. The Ministers recalled that efficient and credible financial coöperation, “targeted” towards the major challenges of the Partnership, was essential. The European Union felt that MEDA remained a measure accompanying and encouraging the association process and that it was necessary to strengthen the link between this programme and the implementation of reforms initiated under the association agreements, from all aspects. The Ministers also considered it necessary to take greater account of the special characteristics of each partner and to strengthen strategic coöperation at the programming stage.

31. The Ministers noted with satisfaction the indicative figure adopted by the Council of the European Union for the MEDA II allocation, namely EUR 5 350 billion for the period 2000 to 2006, which bears witness to the continuing commitment of the European Union to the Mediterranean. They also welcomed the improvements made to the MEDA Regulation with a view to simplifying it, to accelerating procedures and to ensuring an en-
enhanced role for partners in implementing projects, particularly through deconcentrating and decentralising their management.

32. The Ministers noted that the EIB would establish the main strands of its action (infrastructure, sustainable development, the private sector and reconstruction in the Eastern Mediterranean) within the framework of indicative multiannual sectoral programming for the entire Mediterranean area. They accepted the EIB’s offer, over and above its mandate from the European Union (EUR 6.4 billion for the period 2000 to 2007), to contribute a further EUR 1 billion from its own resources and at its own risk over the same period, in accordance with Article 18 of its Statute. That additional amount would contribute to the implementation of projects of regional interest and to projects of common interest between the European Union and the Mediterranean partner countries, in particular in the communications and energy sectors.

33. In order to provide fresh impetus to regional cooperation, the Ministers recommended strengthening the subregional aspect of the process by encouraging the voluntary introduction of south-south development and economic integration initiatives.

34. In order to increase the visibility of cooperation, an information and communication programme designed to increase public awareness in the 27 partners and a Euro-Mediterranean “label” will be established.

35. In the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, a Ministerial meeting will be held under the Belgian Presidency during the second half of 2001. The Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers (Barcelona V) will take place during the first half of 2002 during the Spanish Presidency.
Notes

My thanks to James F. Miskel, William Martel, and Pelham Boyer of the Naval War College for insightful readings of earlier drafts; their suggestions and general observations were extraordinarily helpful. The remaining faults are entirely mine.


7. Ibid., 6.


18. Ibid., 4.


31. A “partial” democracy, broadly speaking, is a state in a period of transition—either experimenting with forms of democracy, intentionally attempting the shift to democratic practice and principle, or separating itself from a strictly autocratic regime.


33. Further, demographic data released in July by the National Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris claims that Algeria’s potentially alarming growth rates projections are incorrect and that Algeria will experience population growth rate declines over the coming decades as well. My thanks to Abdelwahab Biad for this information.

34. According to the Goddard Institute of Science, average temperature at the earth’s surface has risen from 13.5°C in 1860 to 15°C by 2000, referenced in Annan, “Facing the Humanitarian Challenge: Toward a Culture of Prevention,” 5. Notably, the recent IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) report for the UN made temperature rise estimates as high as 5.8°C.


38. Notably, Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty (which emphasizes “collective self-defense”) remains the core purpose of NATO.

Mediterranean process: CSCE/OSCE confidence building, bilateral military cooperation in the Mediterranean, NATO’s and WEU’s continuing Mediterranean dialogues, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), and institutionalized multilateral military cooperation.

40. Said also provides examples of how “Bright Star” joint military exercises have demonstrated increased Euro-Mediterranean participation as well as illustrated that informational problems, lack of specific coordination procedures, and security issues (such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and environmental assistance) have not been sufficiently addressed to date in the Euro-Mediterranean process. Based on remarks provided during the seminar titled “The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue” at the Western European Security Institute, Paris, 14 January 2000, in a working paper titled “How Egypt Thinks Mediterranean? Joint Military Exercises and Regional Security Cooperation.”


42. For the best detailed discussion of the meaning and potential contribution of “epistemic communities,” see the special issue of International Organization 46 (Winter 1992), in particular, Peter M. Haas’s introduction on “Epistemic Communities and International Policy,” 1-36.


45. I thank Mark A. Heller of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, for further discussions on this metaphor.

46. Unquestionably, one could make the argument that the diversity of mutual dialogues is more helpful than disruptive. Dr. Alberto Bin, coordinator for NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, forcefully pointed out in remarks made at the International Peace Research Association summit in Tampere, Finland, August 2000, that NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is unique in its predominantly bilateral relationship with Mediterranean nations. NATO, as an organization, meets most often with individual dialogue states rather than in a multilateral context. Further, among such agenda items as information, civil emergency planning, crisis management, and scientific cooperation, aspects of a “military dimension” receive perhaps the least emphasis in the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. Equally, per the European Union’s 1999 Cologne and Helsinki summit decisions on the ESDI mandate, the WEU will dissolve no later than 2003 (and likely sooner). How the twenty-eight total members, associate members, and associate partners of the WEU will merge their mutual
concerns into the other Mediterranean dialogues (OSCE, EU, NATO) remains unclear.


49. Based on information both from the Worldwatch Institute and the Carnegie Commission on Deadly Conflict, and quoted by Kofi Annan, “Facing the Humanitarian Challenge: Toward a Culture of Prevention,” 7.

50. As Ortega notes (2-3), the issues of “hard” security—specifically, military and defense issues—have been kept out of the Euro-Mediterranean process for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are the reluctance of Mediterranean partners to engage in multilateral cooperation and the changing dynamic of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) following the June 1999 Cologne summit. The broader term of “political and security partnership” used thus far in the Euro-Mediterranean process incorporates aspects of (“soft”) security that move beyond defense issues to address a wide array of issues. As Ambassador Fathy El-Shazly, Egyptian ambassador to Turkey, noted in remarks offered during a roundtable discussion in Paris on 13 January 2000, “I have repeatedly listened with astonishment to European researchers talking about the need to give a greater role for NATO in the Mediterranean to maintain so-called ‘hard’ security, leaving for the Barcelona process only questions of ‘soft’ security. I recall no such distinction in the Barcelona Declaration. In the vocabulary of the Barcelona process, security has always been comprehensive, encompassing both categories ‘hard’ and ‘soft.’ After all, as clearly demonstrated in former Yugoslavia, it has increasingly become difficult to draw dividing lines between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security.”


54. See Haas’s illustration, “Figure 1. Distinguishing epistemic communities from other groups,” in “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” 18.

55. See Hass’s description of “The international setting for epistemic communities,” 7-12, and “Distinguishing epistemic communities from other groups,” 16-34.

56. Partially adapted from Haas, “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” 3; 20.

57. Recent work that acknowledges the significance of Deutsch’s contribution (largely ignored when introduced in the 1950s) can be found in Security Communities, edited by Emmanuel
Future Talk: Building the Hybrid Security Community in the Euro-Mediterranean


60. Haas, “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” 3; 20.


62. One of the early experiments at joint cooperation took place in the 1990s during the search-and-rescue exercise between Israel, Turkey, and the United States known as “Operation Reliant Mermaid.” Notably, a number of Mediterranean states, most notably Spain—a leader in pushing forward the Barcelona Declaration—objected to the exercise. Thus, the argument that military cooperation should be among the later realized aspects of inter-regional cooperation remains.

