1. See Block, Flanagan, and Güzeldere 1997, section 9, for some of the key papers and citations of others.

2. This concept derives ultimately from *Situations and Attitudes* (Barwise and Perry 1999), in particular the relational account of meaning and the “fallacy of misplaced information,” and more recently from work with David Israel on information (see Israel and Perry 1990, 1991; Perry and Israel 1991), with Mark Crimmins on belief-attribution (Crimmins and Perry 1989) and work on the philosophy of mind and language (Perry 1993, 1977, 1979, 1990, 1997b, 1997c, 2001).

3. Chewing on zinc-coated nails is usually, perhaps always, an accident. One gets into the habit of storing a supply of nails in one’s mouth while working and then becomes involved in a project that uses roofing nails, which are often zinc-coated, and unthinkingly pops some into one’s mouth.

4. I’m not claiming this to really be a Latin term, merely to sound as if it ought to be Latin for “thing to which something is applied.”

5. One might argue that if conscious events are physical they must have *some* physical effects, if not as a matter of logic, then as a matter of very basic physical principles. I do not think this should affect the main point I’m trying to make about Chalmers’ argument. At least an unreflective physicalist might be an epiphenomenalist; such a physicalist could fit in the upper left entry of table 4.1, even if his views are ultimately not quite coherent.

6. One might argue that valves are pretty important, because one thing valves have in common is a certain role in the lives of beings with minds. Perhaps then there being valves implies the existence of things with minds.
So if minds are nonphysical, valves imply dualism. But then we might as well think about minds directly and not take a detour through valves. To return to the theological point of view, if minds are physical, then God didn’t have to work on Friday to decide which objects get to be valves. If minds are not physical, then as long as he spends Friday deciding what minds are like, valves will be taken care of.

7. See Shoemaker 1997 for the history of the argument as well as an extremely subtle analysis of its use against functionalism. At the end of his postscript, Shoemaker arrives at the conclusion that one can maintain a version of functionalism in the face of the inverted spectrum argument only by giving up a bit of common sense: that it makes sense to ask if your color experiences and mine are qualitatively the same. He opts to stick with functionalism and abandon that bit of common sense where I would make the opposite choice.

8. This means that Mary must not have red hair and must not have cut herself, etc.—but exactly how Jackson guarantees that is not our problem.

9. The experiment might put her at risk on this score; perhaps some parts of her color vision system would atrophy from disuse. This is probably not the biggest problem a human subjects committee would have with this experiment.

10. Smart says that Black suggested the objection, not that he made it. Black was a connoisseur of logical and philosophical arguments in many areas in which he didn’t himself hold a fixed position.

11. The Pacific APA is usually held in the San Francisco Bay area every other year and usually meets at the Claremont Hotel. A good time is had by all.

12. For a study of the semantics of paper clips, see Israel and Perry 1990.

13. See Nida-Rümelin 1995. Nida-Rümelin’s room for her character Mari- ana is actually a whole house where the interior decoration includes only randomly colored artificial objects (no leaves or sunflowers or apples or tomatoes allowed).

14. Elwood picks up an interest in such matters by chapter 8.

15. See Evans 1973 for the concept of source and dominant source.

16. Donnellan calls the first content “attributive” and the second “referential.” This terminology doesn’t fit very well with mine. I try to use “reference” for indexicals and names and “denotation” for descriptions and
description-like phrases. I use “designates” and “stands for” as generic semantical relations.

17. I do not claim that the analyses of demonstratives and names incorporated into these examples are particularly sophisticated, only that they are plausible enough to make the point.

18. I often say “the reflexive content” when it would be more accurate to say “a reflexive content,” since there are many reflexive contents, corresponding to the many ways one can load some facts and leave others unloaded.

19. For a more fine-grained analysis, see Perry and Israel 1991.

20. Especially in the idea that “narrow content,” in Fodor’s sense (Fodor 1981), should amount to what I am calling “attributive subject matter content.”

21. For safety’s sake, one might want to include something about braking techniques, too, but I’ll ignore that here.

22. See (http://www.aiki.com) for information on this (and other) aikido moves.


24. Of course, it is not so easy to figure our how to do this, just as it is not easy to figure out how the phone company could add something to the phone book that would solve Terry’s problem. Here are the seeds for a positive argument that dualism, in some of its forms at least, is incoherent. But in this book I am confining myself to replying to the neo-dualist arguments.

25. This is not Faderman’s conclusion; see his Faderman 1997. I have also made it sound as if Faderman is fully committed to the ibex account, whereas his point is simply that it is a candidate with interesting philosophical implications.

26. Black Bart, Mark Twain, Bret Harte, Wells Fargo, Copperopolis, blue oaks, and California live oaks are all real, but the incident and the tree I made up.

27. The main problem with the system seems to me to be the obscurity that remains about what primary propositions are. As Ed Zalta has pointed out, it doesn’t help to say that the primary intension of “water” is “so and so” as long as “so and so” is also something that has both a secondary and primary intension. For problems with this kind of semantical approach and related issues, see Block and Stalnaker 1999. In this chapter, however, I am
trying to locate the sense of contingency the experience gap induces in us within Chalmers' semantic system, as I understand it, without adopting his dualism.

28. Such headlong retreat must be distinguished from the position that claims that the tools of thought and devices of language are in fact themselves the subject matter of thought and language. The confusion mentioned in chapter 6, of those who confound the theory of reflexive contents with the claim that everything is really metalinguistic, is an instance of this. I do not claim that we are thinking about our own ideas or talking about our own words. Arriving at this position would be like getting turned around while in retreat and backing across enemy lines.

29. This drew upon Locke the criticism from Thomas Dodwell and others that he thought the soul was only contingently rather than necessarily immortal, which in turn provoked the important debate between Anthony Collins (who attacked Dodwell and defended Locke) and Samuel Clarke (who attacked Locke and defended Dodwell). Many of the issues currently alive in the philosophy of consciousness are discussed insightfully, albeit from a somewhat different perspective, in these letters (Clarke and Collins 1711ff).