Norman Mineta and Richard Clarke Contradict the 9/11 Commission Report

By: Adam Letalik of http://www.truth911.net

Young Man: “the plane is 50 miles out”, “the plane is 30 miles out”, “the plane is 10 miles out”, “do the orders still stand?”
Cheney: “Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?”

Microsoft Word Version of this Paper:
http://www.members.shaw.ca/truth914/minetaclarkepaper.doc

Web Version of this Paper
http://www.members.shaw.ca/truth914/mineta.html

Contact: truthabout911@hotmail.com

Pilots for 9/11 Truth: Pandora's Black Box - Chapter Two - Flight Of American 77 [VIDEO] (01:04:48)

Summary

Video Norman Mineta’s Testimony: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDfdOwtv3Y

Norman Mineta, the acting Secretary of Transportation on 9/11, testified before the 9/11 Commission in a public hearing that he entered the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) at 9:20 a.m. where Vice President Dick Cheney was in charge. In his testimony, Mineta explained that “probably about five or six minutes” after he entered the PEOC, he observed a conversation between Dick Cheney and a young aide.¹

“… during the time that the airplane coming into the Pentagon. There was a young man who had come in and said to the vice president, "The plane is 50 miles out. The plane is 30 miles out." And when it got down to, "The plane is 10 miles out," the young man also said to the vice president, "Do the orders still stand?" And the vice president turned and whipped his neck
around and said, "Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?"

This testimony contradicts the findings in the 9/11 Commission Report because according to its revised version of events, Cheney did not enter the PEOC until 9:58. Accounts by Richard Clark, a White House photographer, and ABC News all place Cheney in the PEOC long before the Pentagon was struck. The 9/11 Commission Report explains that F-16 fighter jets were not attempting to shoot down the plane that hit the Pentagon, as previous sources state, but were instead chasing a phantom aircraft. The military was not notified at 9:24 about the plane approaching the Pentagon (as previous public records and testimony showed), but instead claims that the military only learned, by chance, that AA 77 was lost at 9:34, minutes prior to the impact. Mineta’s testimony proves that Cheney knew about the incoming aircraft with sufficient time to intercept and shoot it down, thereby saving the 125 victims who died at the Pentagon. The orders that the young man was referring to when he asked if “the orders still stand” must have been orders to stand down and allow the aircraft to hit the Pentagon. This proves that 9/11 was an inside job.

**Context**

To understand the significance of Norman Mineta’s testimony, it is necessary to understand how this testimony contradicts the 9/11 Commission Report. These contradictions prove that the United States Military was aware of the plane approaching the Pentagon and had the capabilities to intercept and shoot down the hostile aircraft.

Located in the Pentagon, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) houses the logistical and communications center for the National Command Authority of the United States of America. The facility, which is composed of several war rooms, is the principal command and control center of the Department of Defense.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), founded on May 12, 1958, is a joint organization of the United States and Canada which provides aerospace
warning and control for North America. They are in charge of defending North American airspace. NORAD has fighter jets on alert that are required by standard protocol to scramble and intercept suspected hijacked aircrafts. If authorization is given, NORAD is required to shoot down hijacked aircrafts in order to protect citizens and property on the ground.

In the event of a suspected hijacking, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is required to contact the NMCC. The three major signs of a hijacked aircraft are: (1) it deviates from its flight path; (2) loss of radio contact; or (3) the transponder goes off. Once any of these things happen, the flight controller tries to contact the pilot to remedy the problem. If radio contact cannot be made, the FAA is required to contact the NMCC for assistance. The FAA’s Aeronautical Information Manual: Official Guide to basic Flight Information and Air Traffic Control (ATC) Procedures explains that if “you are in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency, handle it as though it were an emergency.” After the FAA notifies the NMCC, the NMCC contacts NORAD and military fighter jets are scrambled from the nearest Air Force base with jets on alert. Shoot down authorization is not required to scramble the plane to intercept. The fighter jets are supposed to track the plane, conduct a visual inspection and be in position to shoot it down if necessary. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, these standard operating procedures were supposedly not followed by the FAA, and as a result, none of the hijacked aircrafts were intercepted or shot down. The military was absolved of all blame in the massive communications failure that allegedly occurred that morning and the fault fell squarely on the FAA.

Though there was arguably sufficient time to even prevent the attacks on the Twin Towers, there was certainly ample time to shoot down the plane approaching the Pentagon. The first plane, AA 11, was noticeably hijacked at approximately 8:20 and impacted the North Tower at 8:46. The second plane, UA 175, was hijacked at about this same time (8:46) and impacted the South Tower at 9:03. By this time, it was apparent to everybody that the country was under attack. The third plane, American Airlines Flight 77 (AA 77), which allegedly impacted the Pentagon at 9:37:46am, was hijacked at 8:54
when it made an unauthorized turn and turned off its transponder at 8:56. This airplane was able to fly uninterrupted for over 40 minutes before hitting the Pentagon, arguably the most defended building in the most secure airspace in the world. FAA headquarters was notified that the fourth plane, UA 93, was hijacked at 9:34. This plane was also allowed to fly without being intercepted until the passengers allegedly revolted and crashed the plane at 10:03.\textsuperscript{13} Is it realistic to believe that 19 radicals with box cutters managed to defeat the most sophisticated defense system in existence without any inside help?

**The Changing Official Story of the Military’s Response**

In the first few days following the attacks, the first official story of the military’s response to the hijackings was conveyed to the public, creating the first official version of their story. On September 13\textsuperscript{th}, 2001, General Richard Myers, who on 9/11 had been Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked whether the order to scramble fighter jets had been given “before or after the Pentagon was struck.” Myers replied: “That order, to the best of my knowledge, was after the Pentagon was struck.”\textsuperscript{14} This story was echoed by NORAD spokesman Mike Snyder in a story by Glen Johnson for the Boston Globe.

*Boston Globe*: \textsuperscript{15}

Snyder said the fighters were not scrambled for more than an hour after the first hijacking was reported, by which time the three buildings were struck and a fourth hijacked plane was over Pennsylvania on a course towards Washington.

Johnson describes how this first version of the story places responsibility for the delay with the Military:

[Snyder] said the command [NORAD] did not immediately scramble any fighters even though it was alerted to a hijacking 10 minutes before the first plane…slammed into the first World Trade Center tower… The
spokesman said the fighters remained on the ground until after the Pentagon was hit by American Airlines Flight 77... By that time, military authorities realized the scope of the attack, Snyder said, and finally ordered the jets aloft. The delay in scrambling fighters was confirmed by Air Force General Richard B. Myers, a four-star officer who has been nominated to be the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The New York Times also supported this first official story with its article published on September 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2001.

New York Times: \textsuperscript{16}

By 9:25am the FAA, in consultation with the Pentagon, had taken the radical step of banning all takeoffs around the country, but fighters still had not been dispatched.

These articles were published in the morning papers of September 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2001; however, the official story had begun to change the night before (September 14\textsuperscript{th}) when CBS explained that “contrary to early reports, US Air Force jets did get into the air on Tuesday while the attacks were under way.”\textsuperscript{17}

This contradiction was reconciled on September 18\textsuperscript{th}, 2001, when NORAD released an official timeline of their response which explained that fighter jets were in fact scrambled but arrived too late to intercept any of the hijacked airplanes.\textsuperscript{18} This would become the second official story of the events surrounding the military’s response, which shifted blame to the FAA and attempted to absolve the U.S. Military from any criticism.

According to this second official story, NORAD was notified of AA 77 by the FAA at 9:24, 38 minutes after flight AA 11 struck the North Tower, 30 minutes after AA 77 had made an unauthorized turn at 8:54, 28 minutes after its transponder was turned off, and 21 minutes after the world witnessed live coverage of flight UA 175 hitting the South Tower. “By 8:57a.m.” reported the New York Times, “it was evident that Flight 77 was lost.”\textsuperscript{19} Yet it was a further 27 minutes before the FAA notified NORAD.
NORAD reported in their timeline that they immediately issued a scramble order at 9:24 to get their fighters in the air. David Ray Griffin, author of *The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions*, explains the problems with this second official story.


A problem did arise, however, with regard to the base to which the scramble order was given. This was Langley Air Force base in Virginia, which is some 130 miles from Washington. The order should have gone, critics have said, to Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland, which is only 10 miles from Washington and has the assignment to protect the nation’s capital. [NOTE 1]

A second problem was that, although this scramble order was received at 9:24, the Langley F-16s were said not to have been airborne until 9:30. Why would it have taken them a full six minutes simply to take off if, as we saw earlier, a fighter jet routinely “goes from ‘scramble order’ to 29,000 feet in only 2.5 minutes”?

A third problem was that, even with this delay and the greater distance from Langley, the F-16s should have arrived in plenty of time to prevent the Pentagon from being struck at 9:38, the generally accepted time (or even 9:37, the time NORAD estimated in its September 18 timeline.) F-16s can fly at 1,500 mph (25 miles per minute). At this rate, they could have traversed the 130 miles to Washington in slightly over five minutes, leaving them almost three minutes to intercept and, if necessary, shoot down the hijacked aircraft. But according to NORAD’s September 18 timeline, the F-16s, far from getting to Washington at 9:35, were still 105 miles away at 9:38 when the Pentagon was struck. Critics who did the math could point out that NORAD’s account was absurd. It entailed that during their eight-minute flight after they were airborne, the F-16s had traveled only 25 miles, which would mean they had been flying at under 200 miles per hour.

The Pentagon and White House were also not evacuated. If NORAD knew by 9:24 that a hijacked plane was on its way to Washington D.C. and that planes had already hit both WTC towers, an evacuation during these critical 14 minutes would have saved the 125 lives lost at the Pentagon.

The 9/11 Commission Report shields the military from all blame with a ridiculous third official story which claimed that the military only happened to hear about AA 77 by
chance, during a discussion with FAA about “Phantom” AA 11 (the real AA 11 crashed into the North Tower at 8:46, the first plane to hit the towers).

9/11 Commission Report:\textsuperscript{21}:

At the suggestion of the Boston Center’s military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA’s Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS: "We’re looking—we also lost American 77." The time was 9:34.\textsuperscript{151} This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.

This third official story (The 9/11 Commission Report) claims that the military was not notified about AA 77 at 9:24 (as NORAD’s September 18\textsuperscript{th}, 2001 timeline stated), but that the military only discovered it was missing by chance at 9:34. The 9/11 Commission Report maintained that fighter jets were scrambled from Langley at around 9:24 and were airborne at 9:30. However, the 9/11 Commission Report explains that these fighter jets were not scrambled in response to AA 77, but were actually in pursuit of “Phantom” AA Flight 11, the plane that had crashed into the North Tower at 8:46. The Langley fighters were therefore not heading to Washington to defend the nation’s capital, but were instead in pursuit of an imaginary aircraft, drawing fighters away from Washington D.C.

Reminiscent of George Orwell’s Ministry of Truth, The 9/11 Commission Report [NOTE 2] forces our mind to slip “away into the labyrinthine world of doublethink. To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy, to forget whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it again: and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself. That was the
ultimate subtlety: consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the word ‘doublethink’ involved the use of doublethink.” [NOTE 3] 22

**Norman Mineta’s Testimony**

Norman Mineta served in the President's Cabinet as the United States Secretary of Transportation. Mineta was the only Democratic Cabinet Secretary in the Republican George W. Bush Administration. On June 23, 2006, Mineta announced his resignation after five years and six months as Secretary of Transportation, effective July 7, 2006, making him the longest-serving Transportation Secretary in the Department's history. 23

Interestingly, Mineta announced his resignation the day after Jim Fetzer, founder of the Scholars for 9/11 Truth, appeared on Fox New’s *Hannity & Colmes* where he cited Mineta’s testimony as evidence of a stand-down order. 24 [NOTE 4] Ironically, Fetzer would be invited back for a second appearance on *Hannity & Colmes* on September 27, 2006, during which he had the opportunity to repeat the Mineta testimony, this time without the chance to elaborate on the logic of his reasoning. 25

Fetzer later claimed on Colmes’s radio show that: 26

“...I’m suggesting Norman Mineta resigned because the administration didn’t want him in a public position where he’d have to respond to questions from reporters. By having him resign he becomes a private citizen and he’s no longer obligated to respond to public inquiries.”

In Mineta's testimony before the 9/11 Commission on May 23, 2003, he said that he arrived at the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), where Vice President Cheney was in charge, at 9:20am on 9/11. 27

The Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) is a tube-like bunker structure that lies beneath the East Wing of the White House. Originally constructed for President Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II, it is presumed to be designed to withstand a nuclear blast, although in the event of an incoming Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, the President is more likely to be evacuated to safety by Marine One. It is not the same room
as the White House Situation Room, which is under the West Wing. However, it does possess several televisions, telephones and a communications system to coordinate with other government entities during an emergency. As the name implies, the area is not normally in use.\textsuperscript{28}

Mineta's testimony contradicts the 9/11 Commission Report by revealing the fact that Cheney knew about the aircraft approaching the Pentagon long before the 9/11 Commission Report declared. It proves that Cheney knew about an aircraft approaching the Pentagon at around 9:27 yet the 9/11 Commission Report claims that the US Military was only informed that the flight was missing at 9:34. This time discrepancy is significant because the Langley fighters could have intercepted the plane approaching the Pentagon if the US Military had been aware of the plane at 9:27 instead of 9:34. This testimony was broadcast on C-Span and available to watch on the internet.\textsuperscript{29} The entire testimony is also available online though the 9/11 Commission’s official website where the entire transcript of the May 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2003 hearing is available. This testimony was never mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report and no explanation of the contradictions has ever been adequately addressed by the 9/11 Commission Report, the 9/11 Commission Vice Chairman, Popular Mechanics or any of the main debunking 9/11 myth websites.

Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton, questions Norman Mineta on May 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2003 in an open hearing.

9/11 Commission Hearing Testimony:\textsuperscript{30}

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDfdOwt2v3Y

MR. HAMILTON: We thank you for that. I wanted to focus just a moment on the Presidential Emergency Operating Center. You were there for a good part of the day. I think you were there with the vice president. And when you had that order given, I think it was by the president, that authorized the shooting down of commercial aircraft that were suspected to be controlled by terrorists, were you there when that order was given?

MR. MINETA: No, I was not. I was made aware of it \textit{during the time that the airplane coming into the Pentagon. There was a young man who had come in and said to the vice president, "The plane is 50 miles}
out. The plane is 30 miles out." And when it got down to, "The plane is 10 miles out," the young man also said to the vice president, "Do the orders still stand?" And the vice president turned and whipped his neck around and said, "Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?" Well, at the time I didn't know what all that meant. And --

MR. HAMILTON: The flight you're referring to is the --

MR. MINETA: The flight that came into the Pentagon.

MR. HAMILTON: The Pentagon, yeah.

MR. MINETA: And so I was not aware that that discussion had already taken place. But in listening to the conversation between the young man and the vice president, then at the time I didn't really recognize the significance of that.

Later in Mineta’s testimony, he was asked to explain in more detail, the events surrounding the shoot-down order in the PEOC. From his experience in the Military, he inferred that “the orders” were orders to have the plane approaching the Pentagon shot down.

9/11 Commission Hearing Testimony:31

MR. ROEMER: Nice to see you, Mr. Secretary, and nice to see you feeling better and getting around as well, too.

I want to follow up on what happened in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center and try to understand that day a little bit better. You said, if I understood you correctly, that you were not in the room; you were obviously coming from the Department of Transportation, where you had been busy in a meeting in official business, but you had not been in the room when the decision was made -- to what you inferred was a decision made to attempt to shoot down Flight 77 before it crashed into the Pentagon. Is that correct?

MR. MINETA: I didn't know about the order to shoot down. I arrived at the PEOC at about 9:20 a.m. And the president was in Florida, and I believe he was on his way to Louisiana at that point when the conversation that went on between the vice president and the president and the staff that the president had with him.
MR. ROEMER: So when you arrived at 9:20, how much longer was it before you overheard the conversation between the young man and the vice president saying, "Does the order still stand?"

MR. MINETA: Probably about five or six minutes.

MR. ROEMER: So about 9:25 or 9:26. And your inference was that the vice president snapped his head around and said, "Yes, the order still stands." Why did you infer that that was a shoot-down?

MR. MINETA: Just by the nature of all the events going on that day, the scrambling of the aircraft and, I don't know; I guess, just being in the military, you do start thinking about it, an intuitive reaction to certain statements being made.


There are, however, three problems with Mineta's [shoot-down] assumption. In the first place, this interpretation would imply that Cheney had given shoot-down authorization at some time before 9:25, which is much earlier, as we will see below, than even Clarke says. Mineta's interpretation would not fit with the subsequent facts, because the aircraft headed towards the Pentagon was *not* shot down. Third, Mineta's interpretation would not make the episode intelligible. Had Cheney given the expected order - the order to have an aircraft approaching the Pentagon shot down - we could not explain why the young man asked if the order still stood. It would have been abundantly obvious to him that it would continue to stand until the aircraft was actually shot down. His question would make sense, however, if "the orders" were ones that seemed unusual.

Some critics of the official account have suggested, therefore, that “the orders” in question were orders *not* to have the aircraft shot down. But of course this interpretation, while arguably being the more natural one, would also be very threatening to the Bush administration and the Pentagon.

It is not surprising, therefore, that although Mineta’s account was released in the 9/11 Commission’s staff report in May 2003, this account is not included, or even mentioned, in the Commission’s final report. This omission provides rather clear evidence that the Commission’s real mission was not to provide the fullest possible account of 9/11 but to defend the account provided by the Bush administration and the Pentagon.
Griffin’s analysis of this event proposes that “the orders” that the “young man” referred to, were in fact to *stand down*, rather than shoot down, and allow the attack to succeed.

The military uses the excuse, supported by the 9/11 Commission Report, that they were only made aware of the plane approaching the Pentagon at 9:34, less than four minutes before it struck the Pentagon when the plane was 6 miles southeast of the White House.\(^{33}\)

If it is revealed that Cheney knew of the plane approaching the Pentagon when it was 50 miles out at 9:27, rather than when it was 6 miles out at 9:34, it would prove that the Military would have had sufficient time to intercept the approaching aircraft and shoot it down, thereby saving the lives of 125 employees killed as a result. This not only proves that the Military was responsible for allowing the attacks to succeed, but also that the 9/11 Commission Report covered it up.

**Checking Mineta’s Timeline**

According to Mineta’s testimony, the plane approaching the Pentagon was “50 miles out” at around 9:26. Since the Pentagon was hit at 9:37:46, according to Mineta, it therefore would have taken about 12 minutes for the plane to fly 50 miles, make an incredible 330 degree turn while descending 7000 feet to strike the Pentagon.\(^{34}\) [NOTE 5]

The plane approaching the Pentagon was 38 miles out at 9:29.\(^{35}\) [NOTE 6] Therefore, the plane would have been 50 miles out at approximately 9:27.

Mineta testified that he arrived at around 9:20 and he recalled that the “young man” told Cheney the plane was “50 miles out” about 5 or 6 minutes after he entered the PEOC. Mineta’s memory that the plane was “50 miles out” at 9:26 proved to be very close to the actual time that the plane was in fact 50 miles out, which would have been around 9:27, only 1 minute off. So when Mineta said the conversation occurred “probably about five or six minutes” after he arrived, it would have been more like six or seven minutes, or maybe he arrived closer to 9:21, or some combination thereof. But the bottom line is that Mineta’s timeline proved to be as accurate as could be expected and nearly exactly fits with his assumption that the conversation concerned the plane approaching the Pentagon.
Mineta’s timeline agrees nearly perfectly with his testimony which stated that Cheney received updates on the plane that struck the Pentagon when it was 50 miles at around 9:26. This presents strong evidence to accept Mineta’s timeline and testimony as accurate because it corresponds so well with the accepted timeline of the plane approaching the Pentagon.

There has been some debate over when Mineta arrived at the White House, despite the fact he told Commissioner Roemer that he entered the PEOC at around 9:20. Some supporters of the official story claim that Mineta actually arrived at around 9:45 since many people are under the false impression that the White House evacuation began sometime between 9:40 and 9:45. Mineta stated in his testimony that when he “got to the White House, it was being evacuated.” CNN reported on 9/11 that the evacuation began around 9:20, though it was not until around 9:45 that people were told to actually run out of the White House, since the evacuation was proceeding slowly and orderly prior to Stafford’s urgent evacuation. This topic is explained in more detail later on, in the section “Debunking the Debunkers – United 93 was NOT “50 miles out””.

Maybe Another Plane was “50 miles out”?

Supporters of the official story could argue that the “young man” was actually referring to a different plane, since there were still many planes in the sky during that time. This is an unlikely scenario since it would require this other plane to be “50 miles out” of some place of interest other than the Pentagon at the same time the plane approaching the Pentagon was also 50 miles out. It is an improbable coincidence to suggest that an imaginary plane, which was of no threat, was "50 miles out" of somewhere else, when a real plane that was a threat to the Pentagon and White house, was also 50 miles out at that same time. There is no evidence to support that any other plane was "50 miles out" of anywhere of interest at this time, or any other time. Also, Mineta clearly states that he was in fact referring to the plane that hit the Pentagon by explaining “during the time that the airplane was coming in to the Pentagon, there was a young man who would come in and say to the Vice President, "The plane is 50 miles out".” Hamilton evens clarifies by
asking him if “The flight you're referring to is the –” and Mineta finishes his sentence by saying “The flight that came into the Pentagon.”38

Since this conversation is occurring in the White House, which is very close geographically to the Pentagon, the phrase “50 miles out” implies that they knew the target or destination of the airplane. The natural assumption would be that the plane would be 50 miles out of Washington D.C. What other possible target could a plane be “50 miles out” from where Cheney was certain of the target?

**Phantom AA 11**

The 9/11 Commission Report explains their new version of events by describing the Military’s response to Phantom AA 11 and AA 77.39 **[NOTE 7]** The 9/11 Commission Report admitted that F-16 fighter jets were scrambled from Langley at 9:24 and airborne by 9:30. This fits with Mineta’s assumption that they were trying to shoot down AA 77. Official reports, testimony and mainstream news prior to the publication of the 9/11 Commission all explained that the fighter jets scrambled from Langley were attempting to intercept AA 77. However, the 9/11 Commission Report explains that the fighters scrambled from Langley were not sent to intercept AA 77, but were chasing Phantom AA 11. The real AA 11 crashed into the North Tower at 8:46.

The 9/11 Commission Report later admits that “this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense. The inaccurate accounts created the impression that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft.”40 The 9/11 Commission Report also explains that they “have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information.”41 If the 9/11 Commission heard a tape recording of the one and only reference to Phantom AA 11, it would seem that identifying the source of this misinformation would be valuable. Despite the fact that voice identification technology has existed for some time, the 9/11 Commission was not able to find the FAA source of the misinformation.
The 9/11 Commission Report states that the fighters were actually 150 miles away from the Pentagon at the time of the impact, which is 45 miles further away than NORAD’s September 18th, 2001 timeline proposed. The 9/11 Commission’s new timeline actually has the fighters further away from the Pentagon at the time of the impact than they were when they were initially scrambled, since Langley is only 130 miles away from the Pentagon.

Since Phantom AA 11 was supposedly on its way to Washington D.C., it really should not have mattered that they scrambled the fighters to intercept the wrong plane. Had fighters been placed over Washington D.C., the fighters would have been in position to shoot down any hostile aircraft. The 9/11 Commission Report even admits that the crew commander for NEADS ordered the fighters “towards the Washington area”. This order was changed to have the fighters sent to the “Baltimore area” to position them in-between Phantom AA 11 and Washington. This new version of events described in the 9/11 Commission Report also hinders on the fact that the fighters, which were scrambled after a phantom aircraft, also flew in the wrong direction. The F-16 fighters did not even fly towards Baltimore, let alone Washington, but instead flew out over the ocean in what is largely blamed on pilot error.

Vanity Fair ran an article in the summer of 2006 that gave a fairly unbiased examination of the most popular 9/11 documentary, Loose Change. In the following issue, they ran a story about the NORAD tapes which allowed the public to listen to some of the recordings for the first time. They provided the never before heard tapes of the misinformation concerning Phantom AA 11 and investigated the story surrounding the phantom aircraft, arguably in more detail than the 9/11 Commission. The article explained that “Arnold and Marr approve scrambling the two planes at Langley,” but that they were chasing “what will turn out to be a phantom plane.” It revealed that “20 months later, when the military presents to the 9/11 commission what is supposed to be a full accounting of the day, omitted from the official time line is any mention of this reported hijacking and the fevered chase it engenders.” Vanity Fair then goes onto describe how it was possible for the military to chase a plane that did not exist. [NOTE 8]
An unwieldy conference call between F.A.A. centers had been established, and Scoggins was monitoring it when the word came across—from whom or where isn't clear—that American 11 was thought to be headed for Washington. Scoggins told me he thinks that the problem started with someone overheard trying to confirm from American whether American 11 was down—that somewhere in the flurry of information zipping back and forth during the conference call this transmogrified into the idea that a different plane had hit the tower, and that American 11 was still hijacked and still in the air. The plane's course, had it continued south past New York in the direction it was flying before it dipped below radar coverage, would have had it headed on a straight course toward D.C. This was all controllers were going on; they were never tracking an actual plane on the radar after losing American 11 near Manhattan, but if it had been flying low enough, the plane could have gone undetected. "After talking to a supervisor, I made the call and said [American 11] is still in the air, and it's probably somewhere over New Jersey or Delaware heading for Washington, D.C.,” Scoggins told me.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked General Arnold why he failed to mention that the Langley fighters at 9:24 were scrambled to go after Phantom AA 11. [NOTE 9] His testimony implies that planes were scrambled without Arnold having heard anything about such a flight. Like Mineta and other officials, he testified that the fighters had been scrambled in response to AA 77. This testimony also shows that he subsequently learned about Phantom AA 11 but could “not recall” this information during his previous testimony. It would seem very strange that the person who had given the order to scramble jets did not know what plane his fighters were attempting to intercept. Even had Arnold been confused on the day as to which aircraft he was trying to shoot down, it is admitted that he learned of Phantom AA 11 afterwards. Yet he now claims that he did not mention it in his earlier testimony because he “didn't recall those facts in May of last year”.

In the view of David Ray Griffin, “until there is an investigation of the evidence for this new idea by some truly neutral investigative body, we have reason to wonder whether the “phantom aircraft” is not itself a phantom.” This would explain why there was no mention of the phantom aircraft in any of the previous testimony by numerous respected officials.
Bringing this evidence back to Mineta’s testimony, the 9/11 Commission Report implies that the plane that was “50 miles out” could not have been either AA 77 or Phantom AA 11. The reason for this is that Vice President Dick Cheney supposedly did not enter the PEOC until after the Pentagon was struck. Since Mineta only learned about a plane that was “50 miles out” from overhearing a conversation between Cheney and a young man in the PEOC, the 9/11 Commission Report would have us conclude that Mineta’s timeline was inaccurate and therefore the conversation occurred later, concerning a different plane.

**Timeline of Cheney in the PEOC**

The official narrative and the 9/11 Commission Report imply that Mineta’s testimony is not accurate by claiming that Cheney was not in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) until after the Pentagon was struck. This suggests that Mineta was confused about the times of these significant events, and remained under that assumption for years.

9/11 Commission Report:

The Vice President remembered placing a call to the President just after entering the shelter conference room. There is conflicting evidence about when the Vice President arrived in the shelter conference room. We have concluded, from the available evidence, that the Vice President arrived in the room shortly before 10:00, perhaps at 9:58. The Vice President recalled being told, just after his arrival, that the Air Force was trying to establish a combat air patrol over Washington.

This proposed timeline by the 9/11 Commission Report does not make rational sense when considering the testimony of Norman Mineta. If Cheney did not arrive until after the Pentagon was struck, this would require the belief that Mineta had lied and completely fabricated the entire event of a “young man” telling Cheney that a plane was “50 miles out”. Mineta clearly states that the plane in question, which was “50 miles out”, was the plane approaching the Pentagon. If this conversation occurred after 9:37, why would Mineta think that Cheney and the “young man” were discussing the plane that hit the Pentagon if the Pentagon was already hit? Mineta gave this testimony over a year and
half after 9/11, and it makes no rational sense why he would be under the belief that Cheney and the “young man” were discussing the plane approaching the Pentagon if the Pentagon had already been attacked.

Mineta’s testimony was justified by the NORAD’s initial September 18th, 2001 timeline, testimony by NORAD officials, and news reports in the media. Consequently, there was no reason to think this testimony was inaccurate until the 9/11 Commission changed the story during their investigation. Mineta’s testimony was seen as accurate in the eyes of the Government’s official narrative for nearly three years following the attacks. When the 9/11 Commission revised the Military’s timeline, it made no attempt to adequately explain how the earlier timelines were so inaccurate, and the Final Report completely omitted contradicting testimony, including Norman Mineta’s.

The Timeline:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineta’s Timeline</th>
<th>9/11 Commission Report Timeline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheney is in the PEOC before 9:20</td>
<td>F-16’s are scrambled from Langley at 9:24 in response to phantom Flight 11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military is notified of AA 77 approaching the Pentagon at 9:24, and F-16s are scrambled from Langley.</td>
<td>F-16’s are in the air at 9:30 and are ordered to Baltimore to intercept Phantom AA 11 instead of Washington D.C., but the pilot flies out over the ocean by mistake.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young man enters the PEOC and tells Cheney, “The plane is 50 miles out” at 9:27</td>
<td>Military learns that AA 77 is lost at 9:34 by fluke, during a discussion about Phantom AA 11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-16’s are in the air at 9:30 and are in pursuit of AA 77.</td>
<td>Secret Service brings Cheney to the PEOC with the news of AA 77 at 9:36.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentagon is hit at 9:37:46, Cheney still remains in the PEOC</td>
<td>Pentagon is hit at 9:37:46, Cheney is in the tunnel on the way to the PEOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheney enters the PEOC at around 9:58, after the Pentagon was hit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 9/11 Commission’s Final Report tells a very different story about Cheney’s actions on that day than had been reported earlier by many sources.

9/11 Commission Report:\footnote{48}

American 77 began turning south, away from the White House, at 9:34. It continued heading south for roughly a minute, before turning west and beginning to circle back. This news prompted the Secret Service to order the immediate evacuation of the Vice President just before 9:36. Agents propelled him out of his chair and told him he had to get to the bunker. The Vice President entered the underground tunnel leading to the shelter at 9:37.\footnote{209}

Once inside, Vice President Cheney and the agents paused in an area of the tunnel that had a secure phone, a bench, and television. The Vice President asked to speak to the President, but it took time for the call to be connected. He learned in the tunnel that the Pentagon had been hit, and he saw television coverage of smoke coming from the building.\footnote{210}

The only hard evidence to support this new timeline of when Cheney entered the PEOC cannot be verified. In a 2004 briefing with the Secret Service, the 9/11 Commission learned that “the 9:37 entry time in their timeline was based on alarm data, which is no longer retrievable”.\footnote{49}

A January 27\textsuperscript{th}, 2002 article in the Washington Post states that Cheney didn’t enter the PEOC until after the Pentagon was hit. However, they also mention that Mineta heard about the plane approaching the Pentagon when it was 50, 30 and 10 miles out. The article did not mention the obvious contradiction that Mineta only learned of this by overhearing a conversation involving Cheney, thereby placing Cheney in the PEOC sometime before 9:27 when the plane would have been 50 miles out.

\textit{Washington Post:\footnote{50}}

Secret Service agents burst into Cheney's West Wing office. "Sir," one said, "we have to leave immediately." Radar showed an airplane barreling toward the White House.

Before Cheney could respond, the agents grabbed the vice president under his arms-nearly lifting him off the ground-and propelled him down the
steps into the White House basement and through a long tunnel that led to the underground bunker.

Meanwhile, American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 that had taken off from Dulles International Airport, turned away from the White House and flew back across the Potomac River, slamming into the Pentagon at 9:39 a.m.

In the tunnel below the White House, Cheney stopped to watch a television showing the smoke billowing out of the World Trade Center towers, heard the report about the plane hitting the Pentagon and called Bush again. Other Secret Service agents hustled Rice and several other senior White House officials included in an emergency contingency plan into the bunker with the vice president.

Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta, summoned by the White House to the bunker, was on an open line to the Federal Aviation Administration operations center, monitoring Flight 77 as it hurtled toward Washington, with radar tracks coming every seven seconds. Reports came that the plane was 50 miles out, 30 miles out, 10 miles out—until word reached the bunker that there had been an explosion at the Pentagon.

In a September 11th, 2002, ABC News one year anniversary special with Peter Jennings, ABC details, in chronological order, the official theory before it was updated in the 9/11 Commission Report.

ABC News:51

VICE PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY, UNITED STATES

I was in my west wing office.

DAVID BOHRER, WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPHER

The Secret Service had come in, to his office. I think it was two or three agents, which is very unusual.

CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) David Bohrer is another White House photographer, assigned to Vice President Dick Cheney.

DAVID BOHRER, WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPHER
And agents came inside the office and said "Sir, you have to come with us."

VICE PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY, UNITED STATES

Put his hand on the back of my belt, grabbed me by my shoulder and sort of propelled me down the hall way.

CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) And to an underground bunker, the President's Emergency Operations Center, PEOC they call it.

VICE PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY, UNITED STATES

It's got blast doors on each end. it's a secure phone there as well as a television set.

CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) Up above, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is trying to find the rest of the President's team. Secretary of State Colin Powell is in Peru, Attorney General John Ashcroft is in the air, and Federal Emergency Management Agency Director Joe Allbaugh is at a conference in Montana.

CONDOLEEZZA RICE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

As I was trying to find all the principals, the Secret Service came and said, you have to leave now for the bunker. The Vice President's already there. There may be a plane headed for the White House. There are a lot of planes that are in the air that are not responding properly.

CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) In the bunker, the Vice President is joined by Rice and Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta.

NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

Someone came in and said Mr. Vice President, there's a plane out 50 miles.

CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS
(VO) Mineta confers with Federal Aviation Deputy Chief Monty Belger.

NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

And so I said, Monty, what do you have? He said, well we're watching this target on the radar, but the transponder's been turned off. So we, have no identification.

CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) At the FAA's Air Traffic Control Center near Washington's Dulles Airport, Danielle O'Brien is at a radar scope.

DANIELLE O'BRIEN, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

It was an unidentified plane to the southwest of Dulles moving at a very high rate of speed.

NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

Someone came in and said, Mr. Vice President, the airplane's 30 miles out.

LT COLONEL DAWNE DESKINS, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

We caught on the radar scope, a few blips, maybe seven or eight, you know, just enough to kind of go around in a half circle and then fade right over, losing radar contact right over, Washington. I said, my God, what is that?

DANIELLE O'BRIEN, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

He was fast and it was just, it would be unprecedented for a commercial plane to come screaming through your air space at that kind of speed, unidentified, without making some type of communication.

MASTER SERGEANT MAUREEN DOOLEY, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

We knew that he was headed in that direction and we were calling, Washington Center, oh, my God, you've got, he's coming towards you.

NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

The fellow came in and said, it's ten miles out. Assuming that it was coming into, National Airport, Ronald Reagan National Airport.
(VO) At Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, F-16 fighter pilots Brad Derrig and Dean Eckmann scramble into the air. They are 105 miles, 12 minutes south of Washington. It is just 9:30 a.m.

MAJOR BRAD DERRIG, PILOT, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

We're directed to go and which turned out to be Reagan National which is right by the Pentagon.

DANIELLE O’BRIEN, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

Our supervisor picked up our line to the White House and started relaying to them the information. We have an unidentified, very fast moving aircraft inbound toward your vicinity, eight miles west, seven miles west, and it went, six, five, four, . . .

NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

He said, uh-oh, we just lost the bogey, meaning the target went off the screen. So I said, well, where is it? And he said, well, we're not really sure.

ALLAN WALLACE, FT. MEYER FIRE DEPARTMENT

I happened to look up to my left and there is the airplane. The airplane is about 25 feet above the ground and it's about 150 to 200 yards away. And coming at us.

CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) It is 9:38, just 52 minutes have passed since the first attack. Firefighter Allan Wallace is on duty next to the helicopter landing pad on the west side of the Pentagon.

ALLAN WALLACE, FT. MEYER FIRE DEPARTMENT

I look up and see the airplane. I hear the noise from the airplane. And bang, the airplane hits the building. And that's how fast it happened.

DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The whole building jumped.

This feature story on ABC news has Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, admit that Cheney was in the PEOC before the Pentagon was hit. Cheney himself
recounts his experiences in the story and never informed ABC News that they had distorted the context under which his quotes were taken. Also, the pilot from the F16 that was scrambled from Langley does not mention anything about being ordered to Baltimore or flying out over the ocean, but explains that they were “directed to go and which turned out to be Reagan National which is right by the Pentagon.” The report also presents the misconception that it takes an F-16 twelve minutes to fly 105 miles. “They are 105 miles, 12 minutes south of Washington. It is just 9:30 a.m.” This implies that the F16s were flying at 525mph, which is around one third of their top speed. Had they been flying at maximum speed, there would have been time for the scrambled jets to reach the Pentagon, had they flown directly to the Regan National Airport at 9:30.

From the September 14th, 2002 ABC News article “Moments of Crisis”, David Bohrer, a White House photographer, also explains that it was just after 9:00am when Cheney left for the PEOC.

ABC News:

Just after 9 a.m. ET on Sept. 11, 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney was in his West Wing office when two or three agents came in and told him "Sir, you have to come with us," according to David Bohrer, a White House photographer who was there.

One of the agents "put his hand on the back of my belt, grabbed me by the shoulder and sort of propelled me down the hallway," Cheney said.

They took him into an underground bunker known as PEOC, the President's Emergency Operations Center.

... 

Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta already was in the bunker.

"Someone came in and said, 'Mr. Vice President, there's a plane out 50 miles,'" Mineta said.

Mineta conferred with Federal Aviation Administration Deputy Chief Monte Belger.
"I said … 'Monte, what do you have?'" Mineta said. "He said, 'Well, we're watching this target on the radar, but the transponder's been turned off, so we have no identification.'"

As the plane got closer, air officials had picked up enough information to believe the unidentified plane was headed toward Washington, perhaps toward Ronald Reagan National Airport, near the Pentagon.

At 9:30 a.m. ET, at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, F-16 fighter pilots scrambled into the air 105 miles — or 12 minutes — south of Washington.

"Our supervisor picked up our line to the White House," said Danielle O'Brien, an air traffic controller at an FAA facility near Washington's Dulles Airport, "and started relaying to them the information: 'We have an unidentified, very fast-moving aircraft inbound toward your vicinity, eight miles west, seven miles west.' And it went, '6, 5, 4.'"

"Pretty soon, he said, 'Uh oh, we just lost the bogey,' meaning the target went off the screen," Mineta said. "So I said, 'Well, where is it?' And he said, 'Well, we're not really sure.'"

'Bang, the Airplane Hits the Building'

This version of the official story, being presented as fact one year later, puts Cheney and Mineta in the PEOC before the Pentagon impact. These series of events are presented here in chronological order and clearly establish that the Secret Service brought Cheney to the PEOC, where he was told the plane was “50 miles out,” before the impact on the Pentagon.

This article also articulates that Mineta conferred with Federal Aviation Administration Deputy Chief, Monte Belger, who said that they were tracking the plane on radar. Even though the article admits this plane was the plane that hit the Pentagon, this could not have been either Phantom AA 11 or United 93. Had Monte been referring to phantom AA 11, he would not have been able to track the plane on primary radar, since it did not exist. Had he been tracking United 93 on primary radar, he would have realized the plane crashed when it was 125 miles out, which would also establish that the military was aware of United 93 before it crashed. There is no other possible plane that Monte could have been tracking on radar on its way to Washington. He must have been tracking the plane that hit the Pentagon. The article explains that this conversation between Mineta
and Monte occurred after the plane was 50 miles out, but long before the plane reached Washington since “officials had picked up enough information to believe the unidentified plane was headed toward Washington”. This conversation therefore must have occurred before 9:34 when the military supposedly first learned that AA 77 was lost.

The story of Cheney’s actions on 9/11 described in 9/11 Commission Report are contradicted by earlier statements by the Vice President himself. When Cheney appeared on Meet The Press with Tim Russert on September 16th, 2001, he gave a completely different account of events. Inconsistencies exist with Cheney’s acknowledgement that they had “access to the FAA.” Cheney does not describe the Secret Service rushing him to the PEOC with last minute news of AA 77, but instead claims he headed down to the PEOC after receiving word of a “credible threat to Air Force One.” However, the most glaring contraction is that Cheney himself admits to being in the PEOC shortly before the Pentagon was struck, making no reference to his current supposed whereabouts of being in the tunnel on the way to the PEOC.

Meet The Press:\(^{53}\)

VICE PRES. CHENEY: …The president was on Air Force One. We received a threat to Air Force One--came through the Secret Service...

MR. RUSSERT: A credible threat to Air Force One. You're convinced of that.

VICE PRES. CHENEY: I'm convinced of that. Now, you know, it may have been phoned in by a crank, but in the midst of what was going on, there was no way to know that. I think it was a credible threat, enough for the Secret Service to bring it to me. Once I left that immediate shelter, after I talked to the president, urged him to stay away for now, well, I went down into what's call a PEOC, the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, and there, I had Norm Mineta...

MR. RUSSERT: Secretary of Transportation.

VICE PRES. CHENEY: ...secretary of Transportation, access to the FAA. I had Condi Rice with me and several of my key staff people. We had access, secured communications with Air Force One, with the secretary of Defense over in the Pentagon. We had also the secure videoconference that ties together the White House, CIA, State, Justice, Defense--a very
useful and valuable facility. We have the counterterrorism task force up on that net. And so I was in a position to be able to see all the stuff coming in, receive reports and then make decisions in terms of acting with it.

But when I arrived there within a short order, we had word the Pentagon's been hit.

It certainly seems strange that only five days after the attacks, Cheney would tell a completely different series of events than what was described in the 9/11 Commission Report and no explanation for the contradiction has ever been given.

**Richard Clarke**

Mineta’s testified that after entering the White House on 9/11, he “met briefly with Richard Clark[e]” and was then escorted down to the PEOC. It was after this that he stated that the plane crashed into the Pentagon.

Mineta’s Testimony:54

When I got to the White House, it was being evacuated. **I met briefly with Richard Clark**, a National Security Council staff member, who had no new information. **Then the Secret Service escorted me down to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, otherwise known as the PEOC.** I established contact on two lines, one with my chief of staff at the Department of Transportation, and the second with Monty Belger, the acting deputy administrator of the FAA, and Jane Garvey, both of whom were in the FAA operations center.

And as the minutes passed, the developing picture from air traffic control towers and radar screens became increasingly more alarming. Some aircraft could not be contacted. While on a normal day that may be just a communications snafu, we were faced with trying to quickly sort out minor problems from significant threats. We did not know how many more attacks might be in progress.

The FAA began to restrict air travel in the Northeast United States by a combination of actions which included sterilizing air space in certain regions and at various airports, and ultimately a nationwide ground stop of all aircraft for all locations, regardless of destination.

**Within a few minutes, American Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon.**
Richard A. Clarke (born 1951) provided national security advice to four U.S. presidents: Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, consulting on issues of intelligence and terrorism, from 1973 to 2003. Until his retirement in 2003, Mr. Clarke was a member of the Senior Executive Service. Clarke's specialties are computer security, counterterrorism and homeland security. He was the counter-terrorism adviser on the U.S. National Security Council when the September 11, 2001 attacks occurred. He resigned in January of 2003 to work on his book, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War On Terror*, which was released in early 2004.⁵⁵

As the Washington Post reported, “on 9/11, everyone seems to agree, Clarke instantly took charge -- becoming, as he puts it, "the nation's crisis manager."”⁵⁶

Former President Bill Clinton recommended Clarke’s book during a Fox News interview where he was criticized for not doing enough to get Osama Bin Laden. In Clinton’s opinion, Clarke was “the best guy in the country” to combat terrorism and insisted that Clarke’s book painted an accurate picture of Clinton’s relentless effort to capture Bin Laden. Clinton explained that this “country only has one person who's worked on this terror. From the terrorist incidents under Reagan to the terrorist incidents from 9/11, only one: Richard Clarke. And all I can say to anybody is, you want to know what we did wrong or right, or anybody else did? Read his book.”⁵⁷ [NOTE 10]

Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste questioned Condoleezza Rice during her appearance before the 9/11 Commission about the warnings from Richard Clarke that “Al Qaeda cells were in the United.”:

9/11 Commission Hearing:⁵⁸


The extraordinary high terrorist attack threat level in the summer of 2001 is well documented, and Richard Clarke's testimony about the possibility of an attack against the United States homeland was repeatedly discussed from May to August within the intelligence community, and that is well
documented. You acknowledged that Richard Clarke told you that Al-Qaeda cells were in the United States.

Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste also brought up the August 6th, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing that was titled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US". In the declassified briefing, it stated:\textsuperscript{59}

Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.

As Bill Clinton had suggested, there were many warnings that a terrorist attack was a serious threat, yet President George W. Bush took no actions to combat terrorism in the months prior to 9/11. The military was totally ineffective in stopping any of the attacks on the day itself, and the government and intelligence agencies failed to prevent the attacks from occurring in the first place. The degree of incompetence that the 9/11 Commission Report claims occurred before and on the day of 9/11 crosses the line into criminal negligence. The Bush Administration relies on the public believing in the incompetence of the military and that these colossal failures occurred out of ignorance and stupidity. Nothing could be further from the truth. The failure to prevent the attacks can only be attributed to a deliberate effort to ignore clear warnings and take no preventative actions. The military’s failure to intercept any of the hijacked aircrafts was not the result of a breakdown in communication with the FAA, but was again a deliberate effort to allow the attacks to succeed. Since standard operating procedures would have normally allowed the military to intercept the hijacked planes, an order for the military to stand down must have been given. It is now apparent that Richard Clarke seemed to be the only individual who was concerned about an Al Qaeda threat and terrorism in general. He was honorable and honest enough to confess to the victims’ families that: “Your government failed you, those entrusted with protecting you failed you, and I failed you.”\textsuperscript{60} Richard Clarke’s criticism of the Iraq war and the Bush Administrations’ failures to deal with terrorist threats before 9/11 suggest that Clarke was one of the only trustworthy officials in the Bush Administration. It is suspicious that the two high level
officials who gave the most contradicting accounts of 9/11 were both rare holdovers from the Clinton administration.\textsuperscript{61}

CBC:\textsuperscript{62} From the beginning of the Bush Administration, Richard Clarke says that he did everything in his power to coax them into action against al-Qaeda without success. In the twenty-four hours following 9/11, the Bush team was ready to go to war.

But Mr. Clarke says they picked the wrong target, "\textit{Well, in meetings on September 11th and on September 12th, the defence department officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, began talking about the need to attack Iraq. I first thought that they were kidding and it became clear that they weren't.} Rumsfeld said, well yeah, we could attack Afghanistan but there aren't very many targets to bomb in Afghanistan and they're not worth very much. So we should bomb Iraq where there are much better targets. \textit{I thought there's no connection between what just happened and Iraq. That didn't seem to bother them.} I said well attacking Iraq actually will make it more difficult for us to get the kinds of support we need in the world particularly in the Muslim world. That didn't seem to bother them. Secretary Powell tried to have a restraining influence on this discussion. Secretary Powell said look the world is not going to understand if we don't go after Afghanistan. That's where the attack of September 11th was launched from. So reluctantly, during the course of the week, the defence department came around to a consensus and the consensus was called Afghanistan first that's what the President approved, an Afghanistan first policy. It was very clear what was second, and what was second was Iraq."

Richard Clarke described in his book \textit{Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror} his account of the events in the White House on 9/11. Since he was the man in charge on 9/11, Clarke can be considered a very credible source. Richard Clarke confirms Mineta’s timeline of when he arrived in the PEOC and when Cheney was in the PEOC. He directly contradicts the 9/11 commission report in many respects. He clearly explains that Cheney would have definitely been in the PEOC well before 9:28, likely between 9:05 and 9:10. He also states that his brief meeting with Mineta also occurred before 9:28 and that Mineta also joined the Vice President in the PEOC before 9:28. Clarke’s account supports and verifies Mineta’s testimony, especially since they both recounted the brief meeting with one another at around 9:20am. Richard Clarke could
not possibly be confused about his timeline, as further evident by his notice of when the President made his address on CNN and when the Pentagon was struck.

Clarke’s account of 9/11 represented the first chapter of his book. The relevant sections have been quoted below and “…” spaces are used to replace sections that are irrelevant to this discussion. This is given in chronological order, and “…” spaces represent events occurring and the passing of time. Therefore notice that Clarke sent Mineta to the PEOC before 9:28, and Mineta’s recollection of the time of 9:20 proves to be accurate in light of Clarke’s narrative. Clarke explains that Mineta called in from this car phone, went briefly to the Situation Room where Clarke sent Mineta to the PEOC to be with Vice President Dick Cheney. Also, Mineta was less than two miles away from the White House when he left from the Department of Transportation. Therefore when he called in from his car, he would have only been a few minutes away at most from the White House.

Richard Clarke’s Book:

Cheney began to gather up his papers. In his outer office the normal Secret Service presence was two agents. As I left, I counted eight, ready to move to the PEOC, the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, a bunker in the East Wing.

…

“You’re going to need some decisions quickly,” Rice said off camera. “I’m going to the PEOC to be with the Vice President. Tell us what you need.”

“What I need is an open line to Cheney and you.”

Shortly thereafter, Mineta called in from his car and I asked him to come directly to the Situation Room. He had two sons who were pilots for United. He did not know where they were that day. I suggested he join the Vice President.

…

It was now 9:28.
The television screen in the upper left was running CNN on mute. Noticing the President coming on, Lisa turned on the volume and the crisis conference halted to listen.

Garvey read from a list: “All aircraft have been ordered to land at the nearest field. Here’s what we have as potential hijacks: Delta 1989 over West Virginia, United 93 over Pennsylvania…”

Stafford slipped me a not. “Radar shows aircraft headed this way.” Secret Service had a system that allowed them to see what FAA’s radar was seeing.

Ralph Seigler stuck his head into the room, “there has been an explosion in the Pentagon parking lot, maybe a car bomb!”

Roger Cressey stepped back into the video conference and announced: “A plane just hit the Pentagon.”

“I can still see Rumsfeld on the screen,” I replied, “so the whole building didn’t get hit”.

The above excerpts directly contradict the 9/11 Commission Report but do not reflect the credibility of Clarke’s account. Richard Clarke himself narrated his book which properly illustrates his authority. After listening to him read his full account, it would be naïve to conclude that this man was confused about what he observed on 9/11. Clarke appears to be one of the most credible sources to explain what happened on 9/11. The fact that Mineta’s testimony agrees with Clarke’s account is compelling evidence that Mineta and Cheney were in the PEOC before the Pentagon was struck.
Lee Hamilton Responds to Mineta’s Testimony

In an interview for CBC News on August 21st, 2006, Evan Solomon questioned the 9/11 Commission’s co-chair, Lee Hamilton, who actually interviewed Mineta when he described the events in the PEOC. Solomon asked questions about Norman Mineta’s testimony and Richard Clarke’s account but Hamilton was unable to answer any of the questions.

CBC.63

SOLOMON: Questions about foreknowledge, especially as to when Vice President Dick Cheney knew when he went down to the protective bunker: there was some suggestion that the Secretary of Transport Mineta testified in front of the Commission that he in fact talked to Dick Cheney at 9:20 am. Cheney claims he hadn’t been there.. gotten down there until close to 10 am. That was eventually omitted from the final report,. Can you tell us a bit about about what Secretary of Transport Mineta told the Commission about where Dick Cheney was prior to 10 am?

HAMILTON: I do not recall.

SOLOMON: And we don’t know exactly where that..

HAMILTON: Well, we think that Vice President Cheney entered the bunker shortly before 10 o’clock. And there is a gap of several minutes there, where we do not really know what the Vice President really did. There is the famous phone call between the President and the Vice President. We could find no documentary evidence of that phone call.
Both the President and the Vice President said that the phone call was made, and in that phone call, the order was supposedly was given, allegedly given, to shoot down an airliner - if necessary.

Now, there are a lot of things not answered about that period of time. The order never got to the pilots and when it did get to the pilots, it didn't get to them in time, and when it did get to them, they claimed it was not an order to shoot it down, but to identify and track an airliner, not to shoot it down.

What you had on this day, of course, was a lot of confusion, and a lot of confusion in communications, at the very highest levels. When the President went from the school in Sarasota to Air Force One, he was trying to get communications with the White House, he used a cell phone, in part. When he got to Air Force One, the communications didn’t work all that well. Well, this is all very disturbing, and I'm told has now been corrected.

SOLOMON: Disturbing in what way?

HAMILTON: Well, disturbing that, at this particular time, the Commander in Chief lost communications with the White House, and with his chief aides there, right in the middle of a crisis - that's very disturbing. I hope that’s been corrected, I’ve been told that it has been. But the fact of the matter is, if you look at 9/11, all the way through, FAA communications, NORAD communications, White House communications, there was just a lot of confusion, and a lot of gaps.

SOLOMON: So, just in terms of Mineta, just because I think that's sort of interesting, when Secretary Mineta made at your Commission hearing, I think he did this May 23rd, that he arrived and talked to Dick Cheney at 9:20 - that would show that Mr. Cheney had had some earlier knowledge that planes had been hijacked and they wanted to take action. That was not -

HAMILTON: What did the Secretary say at that time to the Vice President?

SOLOMON: They talked about a plane being hijacked, according to the testimony that I’ve seen, according to the Mineta report. But there’s another one, in Richard Clarke’s book, "Against All Enemies", and I know Richard Clarke took the stand very famously - not the stand, but testified before the Commission very famously - he says he received authorization from Dick Cheney to shoot down Flight 93 at about 9:50 am. In the Commission's Report, it said the authorization didn't come from Dick
Cheney until 10:25, and Richard Clarke’s testimony that he and his book, isn’t mentioned in the Commission’s. Why didn't you mention that?

HAMILTON: Look, you’ve obviously gone through the report with a fine-toothed comb, you're raising a lot of questions - I can do the same thing...

SOLOMON: Yeah.

HAMILTON: ..all I want from you is evidence. You’re just citing a lot of things, without any evidence to back them up, as far as I can see.

SOLOMON: No, I'm just asking why they weren't -

HAMILTON: I don’t know the answer to your question.

SOLOMON: I guess part of the reason is..

HAMILTON: I cannot answer every question with regard to 9/11. I can answer a good many of them, but I can't answer them all.

SOLOMON: I guess, Mr. Hamilton, I don’t think anyone expects you to have all the answers...

HAMILTON: Well, you apparently do, because you have asked me questions of enormous detail from a great variety of sources. You want me to answer them all - I can’t do it (laughs)

**Debunking the Debunkers - United 93 was NOT “50 miles out”**

Supporters of the official story of 9/11 claim that Mineta must have witnessed a conversation between Cheney and a young man about Flight Untied 93. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, it would seem possible that the young man and Cheney could have been talking about United 93. The 9/11 Commission Report claims that the flight crash landed at 10:03 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania because the passengers tried to overtake the cockpit from the hijackers. This could account for Mineta’s testimony, assuming he was confused as to the time of his arrival in the PEOC. This claim does not, however account for the inconsistencies about Cheney’s timeline of when he entered the PEOC. It cannot account for the stories by ABC news and the changing account of the Military’s response to AA 77 which included Phantom AA 11. This claim also cannot even begin to explain the numerous contradictions in Richard Clarke’s account. The
Government’s changing official story of what happened to United 93 is contradicted by many credible sources, most notably Richard Clarke. Ever since 9/11, there have been suspicions that United 93 was shot down by the U.S. Military because of the fear that it would have been used as a weapon to attack targets on the ground. [NOTE 11]

The 9/11 Commission Report attempted to eliminate any suspicion of this allegation by claiming that military notification of United 93 came after the plane already crashed and authorization to shoot down hijacked aircrafts came after United 93 was down.

The first problem with claiming that Mineta overheard a discussion about United 93 is that it crashed approximately 125 miles away from Washington D.C. Therefore, United 93 was never “50 miles out” of the White House, Pentagon, or any other specific target. It certainly was not “30 miles out” or “10 miles out” either.

However, the 9/11 Commission paints a picture of incompetence and confusion that still makes it seem possible that Mineta witnessed the young man and Cheney discussing United 93 or a medevac helicopter or some combination thereof. The argument is quite farfetched and does not coincide with respect to Mineta’s testimony, especially considering it has Cheney giving an order to shoot down a plane that was already down and an order to shoot down a medevac helicopter.

9/11 Commission Report:

At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft-presumably hijacked-heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania.

At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the Vice President and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage the aircraft. His reaction was described by Scooter Libby as quick and decisive, "in about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing." The Vice President authorized fighter
aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us he based this authorization on his earlier conversation with the President. The military aide returned a few minutes later, probably between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He again asked for authorization to engage. The Vice President again said yes.\footnote{219}

At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment," suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President.\footnote{220}

The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a two-minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary.\footnote{221}

Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania. Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot down pursuant to this authorization.\footnote{222}

**At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out.** Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. At 10:33, Hadley told the air threat conference call: "I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there's an inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out. The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out."\footnote{223}

Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. In the apt description of one witness, "It drops below the radar screen and it's just continually hovering in your imagination; you don't know where it is or what happens to it." Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter.\footnote{224}

Although the 9/11 Commission Report does not address Mineta’s testimony, some defenders of the official theory claim that Mineta witnessed a discussion about Flight 93, not the plane approaching the Pentagon. When looking at the totality of Mineta’s testimony in response to Lee Hamilton’s questions, it does not seem plausible that the plane which was 50, 30 and 10 miles out could have been Flight 93.
MR. MINETA: And then later I heard of the fact that the airplanes had been scrambled from Langley to come up to DC, but those planes were still about 10 minutes away. And so then, at the time we heard about the airplane that went into Pennsylvania, then I thought, "Oh, my God, did we shoot it down?" And then we had to, with the vice president, go through the Pentagon to check that out.

MR. HAMILTON: Let me see if I understand. The plane that was headed toward the Pentagon and was some miles away, there was an order to shoot that plane down.

MR. MINETA: Well, I don't know that specifically, but I do know that the airplanes were scrambled from Langley or from Norfolk, the Norfolk area. But I did not know about the orders specifically other than listening to that other conversation.

MR. HAMILTON: But there very clearly was an order to shoot commercial aircraft down.

MR. MINETA: Subsequently I found that out.

MR. HAMILTON: With respect to Flight 93, what type of information were you and the vice president receiving about that flight?

MR. MINETA: The only information we had at that point was when it crashed.

MR. HAMILTON: I see. You didn't know beforehand about that airplane.

MR. MINETA: I did not.

MR. HAMILTON: And so there was no specific order there to shoot that plane down.

MR. MINETA: No, sir.

Based on the conversation that he overheard between the young man and Cheney, Mineta clearly explained that there were no orders to shoot down United 93 and that “the orders” referred to AA 77. Mineta explained that the first time they heard of United 93, it had already crashed. Mineta makes no mention or reference to the fact that they were
tracking and attempting to shoot down United 93 after it already crashed, or that they almost shot down a medevac helicopter.

Commissioner Lee Hamilton admitted to CBC that it was not clear who gave the order to shoot down the hijacked aircrafts, which is a central claim used to defend against accusations that Untied 93 was shot down.

CBC.

To this day, it is unclear who was really giving the most critical orders on 9/11. The most controversial question regards the order to shoot down commercial airliners if they were hijacked -- an order which could have killed hundreds more innocent people. The 9/11 commissioners have suggested the President and the Vice President have not been forthcoming about that issue and that the truth has yet to be revealed. The record shows that between 10:10 and 10:15 in the White House bunker, the Vice President was asked if military pilots could shoot down any hijacked aircraft headed for Washington. He immediately gave the order. The problem is that only the President had the authority to do so. Later, both Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney claimed to the 9/11 Commission that the President actually gave the shoot-down order about 15 minutes earlier, but the White House call records do not support their claim. Lee Hamilton, vice chair of the 9/11 Commission says it wasn't clear who gave the order, "The principals haven't said. The President and the Vice President are the only ones that can clarify that completely. And we just don't know what happened there."

The other astonishing fact about the shoot-down order is that it was never relayed to the fighter pilots who might have carried it out. "No, we never got the order. What we were told is that you can expect to shoot down the next hijack track. It was kind of informational only. There was no order, no authentication, nothing even remotely close to what would be required to fire on a plane," remembers Duffy. "The idea that the President of the United States can give an order and the Air Force doesn't get it, that's serious stuff," says Kean, chair of the 9/11 Commission.

MSNBC also reported that staffers on the 9/11 Commission did not believe Cheney’s version of events.

MSNBC.
Around 9:35 on the morning of 9/11, Cheney was lifted off his feet by the Secret Service and hustled into the White House bunker. Cheney testified to the 9/11 Commission that he spoke with President Bush before giving an order to shoot down a hijacked civilian airliner that appeared headed toward Washington. (The plane was United Flight 93, which crashed in a Pennsylvania field after a brave revolt by the passengers.) But a source close to the commission, who declined to be identified revealing sensitive information, says that none of the staffers who worked on this aspect of the investigation believed Cheney's version of events.

Although officials at Herndon told FAA headquarters that United 93 was hijacked by 9:34, the 9/11 Commission Report claims that they stubbornly refused to notify the military, despite encouragement to do so from FAA personnel in the field. 69 [NOTE 12] United 93 crashed at 10:03, meaning that officials at FAA headquarters would have known of the hijacking for nearly half an hour yet did not relay this information to the military. The 9/11 Commission Report claims that “by the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed” 70 and that “NORAD did not even know the plane was hijacked until after it had crashed”. 71

9/11 Commission Report: 72

Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93. Nor did any manager at FAA headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military.

Military Notification and Response. NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft’s last known latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 on radar because it was already in the ground. 171

At the same time, the NEADS mission crew commander was dealing with the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington, D.C., sorting out what their orders were with respect to potential targets. Shortly after 10:10, and having no knowledge either that United 93 had been heading toward Washington or that it had crashed, he explicitly instructed the Langley fighters: "negative- negative clearance to shoot" aircraft over the nation's capital. 172
This account that the military did not know about United 93 until after it crashed is contradicted by earlier reports in the public record. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told the Boston Globe on September 15th, 2001 “that the Air Force was tracking the hijacked plane that crashed in Pennsylvania on Tuesday after other airliners slammed into the Pentagon and World Trade Center and had been in a position to bring it down if necessary.”

USA Today:

The Nashua controllers have learned through discussions with other controllers that an F-16 fighter stayed in hot pursuit of another hijacked commercial airliner until it crashed in Pennsylvania, the employee said.

Although controllers don't have complete details of the Air Force's chase of the Boeing 757, they have learned the F-16 made 360-degree turns to remain close to the commercial jet, the employee said.

"He must've seen the whole thing," the employee said of the F-16 pilot's view of United Flight 93's crash near Pittsburgh. The flight took off from Newark Airport for San Francisco, and authorities say the hijackers were headed for another target in Washington, D.C.

Richard Clarke’s account in his book is perhaps the most glaring contradiction of the 9/11 Commission Report. He wrote that FAA notified everyone in the video teleconference that United 93 was hijacked shortly before the Pentagon was struck. This seems reasonable, as FAA headquarters received this information at 9:34 and therefore relayed the information shortly after it received word of the hijacking. Clarke reported still seeing Rumsfeld on the screen of the video conference and then talking to Myers who both would have learned of United 93’s hijacking long before it crashed.

Richard Clarke’s Book:


Garvey read from a list: “all aircraft have been ordered to land at the nearest field. Here’s what we have as potential hijacks: Delta 1989 over West Virginia, United 93 over Pennsylvania…”
Stafford slipped me a note. “Radar shows aircraft headed this way.” Secret Service had a system that allowed them to see what FAA’s radar was seeing. “I’m going to empty out the complex.” He was ordering the evacuation of the White House.

Ralph Seigler stuck his head into the room, “There has been an explosion in the Pentagon parking lot, maybe a car bomb!”

Defenders of the official story and the 9/11 Commission Report claim that since Mineta witnessed a discussion about United 93, his timeline was therefore off by around half an hour. The logic that is used to support this claim is that Mineta arrived at the White House sometime after 9:45. Mineta mentioned in his testimony that when he “got to the White House, it was being evacuated.” It is clear that Stafford’s order to evacuate the White House went into effect sometime between 9:40 and 9:45. Clarke recounted that at around this time the “Uniformed Secret Service guards yelled at the women, “If you’re in high heels, take off your shoes and run-run!’”76 Defenders of the official story therefore claim that it was at this time that Mineta arrived at the White House since this is when the main evacuation was taking place. Though it is correct that the urgent evacuation occurred around 9:45, the evacuation of the White House began much earlier, at around 9:20, around the time Mineta arrived. As Clarke wrote in his book, long before Mineta’s arrival at 9:20, he “would evacuate the White House”.77 CNN broadcast live at 9:52 on 9/11 a report on the White House evacuation titled ‘The White House Has Been Evacuated’. It reported that “they started slowing evacuating the White House about 30 minutes ago”78, which puts the start of the evacuation at about 9:22 according to CNN. Mineta was in fact correct when he stated that when he “got to the White House, it was being evacuated” since the White House was being evacuated when Mineta arrived at around 9:20. Because defenders of the official story maintain that the evacuation did not start until around 9:45, the entire CNN transcript is pasted below exactly as it appears on CNN’s webpage to prove that the evacuation started around the time Mineta arrived, at around 9:20.

CNN:

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/11/bn.06.html
CNN BREAKING NEWS

The White House Has Been Evacuated
Aired September 11, 2001 - 09:52 ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

We also have a report now that it was a plane that crashed into the Pentagon, and we have a large fire at the Pentagon. The Pentagon is being evacuated as we speak now. The White House had been evacuated as well.

AARON BROWN, CNN ANCHOR: CNN's John King joins us on the phone. John?

JOHN KING, CNN SENIOR WHITE HOUSE CORRESP.: Aaron, I'm standing in Lafayette Park, directly across the White House, perhaps about 200 yards away from the White House residence itself. The Secret Service has pushed most people all the way back to the other side of the park. I'm trying to avoid having that done to me at the moment.

Just moments ago they started slowing evacuating the White House about 30 minutes ago. Then, in the last five minute people have come running out of the White House and the old executive office building, which is the office building right directly across from the White House.

About 10 minutes ago, there was a white jet circling overhead. Now, you generally don't see planes in the area over the White House. That is restricted air space. No reason to believe that this jet was there for any nefarious purposes, but the Secret Service was very concerned, pointing up at the jet in the sky.

It is out of sight now, best we can tell. They've evacuated the entire White House staff and the old executive office, as well as some townhouses that are government offices. Many of our viewers might know Blair House, where other international leaders say when they are in Washington. That block of townhouses has been evacuated as well. They are pushing us now back towards 8th Street, which is the next main street to the north from Pennsylvania Avenue, across from the White House.

BROWN: John, hang on one second. We are getting reports that the Capitol, the Treasury building also being evacuated.
John, is this evacuation from the White House, was it orderly? Did it seem panicky? How would you characterize it?

KING: It started off as orderly, much like we get when there are occasional bomb scares near the White House. But then, again in the last 10 minutes or so, the people who came out -- the last several hundred I saw leaving the grounds, were told and ordered by the Secret Service to run. They were running through the gates. These were of course professionals in business suits.

I'm also told that prior to that, and we don't know the current situation that the vice president and other administration officials on the scene very meeting in the White House situation room, which is in the basement of the White House. Whether they have stayed on the complex or not is unknown to us at this moment.

I spoke to an administration official shortly after the president delivered his statement. He said obviously the operating assumption here is terrorism. The initial assumption, this official said, was that this had something to do, or at least they were looking into any possible connection with Osama Bin Laden. The administration recently released a warning that they thought Osama Bin Laden might strike out against U.S. targets.

BROWN: Just to add at bit, John, to what you've been saying. We're getting a report from the Associated Press now that the White House was evacuated after the Secret Service received what the AP is describing as a credible threat of a terrorist attack against the White House itself. I expect you'll be checking that out. We'll try and confirm that. But that is what AP is reporting right now.

TO ORDER A VIDEO OF THIS TRANSCRIPT, PLEASE CALL 800-CNN-NEWS OR USE OUR SECURE ONLINE ORDER FORM LOCATED AT www.fdch.com

The 9/11 Commission’s Response

During the open Commission’s hearings, where many officials from the FAA and NORAD testified, officials gave the timeline presented by NORAD on September 18th, 2001 and since then to media outlets such as ABC. Since this version of events was seen as the official story at the time, there was no reason for any of the officials to think that their testimony might be incorrect. But since this timeline left the U.S. Military vulnerable to criticism, the 9/11 Commission Report would have to propose their new
timeline which made most of the testimony inaccurate. The 9/11 Commission’s Report simply stated that some of the testimony from Government officials during public testimony before this Commission was “incorrect”. They do not mention that this testimony agreed with NORAD’s timeline presented as fact one week after 9/11 and that it was also represented as fact years later in mainstream news reports. They do not claim that Government or NORAD officials lied in their testimony or discuss how it was possible that the testimony could be so inaccurate. Very little evidence or information is provided to justify such radical revisionism.

9/11 Commission Report:

Clarifying the Record
The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes’ notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth.

We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities. NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly.

American Airlines Flight 77
(AA 77)
Washington, D.C., to Los Angeles

United Airlines Flight 93
(UA 93)
Newark to San Francisco
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:20</td>
<td>Takeoff</td>
<td>8:42</td>
<td>Takeoff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:51</td>
<td>Last routine radio communication</td>
<td>9:24</td>
<td>Flight 93 receives warning from UA about possible cockpit intrusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:51-8:54</td>
<td>Likely takeover</td>
<td>9:27</td>
<td>Last routine radio communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:54</td>
<td>Flight 77 makes unauthorized turn to south</td>
<td>9:28</td>
<td>Likely takeover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:56</td>
<td>Transponder is turned off</td>
<td>9:34</td>
<td>Herndon Command Center advises FAA headquarters that UA 93 is hijacked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:05</td>
<td>AA headquarters aware that Flight 97 is hijacked</td>
<td>9:36</td>
<td>Flight attendant notifies UA of hijacking; UA attempts to contact the cockpit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:25</td>
<td>Herndon Command Center orders nationwide ground stop</td>
<td>9:41</td>
<td>Transponder is turned off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:32</td>
<td>Dulles tower observes radar of fast-moving aircraft (later identified as AA 77)</td>
<td>9:57</td>
<td>Passenger revolt begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:34</td>
<td>FAA advises NEADS that AA 77 is missing</td>
<td>10:03:11</td>
<td>Flight 93 crashes in field in Shanksville, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:37:46</td>
<td>AA 77 crashes into the Pentagon</td>
<td>10:07</td>
<td>Cleveland Center advises NEADS of UA 93 hijacking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>AA headquarters confirms Flight 77 crash into Pentagon</td>
<td>10:15</td>
<td>UA headquarters aware that Flight 93 has crashed in PA; Washington Center advises NEADS that Flight 93 has crashed in PA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than the actual events, **inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response.** Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the
military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning.

In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time.

In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C.

In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77, United 93, or both. These statements were incorrect as well. The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records. Yet this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense. The inaccurate accounts created the impression that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft.

In fact, not only was the scramble prompted by the mistaken information about American 11, but NEADS never received notice that American 77 was hijacked. It was notified at 9:34 that American 77 was lost. Then, minutes later, NEADS was told that an unknown plane was 6 miles southwest of the White House. Only then did the already scrambled airplanes start moving directly toward Washington, D.C.

Thus the military did not have 14 minutes to respond to American 77, as testimony to the Commission in May 2003 suggested. It had at most one or two minutes to react to the unidentified plane approaching Washington, and the fighters were in the wrong place to be able to help. They had been responding to a report about an aircraft that did not exist.

Nor did the military have 47 minutes to respond to United 93, as would be implied by the account that it received notice of the flight's hijacking at 9:16. By the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed.
Lou Dobbs reported on CNN, on August 9th, 2006 about these apparent “lies” that were told by FAA and NORAD officials.

CNN:

DOBBS: Tonight, we're one month away from the fifth anniversary of September 11th. A shocking new book by the 9/11 Commission co-chairmen, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, says Americans still don't know the whole truth about their government's initial response to those terrorist attacks that day.

Christine Romans has the report.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

CHRISTINE ROMANS, CNN CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): Two hours of chaos and confusion on September 11th, and months of government ineptitude at incorrect testimony. A new book by 9/11 commission co-chairmen Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton outlines repeated misstatements by the Pentagon and Federal Aviation Administration.

They write, "Fog of war could explain why some people were confused on the day of 9/11. But it could not explain why all of the after-action reports, accident investigations and public testimony by FAA and NORAD officials advanced an account of 9/11 that was untrue."

Untrue, the military's original timeline of United Flight 93. The military said FAA notified NORAD of a hijacked plane at 9:16 a.m., 47 minutes before the plane crashed in Pennsylvania. In fact, the military found out three minutes after the plane crashed. And equally untrue, the government's timeline for American Flight 77 and details about fighter jets scrambled to intercept it.

The book also alleges government officials weren't forthcoming with the investigation and it took interviews and subpoenas to shake loose valuable information.

A Pentagon audit declassified last year found "DOD did not accurately report to the 9/11 Commission on the response to the September 11th, 2001 hijackings." Pentagon investigators blamed "insufficient forensic capabilities" and worse. Admits, "DOD might not be able to sufficiently capture and report on actions taken in response to a future significant air event."

Still, so far government investigators stopped short of calling all these
inaccuracies lies.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

ROMANS: Investigations are under way by the inspectors general of the Pentagon and the Department of Transportation to find out just why the FAA and NORAD didn't tell the truth.

Now, Kean and Hamilton say all the inaccuracies have fueled conspiracy theorists, they've stymied the investigation, and Lou, damaged the credibility of this government.

DOBBS: Well, this government doesn't deserve much credibility, does it? In point of fact, if all of the after-action reports are untrue, for whatever reason, that's a lie, because they were asserted as the truth by people who knew better or should have.

ROMANS: And really troubling, the Department of Defense's own inspector general report that was declassified showed that if the same thing happened again, you'd have the same chaos and the same misreporting or lies afterward.

DOBBS: Incompetence and ineptitude on the part of this government on September 11th and in the weeks and months leading up to it are established. The fact that the government would permit deception after a deception, whether honestly, if you can call it that, honestly intended or not. But the fact that they were continue and perpetuate the lie, suggests that we need a full investigation of what is going on and what is demonstrably an incompetent and at worst deceitful federal government.

Christine Romans, thank you very much. Incredible.

Though Dobbs is critical of the government by claiming that they “would permit deception”, he does not examine this issue from all angles. Kean and Hamilton’s book claims that “all of the after-action reports, accident investigations and public testimony by FAA and NORAD officials advanced an account of 9/11 that was untrue.” Dobbs does not consider the possibility that some of these reports, investigations and testimony by FAA and NORAD officials could actually be accurate and that the 9/11 Commission Report was the real culprit for advancing an account of 9/11 that was untrue. From all perspectives, a full investigation is justified.
The FAA and the Teleconference

The military has always claimed that the overall reason why they were unable to shoot down any of the hijacked aircrafts is that the FAA was incompetent and failed to notify anyone in a timely fashion. The responsibility has squarely been placed on the FAA within days after the attacks, yet no one at the FAA have been held responsible. Nobody has been fired, demoted, or publicly reprimanded for failing to do their jobs and allowing the attacks to succeed. This argument centers on the claim that a teleconference, where the FAA and NORAD shared information, was ineffective and started late into the attacks. Also, when the transponder on AA 77 was turned off, FAA officials thought the plane had crashed and did not report this to the military. It was much later when the FAA apparently began to doubt its original assumption that AA 77 had crashed.

9/11 Commission Report: 81

American Airlines Flight 77
FAA Awareness. American 77 began deviating from its flight plan at 8:54, with a slight turn toward the south. Two minutes later, it disappeared completely from radar at Indianapolis Center, which was controlling the flight. 138

The controller tracking American 77 told us he noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear. The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched along the plane's projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the air-line. Again there was nothing. At this point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical or mechanical failure, or both, and was gone. 139

Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed. At 9:08, Indianapolis Center asked Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base to look for a downed aircraft. The center also contacted the West Virginia State Police and asked whether any reports of a downed aircraft had been received. At 9:09, it reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this information to FAA headquarters at 9:24. 140
By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft, and began to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Command Center in Herndon prompted it to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost. By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked. At 9:25, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters of the situation.  

The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to investigate this issue further. Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center. The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.

According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 reemerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position. The target remained in Indianapolis Center’s airspace for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center’s airspace at 9:10. As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the flight’s projected path, not east—where the aircraft was now heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.  

In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west. Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. **American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C.**

Though the majority of the United States has Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) coverage, the 9/11 Commission Report would have us believe that the hijackers either had planned for this or were extremely lucky to have turned off the transponder in a rare area without PSR coverage. **PSR operates totally independently of the target aircraft** – that is, no action from the aircraft is required for it to provide a radar return. If an aircraft
does not show up on PSR, the logical conclusion is that it crashed, since it should be impossible for a flying aircraft to disappear from PSR coverage.\textsuperscript{82}

A timely and effective teleconference would have facilitated communication between NORAD and the FAA, allowing the military to intercept the hijacked aircrafts. As the 9/11 Commission Report describes, this teleconference supposedly started far too late and did not include the necessary personnel to prevent the attack on the Pentagon.

9/11 Commission Report:\textsuperscript{83}

The FAA, the White House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multiagency teleconference before 9:30. Because none of these teleconferences-at least before 10:00- included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department, none succeeded in meaningfully coordinating the military and FAA response to the hijackings.

At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department. The NMCC officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks. The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit. Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11. Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was frustrated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call.\textsuperscript{188}

At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted from the Situation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant to the president long involved in counterterrorism. Logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and included the CIA; the FBI; the departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; and the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40. The first topic addressed in the White House video teleconference-at about 9:40-was the physical security of the President, the White House, and federal agencies. Immediately thereafter it was reported that a plane had hit the Pentagon. We found no evidence that video teleconference participants had any prior information that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward Washington. Indeed, it is not clear to us that the video teleconference was fully under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck.\textsuperscript{189}
Richard Clarke described in his book that at around 9:10am on 9/11, he entered the Secure Video Conferencing Center next to the Situation Room in the West Wing of the White House. From there, Clarke directed the response to the 9/11 attacks and stayed in contact with other top officials through video links. On video were Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, CIA Director Tenet, FBI Director Mueller, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson (filling in for the traveling Attorney General Ashcroft), Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (filling in for the traveling Secretary of State Powell), and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers (filling in for the traveling Chairman Henry Shelton). National Security Adviser, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, is with Clarke, but she stepped aside and let Clarke run the crisis response, deferring to his longer experience on terrorism matters. Clarke is also told by an aide, “We’re on the line with NORAD, on an air threat conference call.” The 9/11 Commission described this conference in a staff report that the “White House Situation Room initiated a video teleconference, chaired by Richard Clarke. While important, it had no immediate effect on the emergency defense efforts.” 9/11 Commission’s Final Report covers the conference in greater depth and suggests it begins about 15 minutes later than Clarke claims, at 9:25 a.m but that it was not clear whether “the video teleconference was fully under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck.” The 9/11 Commission Report also claimed that the FAA did not join the teleconference until 9:40, yet Clarke’s book said that Jane Garvey from the FAA relayed information to Clarke and the rest of the teleconference. Garvey told everyone at the conference that the “two aircraft that went in were American flight 11, a 767, and United 175, also a 767. Hijacked.” This confirmation that AA 11 crashed into one of the towers also detracts from the 9/11 Commission Reports claim about Phantom AA 11, since it claimed that there was no confirmation that AA 11 hit the North Tower. Garvey also told the teleconference that she “already put a hold on all takeoffs and landing in New York and Washington, but we have reports of eleven aircraft off course or out of communications, maybe hijacked.”  This conversation that Clarke recounted in his book, occurred before Mineta arrived at the White House and well before 9:28. The 9/11 Commission’s claim that the FAA did not join this teleconference until 9:40 is directly contradicted by Clarke’s book.
The earliest media reports in the days following the attacks explain that fighter jets were not scrambled until after the Pentagon was hit and that the FAA had notified the military about the hijacked airplanes. Some argue that the initial reports after an event can often be more accurate than versions presented years later. In the case of 9/11, there is substantial evidence that shows these initial reports may the closest to the truth.

Laura Brown, the Deputy in Public Affairs at FAA headquarters, sent a memo on May 22, 2003 titled “FAA Communications with NORAD On September 11, 2001”. This memo contradicts the 9/11 Commission Report by explaining that the FAA actually shared real time information about Flight 77. Therefore, the military was actually to blame for not intercepting the planes.

Laura Brown’s Memo:

Within minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center, the FAA immediately established several phone bridges that included FAA field facilities, the FAA Command Center, FAA headquarters, DOD, the Secret Service, and other government agencies. The US Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone bridge and established contact with NORAD on a separate line. The FAA shared real-time information on the phone bridges about the unfolding events, including information about loss of communication with aircraft, loss of transponder signals, unauthorized changes in course, and other actions being taken by all the flights of interest, including Flight 77. Other parties on the phone bridges, in turn, shared information about actions they were taking. NORAD logs indicate that the FAA made formal notification about American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m., but information about the flight was conveyed continuously during the phone bridges before the formal notification.

Dick Cheney accidentally confirmed Laura Brown’s claim in an interview on Meet The Press on September 16th, 2001. Cheney said, before cutting himself off, that “The Secret Service has an arrangement with the F.A.A. They had open lines after the World Trade Center was...” 

War Games
Looking back at the mass confusion and mistakes by the FAA and/or NORAD on 9/11, one speculates as to why there was so much confusion. Hijacked planes were allowed to fly around the country undetected for lengthy periods of time without being intercepted. When scramble orders were given and shootdown authorization was approved, the military was chasing a phantom aircraft and attempting to shoot down planes that had already crashed. One possible explanation for this confusion is that the military was running many drills that pulled fighter jets away to Alaska, leaving the North-East section of the country with very few defenses. One exercise involved training for a response to aircrafts being hijacked to be used as weapons. Though complete information about these drills is not readily available because the information is classified, it is known that at least one of these drills involved inserting fake radar blips to simulate hijacked aircrafts. The confusion that occurred could have been a result of tampering with the radar. Even the technical sergeant fielding the phone call, which was the military's first notification that something was wrong, asked “Is this real-world or exercise?”

Vanity Fair:

On tape, amid the confusion, one hears Major James Fox, then 32, the leader of the Weapons Team, whose composure will stand out throughout the attack, make an observation that, so far, ranks as the understatement of the morning.

08:43:06 FOX: I've never seen so much real-world stuff happen during an exercise.

There are several reasons why it has proven beneficial to stage drills that mirror what is occurring, during a false-flag terrorist attack. In these drills, there can be people in the military who are unknowingly participating in a terrorist attack, who are under the impression that they are simply playing the ‘bad guys’ in a controlled training exercise. Also, if any operatives are captured or identified in committing the terrorist attack, they can explain that they are simply taking part in a legitimate military exercise and not connected with the ‘real terrorists’. And in the case of 9/11, the drills appeared to be used to weaken and confuse the defense system to allow the attacks to succeed.

The Boston Globe:
“In what the government describes as a bizarre coincidence, one U.S. intelligence agency was planning an exercise last Sept. 11 in which an errant aircraft would crash into one of its buildings. But the cause wasn't terrorism -- it was to be a simulated accident.”

The agency is about four miles from the runways of Washington’s Dulles International Airport.

The Toronto Star:

COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. - EARLY morning, Sept. 11. A lifetime before the attacks on New York and Washington.

Deep inside a mountain in Colorado and far beneath the granite of North Bay, members of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) are at full "battle staff" levels for a major annual exercise that tests every facet of the organization.

Operation Northern Vigilance, planned months in advance, involves deploying fighter jets to locations in Alaska and northern Canada. Part of this exercise is pure simulation, but part is real world: NORAD is keeping a close eye on the Russians, who have dispatched long-range bombers to their own high north on a similar exercise.

Everything is going as planned when Capt. Mike Jellinek arrives for his 6 a.m. shift. The Canadian will be overseeing the crew staffing a crucial post inside the mountain- NORAD's command centre.

Whether it's a simulation or a real-world event, the role of the centre is to fuse every critical piece of information NORAD has into a concise and crystalline snapshot.

An hour into his shift, something unscripted happens. NORAD's Northeast Air Defence Sector (NEADS), based in Rome, N.Y., contacts the mountain.

The Federal Aviation Administration has evidence of a hijacking and is asking for NORAD support. This is not part of the exercise.

**In a flash, Operation Northern Vigilance is called off. Any simulated information, what's known as an "inject," is purged from the screens.**

Northern Vigilance was called off however, around 9:00am, after the North Tower was hit. Therefore, many minutes into the real 9/11 attack, there may have been false radar
blips or “inject[s]” causing confusion. Additional details, such as whose radar screens had injects, or from when to when, are unknown. According to Jellinek, the Northern Vigilance was canceled just a minute or two before the second WTC crash at 9:03 a.m.
The Russians, having seen the second WTC crash on television, quickly communicated that they were canceling their Russian arctic exercise.93

Paul Thompson’s Complete 9/11 Timeline describes the available information about the known war games that were occurring on 9/11.

Cooperative Research:94

8:30 a.m.: US Military Holding ‘Practice Armageddon’ Nationwide Training Exercise

As the 9/11 attacks are taking place, a large military training exercise called Global Guardian is said to be “in full swing.” It has been going on since the previous week. [Omaha World-Herald, 2/27/2002; Omaha World-Herald, 9/10/2002] Global Guardian is an annual exercise sponsored by US Strategic Command (Stratcom) in cooperation with US Space Command and NORAD. One military author defines Stratcom as “the single US military command responsible for the day-to-day readiness of America’s nuclear forces.” [Arkin, 2005, pp. 59] Global Guardian is a global readiness exercise involving all Stratcom forces and aims to test Stratcom’s ability to fight a nuclear war. It is one of many “practice Armageddons” that the US military routinely stages. [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/12/1997; Associated Press, 2/21/2002; Omaha World-Herald, 2/27/2002; Omaha World-Herald, 9/10/2002] It links with a number of other military exercises, including Crown Vigilance (an Air Combat Command exercise), Apollo Guardian (a US Space Command exercise), and NORAD exercises Vigilant Guardian and Amalgam Warrior [US Department of Defense, 5/1997; GlobalSecurity (.org), 10/10/2002] Global Guardian is both a command post and field training exercise, and is based around a fictitious scenario designed to test the ability of Stratcom and its component forces to deter a military attack against the US. Hundreds of military personnel are involved. [Collins Center Update, 12/1999; Times-Picayune, 9/8/2002; US Congress, n.d.] According to a 1998 Internet article by the British American Security Information Council—an independent research organization—Global Guardian is held in October or November each year. [Kristensen, 10/1998]
scheduled for October 2001. [Space Observer, 3/23/2001, pp. 2] If this is correct, then some time after March, the exercise must have been rescheduled for early September. Furthermore, there may be another important facet to Global Guardian. A 1998 Defense Department newsletter reported that for several years Stratcom had been incorporating a computer network attack (CNA) into Global Guardian. The attack involved Stratcom “red team” members and other organizations acting as enemy agents, and included attempts to penetrate the Command using the Internet and a “bad” insider who had access to a key command and control system. The attackers “war dialed” the phones to tie them up and sent faxes to numerous fax machines throughout the Command. They also claimed they were able to shut down Stratcom’s systems. Reported, Stratcom planned to increase the level of computer network attack in future Global Guardian exercises. [IAnewsletter, 6/1998] It is not currently known if a computer attack was incorporated into Global Guardian in 2001 or what its possible effects on the country’s air defense system would have been if such an attack was part of the exercise.

Cynthia McKinney, a Democrat, served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1993 to 2003, and returned in 2005, representing Georgia's fourth congressional district. She asked questions and demanded answers to concerns of fiscal anomalies by the Pentagon in 1999 and 2000 and the war games on 9/11. Her questions were not adequately answered. [NOTE 13]

VIDEO: http://www.prisonplanet.com/video/McKinney2.rm

Another example of training drills being used to aid false flag attacks were the exercises by a crisis management team, Visor Consultants, during the London underground bombing of July 7th, 2005. The drills were based on the identical scenario that actually occurred in the London underground bombings, in the exact same places and at the exact same time. The probability of this occurring by chance is so remote, that it cannot be accounted for by a strange coincidence. This drill, involving roughly 1000 people, could have maybe been a coincidence had it occurred on the same day and even at the same time. However, the fact that the drill targeted the specific stations that were bombed is too coincidental when factoring in the number of subway stations in London in combination with the identical time and date. Channel 4 news, a British TV station, reported on the coincidental drills.
Channel 4 News: It began when Peter Power, one time high ranking employee of Scotland Yard and member of its Anti-Terrorist Branch, reported in two major UK media outlets that his company Visor Consulting had on the morning of 7th of July been conducting 'crisis exercises' whose scenarios uncannily mirrored those of the actual attack.

In interviews on Radio 5 Live and ITV News, Power appeared to claim the exercises involved 'a thousand people' as well as a dedicated crisis team whose number was not specified. The consultant described the simulation of 'simultaneous attacks on a underground and mainline station' and 'bombs going off precisely at the railway stations' at which the actual bombings occurred.

The Destroyed Section of the Pentagon

According to USA Today, the attack occurred on “the only part of the Pentagon that already had been renovated in an 11-year, $1.3 billion project meant to bolster it against attack.” Renovations were due to be completed on September 16th, 2001.

Casualties in the Pentagon consisted mostly of Navel Intelligence Officers and accountants. The Office of Naval Intelligence was likely monitoring the classified US Military war games that were taking place the morning of 9/11. The deaths of accountants, bookkeepers and budget analysts and the destruction of accounting information also likely prevented the discovery of the whereabouts of $2.3 trillion that Donald Rumsfeld admitted on September 10th, 2001 that the Pentagon “cannot track”.[NOTE 14]

Conclusion

After examining the evidence behind the revisionism of the military’s response to 9/11, it is clear that the 9/11 Commission Report sought to absolve the military from all blame for not intercepting the hijacked planes. The 9/11 Commission Report did not attempt to provide the fullest possible account of the events of 9/11, but actually omitted any testimony or evidence that threatened this revised account. The testimony of Norman Mineta cannot be denied or reconciled with the 9/11 Commission’s new timeline of the
military’s response. Though the testimony is on record from the public hearings, it is not included or even mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report. Given all the evidence to the contrary, the 9/11 Commission Report is an outrageous lie that cannot adequately account for contradictory testimony. Mineta’s testimony provides strong evidence that Dick Cheney likely knew about the plane approaching the Pentagon and suggests that he gave an order for the military to stand down, allowing the plane to strike the Pentagon. There is motive that Cheney wanted the attacks in general to succeed as planned since he was a member of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) who cited the need for such an attack. In September 2000, the PNAC issued a 90-page report entitled *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, And Resources For A New Century*, proceeding “from the belief that America should seek to preserve and extend its position of global leadership by maintaining the preeminence of U.S. military forces.”\(^99\) Members include: Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Jeb Bush, Paul Wolfowitz and others\(^100\). In the document, they declare that “further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent of some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.”\(^101\)

Cheney’s role in allowing the attacks to succeed cannot be denied since he played a crucial role in giving the stand down order. But the attacks and cover up could not have been successful without the complicity of many more people and organizations that extend beyond Cheney and the Bush inner circle. Republicans and Democrats have both remained silent and have not forced answers to questions surrounding the attacks. The mainstream media in the United States failed to ask questions and demand answers. Media complicity and demonization of the 9/11 Truth Movement played just as important a role in the attacks as Cheney’s stand down order. There is substantial evidence behind almost every aspect of 9/11 that proves that the 9/11 Commission Report is a 571 page lie,\(^102\) but the evidence of Norman Mineta’s testimony and Cheney’s stand down order definitely proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 9/11 was an inside job.

To learn more about the 9/11 attacks, go to the website [www.truth911.net](http://www.truth911.net)

**Notes – Extra Information**
[NOTE 1] - Andrew’s Air Force Base

Andrews Air Force Base, located only 10 miles from the Pentagon, was supposed to house two combat-ready squadrons of fighter jets mandated to protect the skies over Washington D.C. Andrews AFB contained the 121st Fighter Squadron (FS-121) of the 113th Fighter Wing (FW-113), equipped with F-16 fighters; the 321st Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA-321) of the 49th Marine Air Group, Detachment A (MAG-49 Det-A), equipped with F/A-18 fighters. According to the authoritative U.S. military information website, DC Military:  

Training for air combat and operational airlift for national defense is the 113th's primary mission. However, as part of its dual mission, the 113th provides capable and ready response forces for the District of Columbia in the event of a natural disaster or civil emergency. Members also assist local and federal law enforcement agencies in combating drug trafficking in the District of Columbia.

At Andrews, the 113th Wing, its associated DCANG units, and their people are full partners with the active Air Force.

…

In the best tradition of the Marine Corps, a "few good men and women" support two combat-ready reserve units at Andrews AFB.

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 321, a Marine Corps Reserve squadron, flies the sophisticated F/A-18 Hornet. Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 49, Detachment A, provides maintenance and supply functions necessary to maintain a force in readiness.

The 9/11 Commission Report admits that a fighter jet was scrambled from Andrews AFB and airborne at 10:38, roughly an hour after the Pentagon was hit. The justification that it was not scrambled earlier, before the Pentagon was struck, was that this lone fighter jet was not armed with any missiles and was flying “weapons free”. Therefore, this justified the decision to scramble from Langley, despite the fact that there should have been “two combat-ready reserve units at Andrews AFB” who should have been able to provide “capable and ready response forces for the District of Columbia in the event of a natural disaster or civil emergency.”
The CBC reported:

There is one pilot who received a shoot-down order, but he was not in a position to execute it. Marc Sasseville flies out of Andrews Air Force Base, just a few kilometres from the White House. He received the order not through the proper military channels, but directly from the Secret Service in the White House bunker with the Vice President. Desperate to get some protection over Washington, he took off in the only jet available, which was unarmed. If he encountered a hijacked aircraft, his plan was to ram it with his F-16 and try to eject at the last minute. "Well, I would have one hand on the stick and one hand on the ejection handle and, hopefully, I could play it right to get out after I hit the airplane. Basically, I would try and swing my wing into his and knock the engine pod off, or cut the wing if I could get going fast enough. And I would use my fuselage to do that, but pretty soon after that my aerodynamics capabilities would be destroyed and then, if I could have ejected, I would have."

[NOTE 2] - About the 9/11 Commission

Though a full investigation into 9/11 was opposed by the U.S. Government, the families of victims demanded an independent investigation to answer their questions, resulting in the 9/11 Commission Report. Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton gave assurances that their Commission “sought to be independent, impartial, thorough, and nonpartisan.”

Philip D. Zelikow, a Republican, was named the executive director and arguably had the most influence and control over the investigation and the final report. Zelikow picked the areas of investigation, the briefing materials, the topic for hearings, the witnesses, and the lines of questioning for the witnesses. In essence, Zelikow set the agenda and ran the investigation. Though Kean and Hamilton were the public faces on the report, Zelikow was in charge of overseeing the writing of the staff reports, many of which went practically unchanged into the final report. The commissioners were responsible for questioning witnesses, yet it was Zelikow’s staff who determined what information from these interviews would be included. The “dedicated professional staff, headed by Philip Zelikow, has contributed innumerable hours to the completion of this report” after conducting “the exacting investigative work upon which the Commission has built.”

Philip Zelikow had been very closely associated with the Bush White House. He was on the National Security Council in the Bush I administration, where both he and Condoleezza Rice served as aides to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. During the Clinton years, while the Republicans were out of office, he and Rice co-authored a book. Zelikow also directed the Aspen Strategy Group, which involved Rice and Scowcroft as well as, among others, Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz. Then, he served on the national Security Council’s team for the transition between the Clinton and Bush II administrations. In this role, he provided recommendations for Rice, who was becoming the National Security Advisor to the president. Shortly after 9/11, Zelikow was appointed to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, on which he served until becoming executive director of the 9/11 Commission in 2003.

Because of his close ties to the Bush White House, Zelikow’s appointment was controversial from the outset. The Family Steering Committee for the 9/11 Commission, in fact, repeatedly called for Zelikow’s removal. The families were saying, in effect, that Zelikow’s appointment made a mockery of the idea that the Commission was “independent”.

The questionable role of Zelikow on the 9/11 Commission explains how facts could be distorted to advance an account of 9/11 that was untrue, to cover up the fact that 9/11 was an inside job.

Kean’s Commission selected four representatives as its review team to “examine the core group of Presidential Daily Brief articles made up of those that are plainly critical to the Commission’s investigation . . .

Chairman Kean, Vice Chairman and former Congressman Lee Hamilton, Commissioner Jamie Gorelick, and Staff Executive Director Philip Zelikow will review Bush’s sensitive PDBs. . . . Only Kean, Hamilton, Gorelick, and staff member Zelikow may view their own notes--and only at the White House.

Commissioner Jamie S. Gorelick played a leading role in the investigation and had numerous conflicts of interest. She currently serves as a Bush Administration Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) National Security Advisory panel member and also as a member of President Bush’s Review of Intelligence panel, thus providing the CIA with a
direct or circuitous liaison on the Commission while also affording the Bush Administration with a direct link to the Commission and its flow of evidence procurement. In February 2000, she was elected to the board of directors of United Technologies Corp. (NYSE: UTX). Then in April 2005, United Technologies sold its Falk Corp gear and coupling unit to Rexnord Corp, part of Carlyle Group, for $295 million. Members of the Carlyle Group have many conflicts of interest due to their connections with politics and the White House and their ability to exploit profits from foreknowledge and influence of political events. The fact that George H. W. Bush works for the Carlyle group who benefited from the decisions of his son, represents glaring conflicts of interest. Both the defense and oil companies associated with the White House have profited from the War on Terror that 9/11 justified and represent clear motives for covering up the truth about 9/11. The connections between the defense and oil industries, the intelligence community, the Bush Administration and the 9/11 Commission represent a clear conflict of interest since all these groups benefited from the fabricated story.

[Note 3] – Extended Passage from George Orwell’s 1984


George Orwell’s 1984 explains how those in power are able to revise history even to the point where contradicting facts are reconciled with doublespeak.

1984:

Since about that time, war had been literally continuous, though strictly speaking it had not always been the same war. For several months during his childhood there had been confused street fighting in London itself, some of which he remembered vividly. But to trace out the history of the whole period, to say who was fighting whom at any given moment, would have been utterly impossible, since no written record, and no spoken word, ever made mention of any other alignment than the existing one. At this moment, for example, in 1984 (if it was 1984), Oceania was at war with Eurasia and in alliance with Eastasia. In no public or private utterance was it ever admitted that the three powers had at any time been grouped along different lines. Actually, as Winston well knew, it was only four years
since Oceania had been at war with Eastasia and in alliance with Eurasia.
But that was merely a piece of furtive knowledge which he happened to
possess because his memory was not satisfactorily under control.
Officially the change of partners had never happened. Oceania was at war
with Eurasia: therefore Oceania had always been at war with Eurasia. The
enemy of the moment always represented absolute evil, and it followed
that any past or future agreement with him was impossible.

The frightening thing, he reflected for the ten thousandth time as he forced
his shoulders painfully backward (with hands on hips, they were gyrating
their bodies from the waist, an exercise that was supposed to be good for
the back muscles) -- the frightening thing was that it might all be true. If
the Party could thrust its hand into the past and say of this or that event, it
never happened -- that, surely, was more terrifying than mere torture and
death?

The Party said that Oceania had never been in alliance with Eurasia. He,
Winston Smith, knew that Oceania had been in alliance with Eurasia as
short a time as four years ago. But where did that knowledge exist? Only
in his own consciousness, which in any case must soon be annihilated.
And if all others accepted the lie which the Party imposed -if all records
told the same tale -- then the lie passed into history and became truth.
'Who controls the past,' ran the Party slogan, 'controls the future: who
controls the present controls the past.' And yet the past, though of its
nature alterable, never had been altered. Whatever was true now was true
from everlasting to everlasting. It was quite simple. All that was needed
was an unending series of victories over your own memory. 'Reality
control', they called it: in Newspeak, 'doublethink'.

'Stand easy!' barked the instructress, a little more genially.

Winston sank his arms to his sides and slowly refilled his lungs with air.
His mind slid away into the labyrinthine world of doublethink. To know
and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling
carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which
cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of
them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim
to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the
 guardian of democracy, to forget whatever it was necessary to forget, then
to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and
then promptly to forget it again: and above all, to apply the same process
to the process itself. That was the ultimate subtlety: consciously to induce
unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become unconscious of the act
of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the word
'doublethink' involved the use of doublethink.
“Norman Mineta testified to the 9/11 Commission that the observed Dick Cheney in an underground bunker when a young aide came up to him and repeatedly told him, sir it’s 50 miles out, sir it’s 30 miles out, sir it’s 10 miles out, sir do the orders still stand? Cheney turned around jumped on and nearly bit off his head and said of course the orders still stand, have you heard anything different? The order had to be to not shoot down the plane that was approaching the Pentagon. After all, the order should have been to shoot it down. Shooting it down would be the obvious thing to do when you consider that you’re going to lose the passengers and the plane if you shoot it down, but if you don’t, you’re going to lose the passengers and the plane, and also of course, all the personnel and property of the target.”


The 9/11 Commission Report

At 9:34, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House. American 77 was then 5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon and began a 330-degree turn. At the end of the turn, it was descending through 2,200 feet, pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington. The hijacker piloted then advanced the throttles to maximum power and drove toward the Pentagon.

At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, traveling at approximately 530 miles per hour. All on board, as well as many civilian and military personnel in the building, were killed.

At 9:34, the plane was 5 miles out and would have traveled 45 miles in about 8 minutes according to Mineta’s timeline. Assuming the plane traveled at 400mph, it would have
taken almost 7 minutes for the plane to travel 45 miles. From this calculation, Mineta’s timeline is accurate to within a couple of minutes.

**[NOTE 6] – Passage from the 9/11 Commission Report**


9/11 Commission Report:

“At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the aircraft was at 7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon. At 9:32, controllers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed." This was later determined to have been Flight 77.”


9/11 Commission Report:

**Military Notification and Response.** NORAD heard nothing about the search for American 77. Instead, the NEADS air defenders heard renewed reports about a plane that no longer existed: American 11.

At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the FAA:

**FAA:** Military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards-heading towards Washington.

**NEADS:** Okay. American 11 is still in the air?

**FAA:** Yes.

**NEADS:** On its way towards Washington?

**FAA:** That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That's the latest report we have.

**NEADS:** Okay.
FAA: I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.

NEADS: Okay. So American 11 isn't the hijack at all then, right?

FAA: No, he is a hijack.

NEADS: He-American 11 is a hijack?

FAA: Yes.

NEADS: And he's heading into Washington?

FAA: Yes. This could be a third aircraft. The mention of a "third aircraft" was not a reference to American 77. There was confusion at that moment in the FAA. Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington that American 11 was still airborne. We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information.

The NEADS technician who took this call from the FAA immediately passed the word to the mission crew commander, who reported to the NEADS battle commander:

Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he's heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.

After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued the order at 9:23: "Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area . . . [I]f they're there then we'll run on them . . . These guys are smart." That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24. Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York. The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between the reported southbound American 11 and the nation's capital.

At the suggestion of the Boston Center's military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA's Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS: "We're looking—we also lost American 77." The time was 9:34. This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was
missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.

At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington: "Latest report. Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away." This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters: "Okay, we're going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House." He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean. "I don't care how many windows you break," he said. "Damn it. . . . Okay. Push them back." 152

The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target or the target's location. Second, a "generic" flight plan-prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly—incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles. Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go "090 for 60" superseded the original scramble order. 153

After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington, D.C. Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but "it kind of faded" over Washington. The time was 9:38. The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46. The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away. 154

[NOTE 8] – Sections of the Vanity Fair Article relating to Phantom AA 11


Vanity Fair:

9:21:37

DOOLEY: Another hijack! It's headed towards Washington!
NASYPANY: Shit! Give me a location.


This report, received from Colin Scoggins at Boston Center, will set off a major escalation in the military response to the attack, resulting in the launch of additional armed fighter jets. But 20 months later, when the military presents to the 9/11 commission what is supposed to be a full accounting of the day, omitted from the official time line is any mention of this reported hijacking and the fevered chase it engenders.

... The call that sets off the latest alarm ("Another hijack! It's headed towards Washington!") comes from Boston and is wholly confounding: according to Scoggins, the Boston manager, American 11, the plane they believed was the first one to hit the World Trade Center, is actually still flying—still hijacked—and now heading straight for D.C. Whatever hit the first tower, it wasn't American 11.

The chase is on for what will turn out to be a phantom plane.

9:21:50

NASYPANY: O.K. American Airlines is still airborne—11, the first guy. He's heading towards Washington. O.K., I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I'm—I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis and try to chase this guy down if I can find him.

Arnold and Marr approve scrambling the two planes at Langley, along with a third unarmed trainer, and Nasypany sets the launch in motion.

It's a mistake, of course. American 11 was, indeed, the plane that hit the first tower. The confusion will persist for hours, however. In Boston, it is Colin Scoggins who has made the mistaken call.

"When we phoned United [after the second tower was hit], they confirmed that United 175 was down, and I think they confirmed that within two or three minutes," Scoggins, the go-to guy at Boston Center for all things military, later told me. "With American Airlines, we could never confirm if it was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds."

An unwieldy conference call between F.A.A. centers had been established, and Scoggins was monitoring it when the word came across—from whom or where isn't clear—that American 11 was thought to be headed for
Washington. Scroggins told me he thinks that the problem started with someone overheard trying to confirm from American whether American 11 was down—that somewhere in the flurry of information zipping back and forth during the conference call this transmogrified into the idea that a different plane had hit the tower, and that American 11 was still hijacked and still in the air. The plane's course, had it continued south past New York in the direction it was flying before it dipped below radar coverage, would have had it headed on a straight course toward D.C. This was all controllers were going on; they were never tracking an actual plane on the radar after losing American 11 near Manhattan, but if it had been flying low enough, the plane could have gone undetected. "After talking to a supervisor, I made the call and said [American 11] is still in the air, and it's probably somewhere over New Jersey or Delaware heading for Washington, D.C.," Scroggins told me.

[NOTE 9] – 9/11 Commission Hearing – Ben-Veniste questions Arnold


9/11 Commission Hearing:

BEN-VENISTE: Let me direct my remaining time to General Eberhart and General Arnold.

Why did no one mention the false report received from FAA that flight 11 was heading south during your initial appearance before the 9/11 Commission back in May of last year? And why was there no report to us that, contrary to the statements made at the time, that there had been no notification to NORAD that flight 77 was a hijack?

ARNOLD: Well, the first part of your -- Mr. Commissioner, first of all, I'd like to say that a lot of the information that you have found out in your study of this, of the 9/11 -- things that happened on that day -- helped us reconstruct what was going on.

If you're talking about the American 11 in particular, the call of the American 11 -- is that what you're referring to?

BEN-VENISTE: Yes.

ARNOLD: The American 11 that was called after it impacted, is that what you're referring to?
BEN-VENISTE: No. I'm talking about the fact that there was miscommunication that flight 11 was still heading south instead of having impacted...

ARNOLD: That's what I'm referring to. That's correct.

As we worked with your committee in looking at that, that was probably the point in time where we were concerned -- remember, that call, as I recall, actually came after United 175, as well as American 11, had already impacted the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center. Then we became very concerned -- not knowing what the call signs of those aircraft were that had hit the World Trade Center, we became very concerned at that particular point that those aircraft -- that some aircraft might be heading toward Washington, D.C.

BEN-VENISTE: General, is it not a fact that the failure to call our attention to the miscommunication and the notion of a phantom flight 11 continuing from New York City south, in fact, skewed the whole reporting of 9/11? It skewed the official Air Force report, which is contained in a book called "Air War Over America," which does not contain any information about the fact that you were following or thinking of a continuation of flight 11 and that you had not received notification that flight 77 had been hijacked?

ARNOLD: Well, as I recall, first of all, I didn't know the call signs of the airplanes when these things happened. When the call came that American 11 was a possible hijacked aircraft, that aircraft just led me to come to a conclusion that there were other aircraft in the system that were a threat to the United States.

BEN-VENISTE: General Arnold, surely by May of last year, when you testified before this commission, you knew those facts.

ARNOLD: I didn't recall those facts in May of last year. That's the correct answer to that.

In fact, as I recall, during that time frame, my concern was why did -- the question that came to me was, "Why did we scramble the aircraft out of Langley Air Force Base, the F-16s out of Langley Air Force Base?"

And there had been statements made by some that we scrambled that aircraft at a report of American 77, which was not the case and I knew that. And I was trying to remember in my own mind, what was it that persuaded us to scramble those aircraft.
And I thought at the time it was United 93. But as I was able to -- we did not have the times when we were notified of this. I did not have that information at that time.

BEN-VENISTE: General Arnold,....

ARNOLD: It didn't happen.

We scrambled those aircraft to get them over Washington, D.C., to protect Washington, D.C.

BEN-VENISTE: According to our staff, you know that there was a substantial problem in getting information from NORAD; that we received information, we were told that the information was complete, we went out into the field -- our staff did and did a number of interviews.

And as a result of those interviews, we found that there were tapes which reflected the facts relating to flight 11. And we found additional information by which we were able, through assiduous and painstaking work, listening to any number of tape recordings, to reconstruct what actually occurred as you have heard in the staff statement.

I take it you have no disagreement with the facts put forward in the staff statement. That's been produced in advance for comment and I take it you're in agreement now with our staff's conclusions with respect to those facts.

ARNOLD: I am.

BEN-VENISTE: We have -- and I'm not going to go through it, but it is disturbing to see that there were efforts at after-action reports, which were available shortly after 9/11.

There were communications which our staff has received with respect to e-mails that reflect some of the facts on nearly a contemporaneous basis with the 9/11 catastrophe, that reflect a story which unfortunately is different from the one which was presented to this commission earlier.

When you and General Eberhart were asked about the existence of tape recordings reflecting these open line communications, both of you indicated that you had such -- no such recollections.

EBERHART: Mr. Commissioner, I think it's important to note that I did not testify in front of this commission. So to say that I said that that day is categorically wrong.
BEN-VENISTE: I'm sorry, sir. I'm sorry. You are correct. I will refer to General Arnold's comments, both with respect to...

KEAN: This is the last question, Commissioner.

BEN-VENISTE: Thank you.

EBERHART: Yes. The Northeast Air Defense sector apparently had a tape that we were unaware of at the time. And you're -- and to the best of my knowledge, what I've been told by your staff is that they were unable to make that tape run.

BEN-VENISTE: I'm told...

EBERHART: Though they were later able to -- your staff was able, through a contractor, to get that tape to run.

And so, to the best of my knowledge, that was an accurate statement in May that I did not know of any tape recordings. If I would have had them available to me, it certainly would have been -- I would have been able to give you more accurate information.

Our focus was on when the events occurred, and we did not focus on when we -- we didn't have a record -- I did not have a record of when we had been told different things.

[NOTE 10] – Clinton on Fox News

http://youtube.com/watch?v=aPyQ4Ae6Ei0


Fox News:

CLINTON: But at least I tried. That’s the difference in me and some, including all the right-wingers who are attacking me now. They ridiculed me for trying. They had eight months to try. They did not try. I tried.

So I tried and failed. When I failed, I left a comprehensive anti-terror strategy and the best guy in the country, Dick Clarke, who got demoted.

So you did Fox's bidding on this show. You did your nice little conservative hit job on me.
[NOTE 11] – United 93 Crash Site

In addition to the accounts which acknowledged military notification of United 93 long before the supposed heroic actions were taken by the passengers, all anyone has to do is look at the pictures of the crash site to see that a Boeing 757 did not crash land there. There is overwhelming evidence to prove that United 93 did not crash land and was therefore likely shot down by the military.\textsuperscript{115}

Instead of admitting that Flight 93 was shot down, the 9/11 Commission Report describes a series of bizarre cell phone and airphones calls that were made by the passengers who described their plan to overtake the cockpit from the hijackers. The CBC (Canada’s Public Television Station), with host Evan Solomon, investigated the claims about the cell phone calls in their September 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2006 exposé into the so called “9/11 Conspiracies”.

CBC:\textsuperscript{116}

EVEN SOLOMAN: Critics have another claim about Flight 93. The cell phone calls made by passengers to loved ones, were not technically possible. Why not? Cell phones, they allege, do not work over 30,000 feet.

DAVID RAY GRIFFIN: Flight 93 was evidently above 30,000 feet. So it would have been completely impossible. This is very strong evidence that all these cell phone calls were fabricated. And if the cell phone calls were, then probably the airphone calls were too.

EVEN SOLOMAN: In fact, we recently tried to use our cell phones on a flight over Washington and could not get a signal at all. So what do defenders of the official story say?

JIM MEIGS (POPULAR MECHANICS): We talked to leading engineers across the cell phone industry, and they told us that cell phone work, not perfectly, but reasonably well in airplanes up to 35,000 feet and more.

Washington Post:\textsuperscript{117}

Miller was among the very first to arrive after 10:06 on the magnificently sunny morning of September 11. He was stunned at how small the
smoking crater looked, he says, "like someone took a scrap truck, dug a 10-foot ditch and dumped all this trash into it." Once he was able to absorb the scene, Miller says, "I stopped being coroner after about 20 minutes, because there were no bodies there."

Miller, who was the local coroner, told the Houston Chronicle that "it just looked like somebody just dropped a bunch of metal out of the sky".118

From the pictures of the crash site and the eyewitness accounts119, it is clear that a plane did not crash land in field, but that the plane must have exploded in the air to disperse the debris over a large distance instead of localized at a crash site. This only leaves the possibility that a bomb on board the plane exploded or that it was shot down by the F16 that some claim was in hot pursuit of the aircraft.

There is also one picture of supposedly the smoke plume emanating from the crater just after Flight 93 supposedly crashed.120 There is a strange story behind this picture, but essentially, the smoke plume resembles an ordnance blast plume, not smoke from a plane crash. Research done by the Killtown website also explains that there are other problems with this picture. Considering the location and direction from where the picture was taken, the smoke plume did not line up with the supposed crash site. Also, the relative size of the smoke plume is far too large in the photograph considering the distance from the crash site.121

[NOTE 12] - 9/11 Commission Report:


9/11 Commission Report:

At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency: "Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board." The controller understood, but chose to respond: "Calling Cleveland Center, you're unreadable. Say again, slowly." He notified his supervisor, who passed the notice up the chain of command. By 9:34, word of the hijacking had reached FAA headquarters.160
FAA headquarters had by this time established an open line of communication with the Command Center at Herndon and instructed it to poll all its centers about suspect aircraft. The Command Center executed the request and, a minute later, Cleveland Center reported that "United 93 may have a bomb on board. "At 9:34, the Command Center relayed the information concerning United 93 to FAA headquarters. At approximately 9:36, Cleveland advised the Command Center that it was still tracking United 93 and specifically inquired whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter aircraft to intercept the aircraft. Cleveland even told the Command Center it was prepared to contact a nearby military base to make the request. The Command Center told Cleveland that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue.  

[NOTE 13] - Cynthia McKinney

VIDEO: http://www.prisonplanet.com/video/McKinney2.rm

Transcript of Representative Cynthia McKinney's Exchange with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers, and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Tina Jonas, March 11th, 2005

Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld in House Hearing on FY06 Dept. of Defense Budget
Chairman Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) and witnesses Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and JCS Chairman General Richard Myers hold a House Hearing on the FY 2006 Budget for the Department of Defense and Military Services.
3/11/2005: WASHINGTON, DC: 2 hr. 5 min.

CMK: Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney (D-GA)
DR: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
RM: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers
TJ: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Tina Jonas
DH: Chairman Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA)

25:20
CMK: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I watched President Bush deliver a moving speech at the United Nations in September 2003, in which he mentioned the crisis of the sex trade. The President called for the punishment of those involved in this horrible business. But at the very moment of that speech, DynCorp was exposed for having been involved in the buying and selling of young women and children. While all of this was going on, DynCorp kept the Pentagon contract to administer the smallpox and anthrax vaccines, and is now working on a plague vaccine through the
Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program. Mr. Secretary, is it [the] policy of the
U.S. Government to reward companies that traffic in women and little
girls?

That's my first question. My second question, Mr. Secretary: according to
the Comptroller General of the United States, there are serious financial
management problems at the Pentagon, to which Mr. Cooper alluded.

Fiscal Year 1999: $2.3 trillion missing.

Fiscal Year 2000, $1.1 trillion missing.

And DoD is the number one reason why the government can't balance its
checkbook. The Pentagon has claimed year after year that the reason it
can't account for the money is because its computers don't communicate
with each other.

My second question, Mr. Secretary, is who has the contracts today, to
make those systems communicate with each other? How long have they
had those contracts, and how much have the taxpayers paid for them?

Finally Mr. Secretary, after the last Hearing, I thought that my office was
promised a written response to my question regarding the four wargames
on September 11th. I have not yet received that response, but would like
for you to respond to the questions that I've put to you today. And then I
do expect the written response to my previous question - hopefully by the
end of the week.

27:26

DR: Thank you, Representative. First, the answer to your first question is,
is, no, absolutely not, the policy of the United States Government is clear,
unambiguous, and opposed to the activities that you described. The second
question -

CMK: Well how do you explain the fact that DynCorp and its successor
companies have received and continue to receive government contracts?

DR: I would have to go and find the facts, but there are laws and rules and
regulations with respect to government contracts, and there are times that
corporations do things they should not do, in which case they tend to be
suspended for some period; there are times then that the - under the laws
and the rules and regulations for the - passed by the Congress and
implemented by the Executive branch - that corporations can get off of -
out of the penalty box if you will, and be permitted to engage in contracts
with the government. They're generally not barred in perpetuity -
CMK: This contract - this company - was never in the penalty box. If you could proceed to my second question, please.

DR: The second question - I've forgotten what the second question was.

CMK: I think Ms. Jonas knows it.

DR: Okay.

29:00

TJ: Thank you Ms. McKinney. I appreciate the question and I appreciate your interest in our Department's financial condition. We are working very hard on that program. I've just come back, recently -

CMK: I understand that you're working hard on it, but my question was who has the contract? How long have they had that contract, and how much money have we spent on it?

TJ: There are - In general we spend about $20 billion dollars in the Department on information technology systems. The accounting systems are part of that. I can get you the exact number for the record, of what we spend on our current, what we call "legacy systems," and those that we're moving toward.

CMK: And who has the contract?

TJ: That would be a multitude of individuals that have -

CMK: Could you name some, please?

TJ: Well, I think of the top of the, off the top of my head, well, I would rather not; I'd rather provide that for the record.

CMK: That's not privileged information, is it?

TJ: I'm sure it's not.

CMK: Well, please. We still have time, so, please.

TJ: I would be glad to provide for the record; I don't want to talk from the top of my head and be incorrect.

DR: On your first question, I'm advised by DR. Chu that it was not the corporation that was engaged in the activities you characterized but I'm told it was an employee of the corporation, and it was some years ago in the Balkans that that took place.
CMK: It's my understanding that it continues to take place, and that -

DR: Is that right?

CMK: Yes.

DR: Well if you can give me information to that effect, we will -

CMK: I'm sure you are interested in all of the information that I have and I'll be more than happy to provide it to you.

DR: Good. Thank you.

CMK: But I would also like to get information from you, for example, the information that I just requested about who has those contracts.

DH: Let me assure the gentlelady that we'll make sure that this exchange of information takes place and that, Mr. Secretary if you can get back with us on the DynCorp -

DR: We will -

DH: - story, we'll get that to the gentlelady.

CMK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DR: We'll get back on both of the first two questions but the Congresswoman has raised the other question twice now, and I'd like to have general Myers respond, because you mentioned it in the last Hearing and I think it'd be helpful to get the answer even though we're on red, if you don't mind, Mr. Chairman?

DH: General Myers, go right ahead.

CMK: But I would like to have the answer in writing as well, as I thought my office was promised.

RM: Okay I don't know about the promise, Congresswoman, but could you repeat the question to make sure I'm answering the right question; this is a 9/11 question.

31:25
CMK: The question was, we had four wargames going on on September 11th, and the question that I tried to pose before the Secretary had to go to lunch was whether or not the activities of the four wargames going on on September 11th actually impaired our ability to respond to the attacks.
RM: The answer to the question is no, it did not impair our response, in fact General Eberhart who was in the command of the North American Aerospace Defense Command as he testified in front of the 9/11 Commission I believe - I believe he told them that it enhanced our ability to respond, given that NORAD didn't have the overall responsibility for responding to the attacks that day. That was an FAA responsibility. But they were two CPXs; there was one Department of Justice exercise that didn't have anything to do with the other three; and there was an actual operation ongoing because there was some Russian bomber activity up near Alaska. So we -

CMK: Let me ask you this, then: who was in charge of managing those wargames?

DH: General, why don't you give the best answer that you can here in a short a period of time and we'll - the gentlelady wants to get a written answer anyway, and then we can move on to other folks.

RM: The important thing to realize is that North American Aerospace Defense Command was responsible. These are command post exercises; what that means is that all the battle positions that are normally not filled are indeed filled; so it was an easy transition from an exercise into a real world situation. It actually enhanced the response; otherwise, it would take somewhere between 30 minutes and a couple of hours to fill those positions, those battle stations, with the right staff officers.

CMK: Mr. Chairman, begging your indulgence, was September Eleventh declared a National Security Special Event day?

RM: I have to look back; I do not know. Do you mean after the fact, or

CMK: No. Because of the activities going on that had been scheduled at the United Nations that day.

RM: I'd have to go back and check. I don't know.

[NOTE 14] – War on Waste, $2.3 Trillion


Below is the entire CBS article, The War on Waste, since the article reveals shocking amounts of money missing and damaging testimony that has been largely overlooked and provides clear motive for Cheney allowing the plane to strike the Pentagon.
On Sept. 10, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared war. Not on foreign terrorists, "the adversary's closer to home. It's the Pentagon bureaucracy," he said.

He said money wasted by the military poses a serious threat.

"In fact, it could be said it's a matter of life and death," he said.

Rumsfeld promised change but the next day – Sept. 11-- the world changed and in the rush to fund the war on terrorism, the war on waste seems to have been forgotten.

Just last week President Bush announced, "my 2003 budget calls for more than $48 billion in new defense spending."

More money for the Pentagon, CBS News Correspondent Vince Gonzales reports, while its own auditors admit the military cannot account for 25 percent of what it spends.

"According to some estimates we cannot track $2.3 trillion in transactions," Rumsfeld admitted.

$2.3 trillion — that's $8,000 for every man, woman and child in America. To understand how the Pentagon can lose track of trillions, consider the case of one military accountant who tried to find out what happened to a mere $300 million.

"We know it's gone. But we don't know what they spent it on," said Jim Minnery, Defense Finance and Accounting Service.

Minnery, a former Marine turned whistle-blower, is risking his job by speaking out for the first time about the millions he noticed were missing from one defense agency's balance sheets. Minnery tried to follow the money trail, even crisscrossing the country looking for records.

"The director looked at me and said 'Why do you care about this stuff?' It took me aback, you know? My supervisor asking me why I care about doing a good job," said Minnery.

He was reassigned and says officials then covered up the problem by just writing it off.

"They have to cover it up," he said. "That's where the corruption comes in. They have to cover up the fact that they can't do the job."
The Pentagon's Inspector General "partially substantiated" several of Minnery's allegations but could not prove officials tried "to manipulate the financial statements."

Twenty years ago, Department of Defense Analyst Franklin C. Spinney made headlines exposing what he calls the "accounting games." He's still there, and although he does not speak for the Pentagon, he believes the problem has gotten worse.

"Those numbers are pie in the sky. The books are cooked routinely year after year," he said.

Another critic of Pentagon waste, Retired Vice Admiral Jack Shanahan, commanded the Navy's 2nd Fleet the first time Donald Rumsfeld served as Defense Secretary, in 1976.

In his opinion, "With good financial oversight we could find $48 billion in loose change in that building, without having to hit the taxpayers."

**[NOTE 15] – Questions for Skeptics**

Skeptics still maintain that Norman Mineta is only one man. Skeptics are therefore faced with the option of 9/11 being an inside job, or that Mineta was terribly confused. People who cannot fathom their government committing such atrocities find more comfort in believing that Mineta’s testimony is grossly inaccurate when faced with the horrifying alternative. Mineta’s testimony clearly places Cheney in the PEOC before the Pentagon was struck. Both Richard Clark and David Bohrer also corroborate that Cheney was in the PEOC before 9:37.

Skeptics who still doubt this logic by making irrational arguments will be unable to adequately answer the following three questions.

1. Did Mineta witness a conversation between a “young man” and Dick Cheney where the “young man” said “the plane is 50 miles out”? (Yes/No)

This question is normally answered “yes”, even by the most extreme skeptics. To argue that no young man ever came in and said those words, you would have to be under the belief that this conversation occurred in Norman Mineta’s imagination and that no young
man ever said those words to Cheney. The other alternative is that he knowingly lied in his testimony by fabricating an event that he claimed to witness, knowing it was not true, with no apparent motive.

2. Did Mineta witness this conversation before or after the Pentagon was hit? (Before/After)

If skeptics answer “before”, this puts Cheney in the PEOC before 9:37. This would directly contradict the 9/11 Commission Report. So if a skeptic answers “before” the official timeline is proven wrong, without having to prove that the plane in question was the one approaching the Pentagon.

So the only option for a skeptic is to answer “after”. This answer obviously implies that the plane that was “50 miles out” was therefore not the plane that hit the Pentagon, and that the “young man” was referring to a different plane.

There is no other possible answer to this second question. It must either be one or the other, before or after. So if a skeptic answers that they “don’t know”, you have to walk them through the only two possibilities. If they answer “before” it contradicts the 9/11 Commission’s timeline, therefore their only option is to pick “after” so as to not contradict the official story. The most effective way to force an answer to this question is to say that ‘the 9/11 commission report states that Cheney entered the PEOC after the Pentagon was struck. Are you therefore saying you “don’t know” if the 9/11 Commission Report is accurate?’ Once a skeptic answers ‘yes’ to question 1, and ‘after’ to question 2, they will be unable to answer the third question.

3. If this conversation occurred after the Pentagon was hit, why would Mineta think that the young man and Cheney were discussing the plane approaching the Pentagon?

By answering “yes” to question 1 and “after” to question 2, it implies the following series of events: The WTC towers are hit, the pentagon is hit, then after this, a young man says to Cheney “the plane is 50 miles out”. Why would Mineta think they were talking about
the plane approaching the Pentagon if this conversation occurred after the Pentagon was already hit? It makes no sense at all. He clearly states that he heard the young man say that the plane was 50 miles out, “during the time that the airplane coming into the Pentagon.” A skeptic would at the very least have to admit that it would be unlikely or strange that Mineta’s recollection of these major events could be so skewed.

4. Explain the many glaring contradictions between Clarke’s account and the 9/11 Commission Report.

References

* View the following link for a complete copy of the 9/11 Commission Final Report in .pdf format. This is an identical copy of the published text so that page numbers correspond to the references rather than an .html version of the referenced Chapter.

Complete 9/11 Commission Report. .PDF, (7.4MB)


VIDEO: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDfdOwt2v3Y


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3610.01A, June 1, 2001, “Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects” ([www.dtic.mil](http://www.dtic.mil)).


Senate Armed Services Committee. *U.S. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) Holds Hearing on nomination of General Richard Myers to be Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Washington D.C., September 13, 2001. The portion of this interview in question is printed in Meyssan, 9/11: The Big Lie, 164-63.


YouTube. VIDEO: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDfdOwt2v3Y


CNN. Lou Dobbs Tonight. Aired August 9, 2006 - 18:00 ET


Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Ur2uV_PYw


Richard Clarke. Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror. 2004. pp. 3-4. [link]
NBC. Meet the Press. Sunday 16 September 2001. 10:00 AM ET. [link]
Vanity Fair. 9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes. By: Michael Bronner. August 2006. [link]
The Toronto Star. The scene at NORAD on Sept. 11: Playing Russian war games ... and then someone shouted to look at the monitor. By: Scott Simmie. December 9th, 2001. [link]
Paul Thompson. Cooperative Research. [link]
Killtown. Did Flight 77 Really Crash Into the Pentagon? – Pentagon Fatalities. [link]
101 Project For A New American Century. *Rebuilding America's Defenses*. September 2000. (Statement is on page 63/90 in PDF. Page number on document is 51)  
http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf

http://www.911truth.org/article.php?story=20050523112738404


113 The Iron Triangle - The Carlyle Group Exposed  
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=7094545816220336237

http://video.google.ca/videoplay?docid=-6621486727392146155


http://www.911podcasts.com/files/video/CBCSunday_20060910.wmv

118 Huston Chronicle. *Vignettes: They were there*. September 8th, 2002.

119 Truth911.net. *United 93 - No Wreckage at Crash Site*
http://www.members.shaw.ca/truth911/truth911/crashsite1.htm

120 Truth911.net. *United 93 – Smoke Plume*
http://www.members.shaw.ca/truth911/truth911/smokeplume.htm

121 Killtown. *Val McClatchey Photo: More Smoking Guns, or Total Fraud?*
http://flight93photo.blogspot.com/2006/07/val-mcclatchey-photo-more-smoking-guns.html